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SUMMARY 
Disruptive innovation has been a key concern of managers and academics alike for several 
decades. In recent years the rapid pace of innovation and change in ICT (Internet 
Communication and Telecom) industries has caused disruption to be frequent in some industries. 
Research on products, which have had a rapid lifecycle such as the computer disk drive, has 
paved the way to a modern detailed version of Schumpeter's creative disruption theory which 
also extends to aspects such as product architecture and systems integration. 
Christensen's disruptive innovation theory, based on a study of the disk drive industry, 
hypothesized that as incumbent producers attain technological maturity, they tend to surpass the 
needs of the mainstream clients in favor of their big account clients which continue to push the 
envelope with their specialized needs. As the incumbents overshoot, low-level entrants enter the 
market and cater only to non-consumers or those favoring flexibility or cost considerations over 
technological advancement. As the entrants advance their technological capabilities, they start to 
attract mainstream clients satisfying their needs but without the price premium that incumbents 
require for surpassing them. The incumbents' core competencies, focused on technological 
advancement, are then disrupted and the incumbents' lean and low-cost structures become the 
basis of a competitive position in the industry. The incumbents are eventually overthrown by the 
more competitive entrants. 
The shift of competitive advantages from technological advancement to cost and flexibility 
encourages the incumbents to open the product architecture to enable higher efficiencies and 
increased focus on cost reduction. This results in a change of the product architecture towards 
openness. 
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Chesbrough built on this theory further, also based on a study of the disk drive industry, 
hypothesizing that the openness of product architecture will only last for a limited period of time 
until the limits of the current product architecture are reached. Once this technological maturity 
is reached, an entrant often introduces a new technological platform that starts to overtake the 
market by its technological merits again. The product architecture will switch back towards 
closure to allow the developers to compete on product features and technological advancement. 
This phase will terminate by technological maturity, overshooting the needs of the mainstream 
clients and eventually opening of the product architecture again. This cyclical pattern continues 
to alternate throughout the lifecycle of a product. 
This study aimed at finding if disruptive innovation theory, described above, suits complex 
product system (CoPS) industries, taking the aviation training industry as an example of such 
industries. Following observations that the industry has attained technological maturity over the 
past few years, the disruptive innovation theory's anticipation of product architecture openness 
was tested. The broad research hypothesis was that the industry diverged from the behavior 
predicted by the theory for several reasons related to its attributes distinguishing it from appliance 
consumer electronics industries such as the disk drive industry studied in earlier research. 
To approach the study, three sub-industries were defined within the aviation training industry: the 
simulation product industry, the training products suite industry and the training services industry. 
The three sub-industries lie in increasing downstream order on the industry's value map. After 
assessing the industry's technological maturity, the effect of this maturity on the product 
architecture of each of these sub-industries was investigated. 
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Case-based research was conducted interviewing industry experts and collecting qualitative and 
quantitative data as well as reviewing published documents about the industry. The research 
findings have generally converged to demonstrate that the industry has indeed attained 
technological maturity as its players have met and even surpassed the product requirements of 
simulation technologies mandated by regulatory authorities. It was also established that it is these 
regulatory requirements that dictate the product features demanded by customers through their 
regulation of all the stages of the pilot training process. The existing simulation technologies 
readily meet the most stringent fidelity requirements, namely those prescribed for level D full 
flight simulators. Training conducted in these simulation products is considered by regulators as 
equal to actual flight time conducted on the aircraft. 
Industry incumbents, as predicted by disruptive innovation theory, have also started to overshoot 
the requirements of the average airline training facility. With advanced laser visual systems and 
electric motion actuators, the costs of operating and maintaining the simulators are constantly 
improving although with little effects on their fidelity. Concurrently, a number of low-level 
entrants started providing lower cost and higher flexibility simulation devices. This trend was 
especially favored by the parallel increase in the number of no-frills airlines and low-cost carriers. 
The lean operating model of these new customers favored stringent cost control and a shift on 
emphasis from technological advancement to cost. So far, the industry has behaved as predicted 
by the disruptive innovation theory. 
However, the divergence between the evolution of the industry and disruptive innovation theory 
came about in the incumbents' response to the disruption caused by new entrants' cost 
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advantages. While the theory would predict that the incumbents' market shares should have 
taken over by the entrants who will then open the product architecture to continue to drive down 
costs, incumbents actually closed the architecture of their products and services further into an 
integrated solution as a way to create superior value for their customers. 
i) At the individual simulation product level, the incumbents continued to drive their closed 
architecture around proprietary designs and lowered their costs through increased attention on 
supply chain optimization and longer-term agreements with their vendors. This helped them 
achieve significant economies on the costs of data and parts used for their simulators. They also 
developed lower-cost and higher flexibility LCD-based simulation devices leveraging their 
existing simulator libraries developed for full flight simulator projects and benefiting from the 
high computing power available on commercial off-the-shelf personal computers. Innovative 
pricing agreements were devised with data providers to lower the prices of these flexible 
procedure trainers enough to drive out a key entrant competitor WICAT Systems Inc. 
ii) At the product suite level, the incumbents packaged their full flight simulators and flexible 
procedure trainers into integrated training suites that ran the same simulation software seamlessly 
on multiple levels of devices. This feature was valued by many customers who traditionally 
suffered from the learn-unlearn cycles that were inevitable in the open architecture products suite 
industry where training providers traditionally acquired different devices from different vendors 
and provided differences training to bridge the gaps between the simulation fidelity levels. The 
new integrated training not only increased the quality of the training but also lowered the costs of 
upgrades and maintenance needed to keep the simulation devices fleet concurrent with the aircraft 
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fleet. The portability of the simulation software on the different product platforms ensured that 
modifications had to be done only once for an operator's suite of training devices. 
iii) At the training services level, the industry had an open product architecture with two distinct 
training phases: ab-initio and operational, consisting of type-rating and recurring. Ab-initio 
training enables a layman to fly an aircraft for commercial purposes. It is often conducted in 
small flying schools relying on single propeller engine aircraft for complementing classroom 
instruction of flight skills. Type-rating training prepares a licensed pilot for flying a particular 
type of aircraft type. Recurring training is the annual training mandated by regulators to maintain 
a pilot's flight license. Both type-rating and recurring training are often conducted at airlines 
training facilities and make heavy use of simulation equipment. A pilot's training career 
traditionally consisted of ab-initio training at an independent flight school, followed by type-
rating training and recurring training either at the employer's training center or at an independent 
training center. The objectives, technologies and methodologies of training differed significantly 
amongst the 3 phases resulting in a longer and more expensive training cycle that initially taught 
pilots some skills that they had to forget soon afterwards. The 3 phases were governed 
independently by regulatory guidelines that dictated their contents and desired outcomes. 
This open architecture of the training service has been recently changing through two parallel 
changes: the MPL license and the vertical integration of some independent training service 
providers into the ab-initio phase. The MPL (Multi-Pilot License) is currently being defined by 
an industry forum mandated by the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization). The 
license aims at training the pilots directly in a multi-crew setting, using increased simulation and 
on aircraft used by future airline employers from the very beginning of the training cycle. The 
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airlines' industry forecasted growth and serious shortage of pilots over the next decade has 
provided the impetus for the development of the MPL. The other parallel evolution has been the 
trend of acquisitions and partnerships that some independent training providers, such as CAE, 
have made with ab-initio training providers for providing more integrated training using 
synchronized curriculums and therefore reducing the overall cost and duration of training. This 
trend also originated from some ab-initio training providers, such as Oxford Aviation Training, 
who work with airlines for early selection of their pilots. The school synchronizes and adapts 
their training curriculums to better prepare the students for the training environment of their 
future employers. Both the MPL and the vertical integration of training service providers are 
closing the architecture of the flight training service product. 
In summary, the trend of product architecture closure is a divergence from Christensen's 
disruptive innovation theory which would have anticipated architecture openness as a 
consequence of technological maturity. The key reasons studied in this research for this peculiar 
tendency of complex industries towards closed systems are: 
i) Accumulated learning: 
The inherent complexity in CoPS industries favors incumbents' accumulated learning of the 
product and its integration intricacies. With the costs of simulation software development making 
up nearly one third of the total cost of a simulator, accumulated experience allows manufacturers 
to leverage their existing libraries to make their new ones more competitively-priced. This is in 
addition to the learning cycle involved in the integration of the numerous components of the 
simulator and the extensive collaboration that needs to be orchestrated to qualify the simulators 
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by regulatory authorities. These learning cycles make incumbents increasingly competitive and 
reduce the entrants' capability to operate more efficiently. 
ii) The need for regulatory approval of innovations, therefore limiting the influence of the market 
selection forces on disruptive innovation waves: 
Simulation products and services can only create value for the customers once they have been 
approved by regulatory authorities. This extensive regulation of all the elements of pilot training 
influences, almost dictates, customers' requirements and expectations from the products. The 
free market selection forces, assumed to play a role in disruptive innovation in appliance 
industries, are therefore too weak in CoPS industries to result in disrupting the incumbents' core 
competencies in favor of the entrants. The regulatory qualification process, in addition to adding 
to the accumulated learning advantage of incumbents, controls customers' requirements in-line 
with the regulation standards. This does not permit the clear disconnect in competitiveness 
criteria between the mainstream versus high-end markets, which is one of the underlying 
assumptions in the current disruptive innovation theory. 
Hi) The high expertise level of the industry customers and their direct involvement in the design 
and building of the simulation products, undermining the effects of market selection forces as per 
Christensen 's model: 
The clients of the aviation training industry are directly involved in the definition and even design 
of their products and services. Strong communication between buyers and suppliers does not 
allow the entrants to fly under the radar of the incumbents until they are technologically able to 
respond to the needs of the mainstream market. The entrants have rather catered to non-
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consumers at first but had to face the same challenges and offer similar proprietary architectures 
as the incumbents when they entered the competition for the mainstream clients. 
iv) The public safety and legal liability considerations involved in aviation training that make an 
open architecture a potential security threat: 
Open product architecture implies shifting the integration of the product from a particular 
enterprise to the market, using existing standards. The high public safety and legal liability risks 
involved with deficient product integration make this shift unacceptable for regulators and the 
industry in general. The complexity of the simulation products add to the possibility of 
catastrophic failures should the product integration be left for industry standards and customers. 
The material impact of one such catastrophic failure can seriously hurt the financial situation of 
an airline or a simulator component provider. 
v) The high market concentration and the subsequent thinness of production volume for the 
development of a component supplier base to transfer the modularity from the product to the 
industry, thus opening the product architecture: 
Open product architecture implies specialization and the development of a network of specialized 
component providers each focused on one or several subsystems that make the simulator. With a 
thin market ranging from 15 to 30 simulators per year, this is insufficient to sustain such a sub-
component level of specialization and the formation of a network of specialized providers 
working off a standard product architecture. 
The research conducted to test the hypothesis used case-based interviews. More than 40 
interviews of senior management from 29 organizations in the aviation training industry were 
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conducted. A set of exploratory questions were developed for verifying the applicability of the 
constructs and the underlying assumptions of the disruptive innovation theory to complex product 
system industries. The interviews were analyzed and the results documented for discussion. 
The research conducted demonstrated an exception to the prevailing disruptive innovation theory 
which has been developed through a single case study in an appliance industry. While the 
research is insufficient to propose an alternate global theory of disruptive innovation, it raises the 
flag that a more comprehensive study is needed taking into consideration industry cases from 
different innovation games. Until the means are available for such a wide-scoped research, 
disruptive innovation theories should not be generalized across industry games. 
This research demonstrates for managers that the trend of architecture openness and modularity 
that has emerged as a result of the ICT industry's prominence in management literature is not 
necessarily applicable to their particular industries, especially for those in complex product 
industries. Players in these industries have a competitive advantage against potential entrants. 
Their accumulated learning and track-record permits them to create more value for their clients 




Disruptive innovation has become one of the most studied causes of industrial evolution in recent 
years. In the wake of the ICT (Information and Communications Technologies) bubble, many 
researchers have focused on explaining how successful companies with strong strategic positions 
have failed and were driven out of the market by entrants. One of the most prevalent results of 
such studies was the disruptive innovation theory by Christensen, Raynor and Chesbrough 
(Christensen, 1997; Raynor and Christensen, 2002; Chesbrough, 2004). The three studied the 
disk-drive industry; an industry that has demonstrated entire product lifecycles in relatively short 
time spans conducive to research. 
The resulting disruptive innovation theory proposed that industries offer proprietary architecture 
products throughout their technological maturity path until the incumbent suppliers of the 
industry mature and start to exceed the clients' needs, catering to the specialized wishes of high-
end clients. This opens the door for entrants into the industry catering to low-end and cost or 
flexibility-sensitive consumers. With technological advancement of the entrants, their products 
satisfy the needs of mainstream customers and hence start competing against those offered by 
incumbents. The new entrants' lower cost advantage is then further enhanced by the opening of 
the product architecture to enable specialization and parallel innovation on product components 
therefore shifting competition from technical merit to cost or flexibility. The entrants then drive 
the incumbents out of the industry until the standard product architecture they use becomes 
unable to support further development and innovation. Other entrants then offer closed 
proprietary product architectures of superior capabilities and with time displace their predecessors 
as the suppliers of the mainstream clients. This alternation between architecture openness and 
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closure continues as product standards are defined, developed and eventually replaced by new 
standards when obsolete. 
Disruptive innovation, as observed in Complex Product System (CoPS) industries, diverges 
significantly from this hypothesized pattern. A study of the aviation training industry, as an 
example of a CoPS industry, has revealed that in response to technological maturity, the product 
architecture has gone towards further closure instead of openness. The product architecture of the 
individual training product has remained closed despite its technological maturity and the ability 
of simulation providers to satisfy and exceed all the requirements stipulated by the regulatory 
standards. At the product suite level, the legacy open architecture based on acquiring different 
training devices from different suppliers has changed into closed proprietary training suites that 
offer seamless integration around a common core of simulation software. At the training services 
level, a similar closure trend was observed replacing the distinct phases of training, each 
conducted in a different market, with integrated training providers and a new integrated training 
license. 
The evolution of the aviation training industry, as opposed to disruptive innovation theory, was 
shown to be influenced by the importance of accumulation of learning, the involvement and 
technical expertise of clients and the regulation requirements in the industry limiting the role of 
market selection of innovations. Furthermore, public safety and legal liability risks disfavored 
open architectures. Finally, the thinness of the market for simulation products also limited the 
industry's ability to develop a network of specialized component providers able to innovate in 
parallel based on a standard product architecture. 
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CONDENSE EN FRANCAIS 
Avant-Propos 
J'ai toujours ete interesse par la theorie de l'innovation strategique tant durant mes etudes 
universitaires que plus tard dans ma vie professionnelle. J'ai particulierement ete interesse par la 
theorie de l'innovation disruptive et sa faculte de predire les succes et echecs d'entreprises en 
fonction des indicateurs industriels tangibles. Cependant, tout au long de ma carriere dans 
l'industrie de formation aeronautique, je n'ai pas ete en mesure de concilier les constats 
d'innovation disruptive au fonctionnement de cette industrie. La dite theorie prevoit une evolution 
rapide et le remplacement constant d'anciens joueurs par des nouveaux. Toutefois, c'est le 
contraire qui se passe dans l'industrie de formation aeronautique qui privilegie la stabilite et la 
longevite des entreprises, comme mon ancien employeur, qui etait une des premieres compagnies 
dans l'industrie et continue comme un des leaders mondiaux. Cette theorie prevoit une ouverture 
de l'architecture du produit, comme consequence directe de la maturite technologique de 
l'industrie. Ceci une fois de plus, va en porte-a-faux avec les realites observees dans l'industrie de 
formation aeronautique oil l'architecture du produit est plus ferine que jamais malgre le fait que la 
maturite technologique est deja atteint. C'est cette dichotomie entre la theorie et la pratique qui est 
a l'origine de cette etude. Son but etant de valider la pertinence de la theorie d'innovation 
disruptive, dans le contexte d'une industrie complexe telle que celle de la formation aeronautique. 
Revue de litterature 
Pour comprendre la dynamique des relations entre revolution de l'architecture du produit et la 
maturite technologique dans le cadre d'industries complexes, l'etude theorique de plusieurs 
disciplines a ete effectues. II s'agit plus particulierement de la gestion strategique, la gestion 
d'innovation, l'integration des systemes, la modularite et la complexite. 
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Gestion strategique 
En ce qui concerne la theorie de la gestion strategique, les domaines suivants ont ete amplement 
etudies. II s'agit de la strategie concurrentielle de Porter, strategies des configurations, theorie 
economiques evolutionnaires, le modele axe sur les ressources (resource-based view), les paquets 
(bundling), ainsi que la theorie des jeux. 
Gestion d'innovation 
Dans le domaine de la gestion d'innovation les themes etudies furent ceux de la destruction 
creative, la theorie d'innovation disruptive, la diffusion d'innovation et les joutes d'innovation. 
Complexity, modularity et integration des systemes 
Dans ce domaine les themes touches furent ceux de la modularite, les systemes de produits 
complexes, l'ouverture et la modularite d'architecture, ainsi que le modele cyclique de l'ouverture 
et les solutions integrees. 
Reseaux et coordination. 
Les domaines etudies ici furent ceux de la classification des formes organisationnelles selon le 
degre d'integration, les grappes, les reseaux de valeur ainsi que les plateformes. 
L'industrie de formation aeronautique 
L'industrie de formation aeronautique a emerge au debut des annees 1920. Malgre un depart assez 
lent elle a petit a petit gagne du terrain dans le domaine aeronautique. L'industrie de formation 
aeronautique est constitue de trois industries secondaires. Cette division s'est faite sur la base des 
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produits fournis : l'industrie de simulation, l'industrie d'ensemble des produits de formation et 
l'industrie tertiaire des services de la formation. 
L'industrie de simulation 
Cette industrie fournit les simulateurs de vol pour la formation des pilotes ainsi que les equipes 
d'entretien qui eux permet de piloter, operer et maintenir les appareils. Les produits de cet 
industrie sont classes en trois categories : les simulateurs complets de vol {Full Flight Simulators, 
FFSs), les dispositifs d'entrainement au pilotage {Flight Training Devices, FTDs) (Rosenkopf et 
al, 1998) et plus recemment les dispositifs de formation de bureau {Desktop Training Devices, 
DTDs) (CAE, 2000). 
L'industrie d'ensemble des produits de formation 
Cette industrie est responsable de la production des ensembles des outils utilises lors de la 
formation aeronautique. 
L'industrie des services de formation 
Cette industrie offre des services de formation des pilotes dans une des trois phases suivantes : 
• Ab-initio : c'est la formation initiale qu'un individu regoit pour obtenir une licence de 
pilotage. 
• Formation specifique {type-rating) : ou le pilote est forme sur un type d'avion 
specifique avant de le piloter pour des buts commerciaux; 
• Formation recurrent: c'est une procedure de formation annuelle que chaque pilote est 
dans l'obligation de passer pour conserver sa licence. 
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Hypothese et methodologie de recherche 
La theorie d'innovation disruptive, se base sur le fait que lorsque les compagnies s'efforcent de 
satisfaire les exigences de performance des produits des clients, elles developpent de nouvelles 
technologies avec une architecture du produit fermee. Cela leur permet de pousser la 
developpement des technologies et de l'offrir a leurs clients. Cependant, une fois qu'ils atteignent 
la maturite technologique, des nouveaux concurrents entrent le marche et, dans le but de satisfaire 
les besoins de la clientele bas-gamme, etablissent une capacite concurrentielle basee sur la 
convenance, le cout et la flexibilite des services et produits. La consequence d'une telle action est 
l'ouverture de 1'architecture du produit par l'intermediaire des normes et standards afin d'atteindre 
des niveaux de rendement plus eleves et etre concurrentiels. Ce modele a ete formule sur la base 
d'une etude sur l'industrie des disques durs en 1997 (Christensen 1997), et soutenu par des etudes 
de cas des industries des ordinateurs personnels et telecommunications (Christensen et al, 2001). 
Cette etude emet l'hypothese que ce modele n'est pas entierement applicable aux industries des 
systemes de produits complexes {Complex Product Systems, CoPS) definies dans la litterature des 
systemes d'integration (Johnson, 2004; Dosi et al, 2004; Davies, 2004; Prencipe, 2004). 
Dans l'industrie de formation aeronautique, il a ete observe que les compagnies existants ont deja 
atteint, et meme depasses, la phase de maturite technologique du marche. Toutefois, au lieu d'etre 
deplaces par des nouveaux concurrents offrant une architecture ouverte, ils ont commence a offrir 
des solutions integrees en fermant ainsi 1'architecture du produit meme plus loin aux trois niveaux 
de l'industrie definies au debut. 
L'hypothese est done la suivante : 
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En reponse a la maturite technologique, Varchitecture de produit, dans les industries de systemes 
de produits complexes, ne s'ouvre pas necessairement comme le prevoit la theorie d'innovation 
disruptive. 
Les questions suivantes constituent la base de l'instrument de recherche utilisee dans cette 
recherche pour la collecte des donnees : 
/. Quel sont les indicateurs de la maturite technologique de VIndustrie? 
2. L'industrie deformation aeronautique a-t-elle atteint la maturite technologique? 
3. Observe t-on une tendance a Vemergence des fournisseurs de bas-gamme? 
4. Quel est le role des regulateurs dans la determination des besoins des clients de l'industrie? 
5. Quelle est le niveau d'implication des clients dans la conception des appareils dans cette 
Industrie? 
6. Les responsabilites liees a la securite publique et aux risques represented elles un souci pour 
les differents acteurs de cette Industrie? Quelles sont leurs effets sur I'innovation de l'industrie? 
7. L'apprentissage accumule joue t-il unfacteur important dans l'industrie? Quel est son effet sur 
la competitivite des differents acteurs? 
8. Observe t-on des conceptions standards de l'industrie a Vun des trois niveaux? 
9. Observe t-on une ouverture de I'architecture du produit a I'une des trois niveaux de l'industrie? 
10. Quel est le volume du marche en terme de nombre des simulateurs de vol produitspar annee? 
La divergence de comportement observee entre la theorie d'innovation disruptive et l'industrie de 
formation aeronautique est due aux facteurs suivants : 
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1. Le valeur elevee de l'apprentissage accumulee dans l'industrie, qui a pour effet de favoriser les 
innovations soutenant au lieu des disruptives (Christensen et Raynor, 2003); 
2. Le besoin d'approbation reglementaire d'innovations, limite l'influence des forces du marche 
sur les innovations et par consequent celles des vagues disruptives; 
3. Le haut niveau d'expertise des clients ainsi que leur participation directe dans la conception et 
la construction des produits de simulation, conduit aussi a reduire les effets de selection des 
forces du marche qui jouent un role important dans le modele de Christensen; 
4. Les considerations de securite publique et de responsabilite legale impliquees dans la formation 
aeronautique qui rendent une architecture du produit ouverte une menace potentielle de securite; 
5. La forte concentration du marche et 1'insuffisance du volume de production pour l'emergence 
d'une base de fournisseurs pour transferer 1'integration du produit de l'entreprise vers l'industrie, 
ouvrant de ce fait l'architecture du produit (Chesbrough, 2003). 
Collecte de donnees 
Un instrument de recherche a ete cree pour recueillir des donnees aupres des differents 
intervenants dans l'industrie aeronautique. Plus de 40 entrevues ont ete menees aupres de cadres 
superieurs representant les differentes industries de ce secteur dont des fournisseurs de 
simulateurs de vol, des prestataires de formation aeronautique, des integrateurs d'avions, des 
lignes aeriennes, des fabricants de systemes d'avioniques, des regulateurs ainsi que des 
fournisseurs de renseignements industriel. Ces entrevues ont ete transcrites et analysees en vue de 
l'hypothese soulevee, ainsi que dans le but d'apporter des elements de reponse aux questions 
exploratoires mentionnees ci-dessus. En outre, des documents industriels ont ete minutieusement 
examines dont des communiques de presse, des rapports rediges par des magasins specialises, des 
associations ainsi que des cabinets de conseil. Pour une meilleure comprehension des resultats de 
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ces recherches, un certain nombre de presentations ont ete faites au fil du temps a des auditoires 
specialises des cadres et professionnels de l'industrie. Leurs reactions et commentaires ont 
contribue a affiner le champ de recherche, definissant les limites de cette derniere, et contribuant 
a une meilleure comprehension de son impact sur la theorie et la pratique. 
Resultats de la recherche 
La recherche entreprise a menee les conclusions suivantes : 
• La maturite technologique de l'industrie est le resultat de plusieurs facteurs, notamment les 
dispositions reglementaires. 
• L'industrie de formation aeronautique a en effet atteint la phase de maturite technologique. Dans 
certains cas, elle l'a meme largement depasse, car elle est parvenue a faire plus que simplement 
repondre aux exigences de ses clients. En ce qui concerne les produits de simulation, les 
simulateurs de niveau D demontrent un niveau de fidelite qui comble toutes les attentes 
pedagogiques et reglementaires des clients. Sur les ensembles des produits de simulation, le 
niveau de maturite atteint est encore une fois exceptionnel. Ceci se caracterise particulierement 
par la maturite de differents appareils et leur integration verticale avec du logiciel de simulation 
commun (George, 2003). Ces ensembles des produits de simulation ont introduit une 
standardisation de la technologie dans les phases diverses de la formation et done resout en 
grande partie le probleme, auxquels sont confronted les fournisseurs de formation aeronautique, 
des differences majeurs entre les appareils ou la formation se faisait sur des appareils 
independants les uns des autres. Au niveau de fournisseurs de formation, la technologie est au 
niveau des appareils de formation et les outils d'enseignement associes avec eux. Les experts bien 
que n'etant pas tous d'accord sur la date a laquelle cette industrie a atteint la maturite 
technologique, reconnaissent cependant que cela s'est produit au cours des 5 a 10 dernieres 
annees. 
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• Le fait pour les acteurs principaux d'etre parvenus a surpasser les besoins de leurs clients dans le 
courant principal de l'industrie, a ouvert la voie aux fournisseurs de produits de bas de gamme, 
leur permettant ainsi de penetrer dans l'industrie de formation aeronautique. Les entreprises 
offrant des FTD de bas gamme, ont considerablement emerge. Aides par les progres rapides dans 
les technologies de l'ordinateur personnel, de nombreux employes ont lance leurs propres 
entreprises qui offrent des simulateurs de base a faible cout. 
• La recherche effectuee ont demontre que, l'architecture du produit dans l'industrie de la 
formation aeronautique, a ses 3 niveaux, a une grande tendance a la fermeture au cours de ces 
dernieres annees. Ces trois niveaux sont, cependant, restes modulaire grace a la grande variete des 
produits et des services tallies. Au niveau des appareils de simulation de vol, les produits 
continueront d'adopter une architecture fermee. Plusieurs conceptions des appareils se 
concurrencent, chacun avec sa propre architecture fermee. Sur le niveau des ensembles de 
produits de simulation, l'architecture de produits a evoluee d'une architecture ouverte, composee 
des appareils independants de plusieurs fournisseurs, a une architecture fermee des solutions 
integrees ou les fournisseurs des appareils offrent des modeles de simulation communs entre les 
appareils. Au niveau des services de formation, l'architecture du produit a demontre encore une 
fois une tendance a la fermeture. C'etait un marche qui etait divise en deux segments, chacun 
d'eux comportant des fournisseurs differents. Cette division tend cependant a disparaitre. La 
formation ab-initio et celui offert par les lignes aeriennes (compose du type-rating et de la 
formation periodique) etaient des segments traditionnellement distincts sur le marche. Des centres 
de formation aerienne ont commence a offrir de formation integree debutant par ab-initio utilisant 
les memes simulateurs de vol qui sont utilises par les phases suivantes de la formation. 
• Dans les trois niveaux de l'industrie de formation aeronautique les clients sont generalement tres 
bien informes au sujet des produits et, par consequent, ont une influence significative sur sa 
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conception. La recherche a demontre la boucle de retroaction positive accumulee de 
l'apprentissage auxquelles les entreprises sont soumises. Chaque nouveau simulateur construit 
rend la societe plus efficace car lui permet d'amortir les lourds couts de developpement sur un 
plus grand nombre de produits. Cela constitue a creer des barrieres a l'entree pour les novices et 
limiter leur acces au marche des produits plus complexes tels que des simulateurs de vol 
complets. 
• La securite publique ne semblait pas etre une preoccupation majeure ni pour les fournisseurs des 
simulateurs de vol, ni pour les fournisseurs de la formation. Les regulateurs Font identifie comme 
un facteur cle dans l'industrie mais les gerants l'ont pris pour acquis. Cependant, le risque de la 
formation negative est tres claire pour ces gerants. Tous ont conviennent qu'en cas d'accident, les 
repercussions entratnes sur l'industrie sont tres souvent assez radicales, car elles touchent 
plusieurs secteurs y compris les dispositions reglementaires. 
Discussion 
La recherche presentee ci-dessus a examine la validite du modele cyclique des industries, 
alternant entre des architectures ouvertes et fermees, dans le contexte d'une industrie des 
systemes de produits complexes en prenant pour exemple l'industrie de formation aeronautique. 
Les dix questions posees lors de la formulation de l'hypothese trouvent done leurs reponses ci-
dessous : 
1. Quels sont les indicateurs de la maturite technologique de l'industrie? 
II a ete demontre que les dispositions reglementaires sont l'une des determinants les plus 
importantes des besoins de la clientele a tous les niveaux de l'industrie. Les reglements 
determinent la duree, l'equipement de simulation utilise et les qualifications acquises a chaque 
xxvi 
phase de la formation du pilote de la phase preliminaire ab-initio au «type-rating » jusqu'a la 
formation recurrente. 
2. L'industrie de formation aeronautique a-t-elle atteint la maturite technologique ? 
II a ete constate que l'industrie de formation aeronautique a en effet atteint la maturite 
technologique dans les trois niveaux de produits definis dans cette recherche. Objectivement, 
l'industrie est depuis longtemps en mesure de satisfaire aux plus strides exigences reglementaires 
avec les simulateurs de niveau D qui sont jugees equivalentes a des performances d'un avion dans 
l'enveloppe normale de vol. 
3. Observe t-on une tendance a ['emergence des fournisseurs de bas-gamme? 
Au cours des 10 dernieres annees, l'industrie a connu une augmentation des fournisseurs de bas 
de gamme offrant des FTD et des simulateurs de bureau a faible cout pour les compagnies 
aeriennes et certains non-consommateurs de simulation synthetique telles que les ecoles de 
pilotage ab-initio. De 30 a 50 entreprises dans le monde, sont impliquees dans la fabrication d'un 
ou plusieurs produits de simulation ou services de formation avec environ 5 d'entre eux qui sont 
en mesure d'offrir des simulateurs complet de vol. 
4. Quel est le role des regulateurs dans les besoins des clients de l'industrie? 
Les clients et fournisseurs de l'industrie de formation aeronautiques sont restreints par les 
dispositifs reglementaires. La creation de valeur d'un produit ou un service est atteignable 
seulement s 'il est certifie par les regulateurs. Cet effet ralentisse I 'introduction des innovations 
au marche ainsi que filtre ces innovations selon les dispositifs etablis. Ces deux facteurs 
reduisent la pouvoir de selection du marche des innovations et ont pour effet que la plupart des 
innovations introduites au marche sont soutenants est non pas disruptives. 
5. Quelle est le niveau d'implication des clients dans la conception du produit ? 
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Les compagnies aeriennes ont traditionnellement ete des experts en matiere de technologies de 
simulation. La participation des clients tels que Swissair, Lufthansa, ou KLM dans la conception 
des produits d'appareils de simulation, a atteint une ampleur telle que leurs ingenieurs 
participaient a la correction des codes sources de simulation. Cette intime participation permet 
une communication etroite entre les fournisseurs et les clients, ce qui aide les entreprises a mieux 
repondre aux attentes de leurs clients. 
6. Les responsabilites liees a la securite publique et aux risques representent elles un souci pour 
les differents acteurs de cette Industrie? Quelle est leur effet sur Vinnovation de VIndustrie? 
La securite publique est l'une des raisons principales de l'existence de l'industrie de simulation. 
Les considerations de surete et de responsabilite de public continuent a d'etre a l'avant garde des 
preoccupations des regulateurs et des autorites gouvernementales en charge de l'aviation. Pour les 
constructeurs, les fournisseurs de simulation et les responsables de formation, la crainte de l'echec 
est grande et va au-dela des considerations des potentielles consequences catastrophiques. Cette 
crainte renforce la position concurrentielle des joueurs actuels et ralentisse 1'acceptation des 
nouvelles technologies presentees par des debutants, qui manquent la credibilite. 
7. L'experience accumulee joue t-il unfacteur important dans l'industrie? Quel est son effet sur la 
competitivite des differents acteurs? 
L'experience accumulee sur le produit et des prestataires de service dans l'industrie ont un effet 
principal sur leur competitivite. Dans un environnement ou la construction d'un simulateur est un 
projet complexe qui s'etend sur 12 a 24 mois et coute de dizaines de millions de dollars, 
l'experience professionnelle de la compagnie est essentielle pour gagner la confiance des clients. 
En outre, la possession par une compagnie du logiciel de simulation, peut reduire le cout de 
fabrication de son simulateur de 20 a 50 %. Par consequent, l'experience accumulee augmente la 
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competitivite des societes et aide a renforcer leur position strategique face aux novices proposant 
des produits. 
8. Observe t-on des conceptions standards de Vindustrie a I'un des trois niveaux? 
Aucun des experts interviewed tout au long de cette recherche ne reconnait l'existence des normes 
qui regleraient l'architecture du produit dans cette industrie. Ceci malgre les frequentes 
transactions portant sur l'integration de technologies provenant de multiples fournisseurs tels que 
l'integration des systemes visuels d'Evans & Sutherland sur les simulateurs de CAE et Thales. 
Une collaboration etroite existe entre les entreprises et est indispensable a tout projet d'integration 
de systemes ainsi que leurs fonctionnalites. 
9. Observe t-on une ouverture de l'architecture du produit a I'une des trois niveaux de Vindustrie? 
Comme indique ci-dessus l'architecture des produits dans les differents niveaux de l'industrie, 
continue a faire preuve de fermeture. Sur la gamme des produits et des services de formation, 
l'architecture affiche une tendance tres rapide a la fermeture. C'est la reaction previsible des 
grands operateurs en place, en reponse aux menaces concurrentielles des produits et technologies 
peu couteux des debutants. 
10. Quel est le volume du marche de simulateurs de vol? 
Le marche de simulateurs de vol complets est trop mince pour soutenir 1'emergence des 
fournisseurs specialises des composantes des simulateurs de vol. Avec un moyen de 30 
simulateurs par annee et un prix entre 10 $M et 15 $M, le chiffre d'affaires du marche ne justifie 
pas l'existence profitables des fournisseurs des composantes qui ne font pas d'integration des 
systemes. 
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La theorie d'innovation disruptive s'engage a demontrer que les industries passent a une 
architecture ouverte des produits, une fois que ces derniers ont atteint leur maturite technologique 
(Christensen, 1998). Cette transformation d'une architecture fermee a une architecture ouverte est 
cyclique tout le long du cycle de vie de l'industrie (Chesbrough, 2004). L'hypothese implicite qui 
sous-tend cette theorie est que la fermeture de l'architecture technologique, n'est pas une 
caracteristique inherente de l'industrie, mais plutot une fonction de sa maturite technologique qui 
est liee aux exigences de la clientele. Lorsque les industries sont encore sur la voie de la maturite, 
leurs architectures technologiques sont fermees et repondent au besoin d'integration du niveau de 
l'entreprise. En murissant, leur architecture de fermeture diminue a un niveau qui peut etre gere 
au niveau de l'industrie. Cette relativite de l'interdependance de l'architecture technologique a fait 
la base de l'hypothese de base des etudes de Christensen, Chesbrough et d'autres qui ont etudie 
l'industrie des 'electroniques et des autres industries pareils (Christensen, 1997; Chesbrough, 
2004). 
L'industrie de formation aeronautique s'est ecartee de ce schema. Son architecture fermee persiste 
tout au long de son evolution technologique de maturite. Le seul changement que l'industrie a 
demontre etait vers plus de fermeture, comme clairement demontre ci-dessus. Les facteurs 
favorisant cette fermeture souligne la besoin inherente d'une societe d'assumer activement un role 
integrateur afin de gerer un grand nombre de composants et disciplines necessaires a la 
construction d'un produit complexe. 
Conclusion 
La recherche presentee ci-dessus a demontre que les industries de systeme de produits complexes 
(CoPS) n'adherent pas necessairement a la theorie d'innovation disruptive proposee par 
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Christensen et Chesbrough (Christensen, 1997; Chesbrough, 2004). Grace a une etude sur 
l'industrie de formation aeronautique s'etendant sur 4 annees, cette derniere a demontre qu'elle 
avait atteinte et meme depasse la maturite technologique requise par ses clients. Cependant, ceci 
n'a pas eu pour consequence, la remplacement des joueurs actuels par des debutants de bas de 
gamme, comme le suggere la theorie. En outre, on n'a, a aucun des niveaux, observe l'ouverture 
de l'architecture du produit. En fait, l'industrie va dans le sens contraire, a savoir la fermeture de 
la dite architecture. La theorie d'innovation disruptive n'est pas, done, suffisante pour predire la 
structure et les consequences des technologies disruptives sur les acteurs dans les industries de 
produits complexes. 
Limites 
La limite principale de cette recherche est qu'une seule industrie a ete etudiee et s'est averee etre 
une exception a la theorie d'innovation disruptive. Ce n'est pas suffisant pour etablir une theorie 
alternative et decrire le comportement des industries CoPS en reponse a la maturite 
technologique. Une recherche plus approfondie regroupant un plus grand nombre d'industries de 
secteurs differents est necessaire pour se faire une idee plus juste de la situation dans le domaine 
des innovations. 
Opportunites de recherche approfondie 
Une recherche approfondie de cas est necessaire pour etablir une solide theorie d'innovation 
disruptive dont les constructions, les propositions et les arguments logiques de base s'appliquent 
plus largement et permettent une plus large exploration des questions de recherche. Cette 
recherche etablie sur la base de cas concrets devrait se produire plus a 1'etape de formulation de la 
theorie tout en employant des cas additionnels pour amplifier la puissance analytique (Eisenhardt 
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et Graebner, 2007). La recherche presentee ci-dessus a indique que les joutes d'innovation 
pourraient former une base interessante dans le choix des cas qui couvriraient les differents types 
de comportement, en reponse a la maturite technologique des industries. 






CONDENSE EN FRANgAIS XVII 
TABLE OF CONTENTS XXXII 
LIST OF TABLES XXXVII 
LIST OF FIGURES XXXVIII 
LIST OF ACRONYMS XXXIX 
LIST OF APPENDICES XLI 
AVANT-PROPOS XLII 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 
CHAPTER 2 THE EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIES - LITERATURE REVIEW 5 
2.1 INNOVATION MANAGEMENT 5 
2.1.1 Creative Destruction 6 
2.1.2 Disruptive Innovations 7 
2.1.3 Innovation Diffusion 14 
Epidemic model 15 
Probit Model 17 
Legitimation & Competition 18 
Information Cascades 19 
2.1.4 Games of Innovation 20 
Patent-Driven Discovery 21 
Cost-Based Competition 21 
2.2 COMPLEXITY, MODULARITY AND SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 23 
2.2.1 Modularity 23 
2.2.2 Complex Products 25 
2.2.3 Architecture Modularity & Openness 26 
2.2.4 Hierarchical vs. Heterarchical Architectures 28 
2.2.5 The Cyclical Model of Openness 29 
2.2.6 Integrated Solutions 30 
2.3 NETWORKS AND COORDINATION 31 
2.3.1 Integration-Based Classification of Organizational Forms 31 
2.3.2 Clusters 33 
2.3.3 Value Nets 34 
2.3.4 Platforms 35 
2.4 MANAGEMENT LITERATURE 37 
2.4.1 Porter's Competitive Strategy Framework 37 
2.4.2 Industry Transformation 39 
2.4.3 Configuration Strategy School 40 
2.4.4 Evolutionary Theory 41 
Evolutionary Economics 42 
Niche-Overlap Model 43 
Organizational / Population Ecology 44 
2.4.5 Bundling 45 
2.4.6 Resource-Based Theory 48 
2.4.7 Game Theory 49 
CHAPTER 3 THE AVIATION SIMULATION & TRAINING INDUSTRY 61 
3.1 HISTORICAL EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRY 61 
3.1.1 Early Attempts 61 
3.1.2 Link's Simulator 62 
3.2 THE SIMULATION PRODUCT INDUSTRY 65 
3.3 THE TRAINING PRODUCTS SUITE INDUSTRY 65 
3.4 THE TRAINING SERVICES INDUSTRY 66 
3.4.1 Ab-initio 67 
3.4.2 Type-Rating 69 
3.4.3 Recurrent Training 69 
3.5 INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION 69 
3.6 INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS 71 
3.7 THE TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 73 
3.8 REGULATION 73 
CHAPTER 4 HYPOTHESIS & RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 75 
4.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 75 
4.2 DATA COLLECTION 86 
4.2.1 Interviews 86 
4.2.2 Industry Intelligence 87 
4.2.3 Validation with Experts 87 
4.3 INDUSTRY ORGANIZATIONS STUDIED 88 
CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 89 
5.1 INDICATORS OF TECHNOLOGICAL MATURITY OF THE INDUSTRY 89 
5.2 ATTAINING TECHNOLOGICAL MATURITY 90 
5.3 LOW-END ENTRANTS 93 
5.4 ROLE OF REGULATORS 94 
5.5 LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT OF CLIENTS 96 
5.6 PUBLIC SAFETY 96 
5.7 ACCUMULATED LEARNING 97 
5.8 STANDARD DESIGNS 98 
5.9 OPENING OF PRODUCT ARCHITECTURE 98 
5.10 MARKET THINNESS 100 
CHAPTER 6 RESEARCH FINDINGS - SIMULATION DEVICES 102 
6.1 THE PRODUCT 102 
XXXV 
6.1.1 Flight Training Equipment 102 
6.1.2 Product selection criteria 105 
6.2 PRODUCT ARCHITECTURE 107 
6.3 ARCHITECTURE EVOLUTION - DETAILED FINDINGS 109 
6.4 TECHNOLOGICAL MATURITY OF THE INDUSTRY 113 
6.5 CONCLUSION - INDUSTRY ARCHITECTURE 114 
CHAPTER 7 RESEARCH FINDINGS - THE SIMULATION PRODUCTS SUITE 120 
7.1 DEFINITION 120 
7.2 REGULATION 120 
7.3 PRODUCT SELECTION CRITERIA 120 
7.3.1 Training Market Segment 121 
7.3.2 Total Cost 121 
7.4 TRADITIONAL PRODUCT ARCHITECTURE 122 
7.5 RECENT INDUSTRY TRENDS 122 
7.6 MATURITY & EVOLUTION OF THE INDUSTRY ARCHITECTURE 124 
7.7 CONCLUSION 127 
CHAPTER 8 RESEARCH FINDINGS - AVIATION TRAINING SERVICES 129 
8.1 DEFINITION 129 
8.2 REGULATION 130 
8.3 PRODUCT SELECTION CRITERIA 131 
8.4 PRODUCT ARCHITECTURE: 134 
8.5 RECENT INDUSTRY TRENDS: 135 
8.6 CONCLUSION 140 
CHAPTER 9 DISCUSSION 141 
CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS & FURTHER RESEARCH 150 
10.1 CONCLUSIONS 150 
10.2 LIMITATIONS 151 
10.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 151 
xxxvi 
10.4 MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS 153 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 154 
APPENDICES 172 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1: Innovation Strategies 53 
Table 2.2: Complexity, Modularity And Systems Integration 55 
Table 2.3: Networks And Coordination 56 
Table 2.4: Strategy 58 
Table 4.1: Constructs Of Disruptive Innovation Theory And Questions Used To Validate ThemW 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1: Schumpeter's Creative Destruction Force in Industrial Evolution 6 
Figure 2.2: Disruptive innovation cycle (Christensen, 1997) with the slow-to evolve 
regulations 10 
Figure 2.3: S-curve of Technological Diffusion 15 
Figure 2.4: Games of Innovation (Miller and Olleros, 2008) 21 
Figure 2.5: The configurations resulting from product modularity and industry 
architecture openness 27 
Figure 2.6: Classification of organizational forms based on degrees of ownership and 
coordination integration 32 
Figure 2.7: Nalebuffs Value Net Framework 35 
Figure 2.8: Porter's Five Force model (Porter, 1980) 37 
Figure 3.1: Organizational design of the aviation industry 70 
Figure 3.2: A graphical depiction of a regulation-driven training curriculum 73 
Figure 5.1: The number of full flight simulators produced between 1991 and 2007 101 
Figure 7.1: CAE's Integrated Procedures Trainer (IPT) and Virtual Simulator (VSIM) 125 
Figure 7.2: Graphical depiction of the common-core configuration of CAE's integrated 
products training suite 126 
Figure 8.1: Parallel movements by MPL and vertical integration resulting in closing the 
product architecture of aviation training services 140 
xxxix 

























Computer Based Training 
Commercial Off-The-Shelf 
Canadian Ministry of Transport 
Desktop Training Device 
European Aviation Safety Agency 
Federal Aviation Administration 
Federal Aviation Regulations 
Full Flight Simulator 
Flight Navigation and Procedures Trainer 
Flight Training Device 
International Air Transport Association 
International Civil Aviation Organization 
Interface Control Document 
Instrument Flight Rules 
Integrated Procedures Trainer 
Joint Aviation Administration 
Joint Aviation Regulations 
Liquid Crystal on Silicon 
Multiple-crew Pilot License 
Printed Circuit Board 
Royal Aeronautical Society 
Simulation-Based Courseware 
xl 
SOP: Standard Operating Procedures 
VFR: Visual Flight Rules 
VSim: Virtual Simulator 
WBT: Web Based Training 
ZFT: Zero Flight Time 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
xli 
APPENDIX A DATA SOURCES 173 
APPENDIX B RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 184 
xlii 
AVANT-PROPOS 
Strategic innovation literature was very interesting for me throughout my academic and 
professional career. I was especially fascinated by disruptive innovation and its capacity to 
foretell the rise and failure of companies based on tangible industry and product indicators. 
However, with more than 7 years of diversified work experience in the aviation training industry, 
I was not able to reconcile the constructs of disruptive innovation theory. While the literature 
predicted rapid change and constant displacement of old players by new ones, the aviation 
training industry enjoyed long-lasting stability with the life of some companies, such as my 
previous employer, spanning the entire life of the industry. This dichotomy between literature 
and practice was most pronounced during my work as a proposals engineer when I was mandated 
with architecting a low-level FTD to compete with WICAT, the most ferocious competitor of the 
company in the FTD markets back then. This mandate gave me first-hand experience with the 
heavy cost and procedural structures of the industry incumbents contrasted with the agile 
workshops of simulation engineers producing simulation devices. This expertise was further 
enriched when I became one of the few project managers in the newly formed division of 
Integrated Training Solutions, a division operating semi-autonomously for architecting and 
selling integrated training suites including low-level FTDs. I was involved in key projects such 
as Airbus's acquisition of more than 30 of these low-level FTDs (called M/FTDs) for using them 
in their global network of training centers as the only complement to the full flight simulators. I 
was also the project manager of a training suite for the FAA which has opened the door for 
collaboration between the company and the regulatory body on defining the advanced training 
curriculum that integrates the new training devices. I also managed the first fully integrated suite 
delivered to Air Canada Jazz airline and succeeded to challenge and stretch the interpretation of 
Transport Canada regulations to qualify these low-level FTDs. I therefore witnessed the 
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disruptive threats from WICAT and other competitors but was also part of the response of an 
incumbent in offering closed architecture suites that gained back the lost market shares and 
eventually drove WICAT out of business. Therefore I wanted to study the disruptive innovation 
theory and validate its constructs and predictions in the context of a complex industry such as the 
aviation training industry where I worked. 
The research presented in this thesis was carried-out as a part of the MINE (Management of 
Innovation in the New Economy) research program. This program was lead by Professor Roger 
Miller, Jarislowsky Chair on Innovation and Competitiveness at l'Ecole Polytechnique de 
Montreal. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Strategic management of technology is a relatively new discipline that has evolved rapidly in the 
past 30 years. In the 1980's Porter's work on strategic positioning and competitive strategies 
dominated the field (Porter, 1980, Porter 1985 and Porter 1990). Following the realization that 
competitive positions are built and sustained through a firm's unique assets and attributes, the 
focus of literature was gradually including internal parameters such as core competencies (Hamel 
and Prahalad, 1990; Collis, 1994), resource based-view (Barney, 1986) and dynamic capabilities 
(Teece, 1987; Zollo and Winter, 2002). However, with the information technologies boom and 
the rapid development brought about by advanced telecommunications and the internet, systems 
integration and product architecture have become the focus of a significant portion of strategic 
management literature (Miller and Olleros, 2008; Bargigli, 2005). Theories such as disruptive 
innovation and open innovation are focused on a firm's ability to architect its product in 
alignment with its market and industry architecture (Raynor and Christensen, 2002). Many 
revisited existing research through the perspective of product architecture and innovation. For 
example, Christensen's disruptive innovation dilemma (Christensen, 1997) is rooted in 
Schumpeter's description of innovation in capital economies with an additional emphasis on 
product and market architecture following product maturity (Schumpeter, 1934). 
Influenced by the rapid growth and market boom, most of the modern systems integration and 
product architecture research in the late 1990's and 2000's was based on information technology, 
consumer electronic industries or the internet (see for example Christensen, 1997; Chesbrough 
2004; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Olleros, 2007). The resulting literature, as hypothesized in 
this dissertation, may therefore have had an inherent bias towards consumer appliance industries 
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offering limited applicability to other industry types. A revisit of this literature in light of the 
context of other industries may therefore be necessary before a global systems integration theory 
is formulated. 
One such category of non-consumer appliance industries that has gained increased attention in 
recent years is Complex Product System (CoPS) industries (Johnson, 2004), defined as capital-
intensive industries comprising multiple technologies, individuals and scientific disciplines that 
are too complex for any one individual to comprehend, hence requiring the orchestrated 
collaboration of multiple entities (Johnson, 2004; Simon, 2004 and Prencipe, 2004). The 
University of Sussex Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) is one of the specialized research 
centers in the domain with a number of scholars interested in innovation and product architecture 
in complex industries. 
The research presented in this dissertation builds on this existing literature and aims at 
investigating the evolution of product architecture in complex industries as they attain 
technological maturity; a phase in an industry's lifecycle that has received increased attention 
from scholars such as Christensen, Raynor and Chesbrough (Christensen, 1997; Christensen and 
Raynor, 2003; Chesbrough, 2004; Raynor and Christensen, 2002). The industry selected for this 
investigation is the aviation training industry, one that has been previously identified in CoPS 
literature (Prencipe, 2004). The industrial boundaries defined for this research span the flight 
simulation equipment industry, the training product suite industry and the training services 
industry. 
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Chapter 2 presents a summary of this literature review with comments on the relevance of these 
theories to the research objectives. For this investigation, innovation theory was first reviewed to 
understand disruptive technologies and their diffusion mechanisms. Systems integration and 
product architecture literature were also reviewed to gain an understanding of the different 
architectural states of products, their triggers and evolution mechanisms. Networks and 
coordination theories were reviewed as they form an integral part of the organization of complex 
industries as defined above. Finally other management literature was reviewed to provide an 
understanding of the different schools of thought and offer the right tools to analyze the product 
architecture and technological maturity variables within an industrial evolution context. 
This is followed, in Chapter 3, by an introduction to the aviation training industry, its 
organization, regulation and the different industries it interfaces with. Chapter 4 then formulates 
the research hypothesis, the main questions associated with it and the research methodology 
selected for answering these questions. The detailed list of interviewees, their affiliations and 
positions is provided in Appendix A. Chapter 5 describes the research findings of the research 
while chapters 6, 7 and 8 are dedicated to describe the 3 sub-industries mentioned above 
presenting the product of the industry, the state of its technological maturity and the subsequent 
effects, if any, on its architectural evolution. The findings presented in these three chapters are 
the result of the case-based research interviews conducted throughout this research project. 
Chapter 9 then discusses the theoretical implications of the research findings answering the initial 
research questions posed. The conclusions and limitations of the research are then presented in 
chapter 10 followed by a description of future research opportunities in the domain. The 
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Bibliography of academic, industrial and management literature resources used throughout the 
research is then presented. 
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CHAPTER 2 THE EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIES - LITERATURE REVIEW 
To understand the dynamics of the relationship between product architecture evolution and 
technological maturity in complex industries, the existing literature in several domains was 
reviewed. Literature from innovation management was reviewed followed by literature from 
systems integration, modularity and complexity to gain an in-depth understanding of the specifics 
of complex systems and how these may affect their adherence to innovation models developed in 
other industries, such as the disk drive industry (used to develop the disruptive innovation 
theory). Literature from networks and coordination theory was also reviewed to complement the 
understanding of complex product systems where coordination is often a key competency of 
industry players. Finally literature from other theories of strategic management was reviewed to 
ensure completeness. 
These domains in the literature therefore provide a deeper understanding of the various 
components of the research hypothesis, namely complex industries, the dynamics of product 
architecture, innovation and its relationship to product maturity. 
2.1 Innovation Management 
Innovation research has seen a surge since the 1970's (Rogers, 1986) after years of lack of 
attention to it in early economics literature (Rogers, 1962; Freeman, 2003). A review of this 
innovation management literature was necessary in this research to understand technological 
maturity in the industry. The domains of literature reviewed are presented below. 
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2.1.1 Creative Destruction 
In the 1930's Joseph Schumpeter published "Theory of Economic Development" which 
contained a model of innovation in capitalist economies (Schumpeter, 1934). Creative 
Destruction, Schumpeter argued, is the continual emergence of innovations that destroy the core 
competencies of the key incumbent players in an industry, thus possibly giving rise to a new set 
of players, a new industrial structure and even new industries altogether (Schumpeter, 1934). 
Schumpeter's model depicted technological evolution of products from their inception, to their 
battle against existing technologies, to their maturity into dominant designs and finally to 
obsolescence by a radical innovation that requires new core competencies that existing players do 
not possess. A graphical representation of Schumpeter's model of industrial evolution is shown 
in Figure 2. 
* * * * * 
Time 
Figure 2.1: Schumpeter's Creative Destruction Force in Industrial Evolution 
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Studies on the effects of Schumpeter's cycle on industries raised the concern that creative 
destruction may be a disincentive for companies to invest in new technologies and thus leading to 
underinvestment in innovation (for example Nordhaus, 1969). On the other hand, Aghion and 
Howitt argued that because the creators of disruptive technologies are often not the incumbents, 
they have a tendency to over-invest (Aghion and Howitt, 1998). Still, Baumol argues that even 
the externalities leading to the underinvestment fear prevalent in some studies are beneficial to 
the society (Baumol, 2001). 
The interest in Schumpeter's concept has been revived in the recent literature studying radical 
innovations in various industries especially those related to the ICT (Information and 
Communications Technology) sector (Freemand, 2003). These industries, such as the disk drive 
industry, have exhibited the evolution pattern of successive industrial revolutions proposed by 
Schumpeter (Schmidt and Druehl, 2005; Christensen 1997; Christensen, 1998). 
Schumpeter's work was the foundation of Christensen's model predicting a continuous cycle of 
products entering the market and maturing only to be eventually overturned by new disruptive 
innovations (Freeman, 2003). This research will therefore heavily use the models of Schumpeter 
and Christensen to understand and validate the behavior of complex product industries, 
represented by the aviation training industry, consequent to their technological maturity. 
2.1.2 Disruptive Innovations 
The innovator's dilemma, argues Christensen (1997), is that suppliers in mature industries who 
listen to their clients and respond to them most usually end up catering to the high-end specialty 
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customers and continue offering them a proprietary architecture product with increasing technical 
features and capabilities. Meanwhile, low-end entrants to the market start to offer lower-cost 
products, initially to non-customers, competing on other features such as cost or flexibility. With 
continued technological maturity, the incumbents overshoot the needs of the mainstream 
customers in the industry while entrants start to meet them. This results in the entrants displacing 
the incumbents shifting the competitiveness focus from technological merit to cost or flexibility. 
Consequently, the entrants open the industry architecture to enhance the productivity and permit 
further cost efficiencies. This open architecture becomes the new standard in the industry 
replacing the proprietary architecture products already existing. 
The entrants manage to fly under the incumbents' radar due to the following reasons that 
Christensen presents (Christensen, 1997): 
1. Companies depend on customers and investors for resources: 
Customers and investors often fail to recognize the added value of new disruptive technologies at 
their onset. Consequently, firms that are mostly customer-driven ignore these technologies. By 
the time the added value of these technologies is recognized later, it is often too late for the 
incumbents to enter the newly created markets. To overcome this dilemma, Christensen suggests 
that large companies need to create new units or organizations for addressing promising 
disruptive technologies. These organizations will only operate in the emerging markets and will 
hence have the necessary scale to justify their investments in the new technologies. 
2. Small markets don't solve the growth needs of large companies: 
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Large companies often allocate resources to their various projects based on their prospective 
contribution to their overall growth and profitability. This may deprive disruptive technology 
projects of resources due to their lower margin prospects and higher risks. Therefore to mitigate 
this risk, the organizations that large companies need to create, for addressing the emerging 
customers, need to be small for the small low-margin emerging markets to be adequate for their 
operations and growth. 
3. Markets that don't exist can't be analyzed: 
Large companies, that are used to sound decision-making methodologies relying on collecting 
market data before investing, find it difficult to invest in disruptive technology markets that have 
no available market information (Porter and Rivkin, 2000). Christensen, therefore, suggests that 
companies need to prudently invest in new technologies with the failure prospects in mind. The 
investments need to be considered as the price of learning and need to be flexible enough for 
iterative learning. 
4. Technology supply may not equal market demand: 
Continuous improvements on existing products often render them too good for what the market 
demands or can absorb. Competing lower end products, that may have been popular in smaller 
markets, could then become viable choices for the mainstream markets, especially that they 
usually offer superior price, reliability and convenience than existing mainstream ones. To 
ensure that this does not drive out producers of disruptive technologies, they need to move early 
and find markets for new attributes of their products. When mainstream markets reject certain 
attributes, companies need to find smaller markets where they are accepted. These latter markets 
are likely to become the mainstream markets of the future. 
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The disruptive cycle is depicted in figure 3 below with an additional line showing the slow-to-












Figure 2.2: Disruptive innovation cycle (Christensen, 1997) with the slow-to evolve regulations 
The constructs of disruptive innovation theory, presented by Christensen, and its implicit 
assumptions are the following: 
1. Suppliers are customer-driven 
Disruptive innovation theory assumes a market-driven industry where consumer needs evolve 
and alternates between technical features, at the early stages of a developing platform, and 
cost or flexibility later on as it matures. 
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2. The incumbents miss the evolution of customer needs as they continue to focus on high-
end clients 
The theory also assumes that as incumbents focus on the needs and specifications of their 
upper-end customers, they miss the needs of the majority of customers in the market and 
hence overshoot with their product offering the needs of the mainstream industry. 
3. An open architecture permits better efficiency and cost savings than a closed one. 
The theory states that entrants will offer an open product architecture to enable better 
efficiencies and compete on the cost and flexibility parameters demanded by the mainstream 
clients. It hence makes an implicit assumption that an open product architecture is more 
efficient than a proprietary architecture. 
Following "The Innovator's Dilemma", Christensen and Raynor published "The Innovator's 
Solution" (Christensen and Raynor, 2003) about managing technological discontinuities, 
highlighting the following points: 
1. Technological disruptions belong to one of the following 2 categories: 
New Market Disruptions: these involve finding solutions that enable customers to do jobs not 
doable before and therefore create new markets. As the new products improve, customers from 
incumbent value chains are often attracted to the new one. An example is the affordable office 
photocopier technology that created a new value chain around customers doing their own 
photocopying instead of sending them to specialized companies. Once the technology proved to 
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be reliable, many customers acquired it for the improved convenience and pricing over the old 
value chain. 
Low End Disruptions: these provide innovative solutions that resemble those in mainstream 
markets but that are less costly, more flexible or more affordable for that market segment. 
2. Companies may be able to anticipate the next disruptive technology by considering the 
"circumstances" of using their product rather than who their customers are. This will give them 
an understanding of whether "nonconsumers" present a market opportunity or if they have no use 
for the new product in their lives. A nonconsumption that may create a market opportunity is one 
where potential consumers have a need to use the product but have no access to convenient 
solutions because they do not exist, are too expensive, or are too complex to use. 
3. When products are still struggling to satisfy customer requirements, companies should offer 
proprietary and interdependent designs. This helps them to maintain a competitive advantage 
when value is captured in the market. When products exceed customer expectations, new 
emerging markets are eminent to emerge and it is better for companies to outsource and resort to 
an open modular architecture to attain efficiency and speed in bringing innovations to market. 
4. Whenever commoditization and architecture openness is happening at the product level and is 
eroding the profitability of suppliers, de-commoditization and architecture closure is happening at 
the sub-system level in the value chain and is providing opportunities of value capture. The high 
competitive forces on the product suppliers push for proprietary designs at the sub-component 
level to increase efficiency. 
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5. The resources, processes and values of a company determine its potential for pursuing 
disruptive technology markets. 
6. Disruptive technologies should be treated as opportunities not threats by preparing the 
company for harnessing them. This can be done by: 
a. Starting to look for disruption growth opportunities when the company is experiencing 
growth and creating a specialized group for that purpose; 
b. Placing a senior manager, capable of autonomous execution, in charge of the group; 
c. Accumulating expertise in the group for moving and shaping new ideas in the right 
technological channels, sustaining and disruptive; 
d. Training the sales, marketing and engineering employees to recognize disruptive 
opportunities and channel them through the right venues in the corporation. 
In summary, the first volume of Christensen's work warns against disruptive technologies that 
start small, grow unnoticed by large firms until they become the mainstream products thereby 
pushing incumbent firms out of competition. He points-out that large companies may be 
reluctant to venture into these markets due to their small volumes and thin margins, their little 
information available or because they are too focused on mainstream markets that they overshoot 
the clients' requirements in them. 
In the second volume, Christensen and Raynor present some solutions of how organizations can 
be redesigned for harnessing the opportunities presented by disruptive innovations: companies 
should pay attention to the patterns of using their products instead of the consumers themselves, 
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align their product architecture strategy with the product maturity level, search for de-
commoditization opportunities in their value chains and create special units capable of 
recognizing and channeling these opportunities in time to capture value from them (Christensen 
and Raynor, 2003). 
As mentioned above, Christensen's model of disruptive innovation, and implicitly Schumpeter's 
model of creative destruction, will be the main focus of this research. The implications of the 
model on product architecture will be verified for complex systemic product industries, following 
the same sequence of steps proposed by Christensen. This will help to verify the applicability of 
the model to complex industries as well as elaborate on the differences, in the case that they 
diverge from it. 
2.1.3 Innovation Diffusion 
The literature on innovation diffusion is typically focused on either the factors approach, 
investigating the factors that influence the rate of diffusion and adoption, or the stages approach 
where the different stages of the diffusion and adoption processes are studied (Xu and Quaddus, 
2005, Utterback, 2007). The bulk of the models in the stages approach demonstrate that diffusion 
follows a sigmoid pattern as shown in figure 4 below (Geroski, 2000; Geroski, 2003; Abernathy 
and Clark, 1985; Stoneman and Karshenas, 1995, Utterback, 2007). The convexity and concavity 
of this curve, representing the rate of the diffusion process, differ significantly across industries, 
technologies and countries (Stoneman and Karshenas, 1995). The stages of this diffusion process 
also differ significantly between industries and have therefore given rise to several staged models 
in the literature (Xu and Quaddus, 2005; Kwon and Zmud, 1987). Some of the models 
accounting for the delay, demonstrated in the s-curve, between the introduction of the technology 
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and its rapid adoption are: the epidemic model of information diffusion, the probit model, 
legitimation and competition, and information cascades (Geroski, 2000). The innovation curve 
can be decomposed into 2 superimposed curves, one for the product and another for the process. 
There is a time offset between the two curves as process innovation is often at its peak once the 
product innovation has tapered off and the market is in the process of selecting the dominant 
designs (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Utterback, 2007). 
! 
Time 
Figure 2.3: S-curve of Technological Diffusion 
Epidemic model 
The epidemic model is the starting point for most literature on technological diffusion (Stoneman 
and Karshenas, 1995). The news about a new technology typically starts from a single common 
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source (Geroski, 2000). This source transmits the information about the actual technology, i.e. 
the hardware, as well as how it can be used and its advantages over alternatives, i.e. the software 
(Rogers, 2003). While the hardware demonstrates the technical superiority of the innovative 
technology, it is the software that moves people to embrace it. Word of mouth becomes the 
second process of spreading information about the product after manufacturer's initial 
introduction. The convexity of the information flow S-curve depends on the summation of the 
two information flow processes (Geroski, 2000). 
Other factors that may not be reflected in the 2 drivers presented above can affect the rate of 
information flow. Population density, communication between the users and potential-user 
communities, and the ease of describing the new technology may all affect the rate of flow of 
information about it (Geroski, 2000). The degree of homophily or heterophily of the population 
may also affect the information flow. While homophilic populations have lower communication 
barriers between their members, they risk keeping the innovations confined to their boundaries 
hindering its vertical communication to other homophilic communities (Rogers, 2003). 
However, the rate of information flow about the new technology may not necessarily correspond 
to the rate of its adoption by potential users. In fact, Rogers proposes two phases within the 
information flow phase, namely information flow from mass media to opinion leaders followed 
by interpersonal influence of opinion leaders on less informed adopters (Rogers, 2003). Factors 
such as the complexity of the new product, the costs associated with switching to it and its 
superiority over the existing alternatives come into effect between the spread of information 
about the innovation and its adoption by new users (Geroski, 2000). 
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Despite its usefulness, the epidemic model can not be taken as an accurate depiction of the 
innovation diffusion mechanism model due to the changes in the information flow rates, the 
technology features and the potential users profile throughout the diffusion process, which may 
last for years (Geroski, 2000). Its main weakness remains to be its tight correlation between the 
adoption of technologies and the flow of information about them. 
An extension of the epidemic model was proposed by Mansfield based on the objection that 
information flow is not the main obstacle to innovation diffusion but rather the uncertainty about 
the performance characteristics of the new products. Mansfield's model demonstrates that the 
uncertainty is reduced over time as a result of the growth of the installed product base and the 
consequent learning accumulation (Mansfield, 1968). The resulting model, therefore, depicts the 
diffusion as a function of the profitability of installing the new technology and the capital 
requirements for doing so (Stoneman and Karshenas, 1995). Mansfield's model has its own 
inaccuracies in its assumption of static adopters' population, technology versions, and adoption 
profitability throughout the whole diffusion process (Stoneman and Karshenas, 1995). 
Probit Model 
While the epidemics model takes into account the flow of the innovation software, it does not 
account for the individual choices of the potential technology users. The probit model, on the 
other hand, represents the adoption rate by a function of variable x, where x is a feature that 
affects the user's profitability of adopting the new technology. The number of the technology 
adopters is, therefore, determined by the value of this feature, its threshold level for adoption and 
the shape of the mathematical function representing the population. The rate of adoption varies 
with the change in the rate of change of the threshold value of x, the feature variable (Geroski, 
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2000). Davies argues that x is the return on investment of the innovation (Davies, 1979). 
Alternately, x can be viewed as the net benefit of adopting the new technology. It can therefore 
account for both: factors in favor of the new technology, such as technological superiority, and 
factors hindering its diffusion, such as higher switching or learning costs. 
The pattern of change of the threshold of x determines whether it is a type A or type B 
innovation. Type "A" innovations are transparent for users and have, therefore, easy software 
diffusion. They therefore get adopted rapidly at the beginning but then their adoption rate slows 
down and decreases shortly afterwards. Type B innovation, on the other hand, are less 
transparent for users and therefore take a longer time to start diffusion. Once started, though, type 
B innovations reach their plateaus faster than type A innovations (Geroski, 2000). 
Legitimation & Competition 
Based on the density-dependent population growth model, presented in ecology literature, the 
legitimation and competition model justifies the S-curve of technology diffusion by the intensity 
of industrial competition around the innovation hindering its acceptance and institutionalization 
(Geroski, 2000). Two of the competitive forces that affect the diffusion rate are the "pre-emption 
effect" and the "rent displacement". Pre-emption effect occurs when adoption of the new 
technology is more favorable to some firms than others, therefore making the former adopt the 
technology faster than their rivals. Rent displacement arises when the adoption of the new 
technology is particularly costly for some firms primarily because the new technology 
cannibalizes some activities that they do (Geroski, 2000). This can be the reason for the different 
adoption rates between incumbents and new entrants. 
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Competition however may change, in rate and form, during the process of diffusion. At the early 
stages of the introduction of the new technology, competition is often between the new and the 
old technologies. Later on in the adoption cycle, competition shifts to become primarily amongst 
the new technology adopters. A study has also shown that competition between incumbents only 
is not a sufficient motivation for firms to adopt new technologies. However competing entrants 
often do stimulate incumbents to adopt new technologies (Geroski, 2000). 
Information Cascades 
To account for the initial conditions of the innovation diffusion function, Stoneman and 
Karshenas recommend considering generic technologies rather than the particular generations of 
the innovative product (Stoneman and Karshenas, 1995). Geroski, however, proposes an 
information cascades model based on the different competing product variants (Geroski, 2000). 
For 2 new versions of a new product, A and B, early adopters will invest in selecting the more 
favorable one between them. Later adopters, however, are less likely to make similar investments 
and more likely to chose the product of wider popularity and larger installed base. This 
information cascade effect starts with an initial choice between the products, followed by a lock-
in phase where the product initially more popular is increasingly favored and finally a bandwagon 
effect where later adopters mostly imitate early ones (Geroski, 2000). 
The possible outcomes of this information cascades model are more generally applicable than the 
others described above. If the initial choice between A and B is made quickly, then the 
information cascade will accelerate the lock-in effect and the diffusion of A. On the other hand, 
if the initial choice phase is slow and indeterminate, the adoption rate may be slower and both 
products may share the market or both die-out and never diffuse. Factors such as performance 
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differential between products A and B can affect the speed of the initial choice phase and the 
subsequent phases driven by the information cascades (Geroski, 2000). 
Most models of diffusion are based on free selection of innovation by mass markets. In this study 
of complex industries, innovation diffusion is governed by regulatory forces and a specialized 
market where information cascades, legitimation & competition and the probit model all 
influence the rate of technology adoption by clients. 
2.1.4 Games of Innovation 
A game of innovation is "a distinct logic of innovative activities that is largely contingent on 
product architectures and market lifecycle stage" (Miller and Olleros, 2008). Games are 
categorized into a number of natural trajectories (Nelson and Winter, 1982) that are classified 
based on the 2 axes: product architecture category and market phase. Miller and Olleros (2007) 
define the seven games of innovation depicted below in Figure 5. 
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7. Innovation Support: 
Business & Technical 
Figure 2.4: Games of Innovation (Miller and Olleros, 2008) 
A description of the games of innovation is presented below. 
Patent-Driven Discovery 
This game of innovation is common in appliance industries where the market's well-defined 
needs drive in-sourced research and development leading to patenting for value capture. The 
high R&D and capabilities-building expenditures necessitated often result in a few large 
competitors surrounded by their smaller complementary suppliers. 
Cost-Based Competition 
After patents expire, manufacturers of commodities lose their appropriation protection the 
competition metrics shift to cost. Innovation shifts towards cost-cutting process innovation and 
differentiation to target customers in niche markets. Economies of scale become more important 
for competitiveness favoring players with more financial resources. 
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Systems Integration 
This game is common in industries with demanding large buyers of complex engineering 
products. Collaboration with the customers is required before offering them proprietary systems 
to solve their problems. Reputation and product quality are very important assets of suppliers in 
this game as they compete for a share of the market. 
Systems Consulting & Engineering 
As suppliers in systems integration games mature, many forward integrate into offering integrated 
solutions and consulting expertise to their clients, hence entering the Systems Engineering and 
Consulting game. In this game of innovation where customer needs go beyond the technical 
system requirements, knowledge accumulation transcends the boundaries of the organization 
towards networks of expertise including universities, consultants and other experts. 
Platform Orchestration 
In this game of innovation, leaders promote open platforms where players can independently 
innovate based on an established standard. Promoting open standards and collaboration are the 
key innovation levers in this game allowing the technological advancement of the entire platform 
and its growth. 
Customized Mass Production 
Consequent to the selection of a particular platform, players often start mass producing 
components switching the competition battle to the brand level instead of the technology platform 
one. Lean supply chain networks and flexible assembly permit suppliers to differentiate away 
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from each other and towards non-consumers of their products. Barriers to entry at the periphery 
of the established platform become lower while they rise at the core facilitating its growth and 
extension. 
Supporting Innovating Firms 
Firms in this game innovate for selling their innovations to other industries. Market research 
firms and R&D contractors are examples of firms in this game that compete for low-margin 
services of providing technical or specialized expertise to their clients. 
2.2 Complexity, Modularity and Systems Integration 
To better understand the specifics of complex product industries and their divergence from other 
industries, the literature on complexity, modularity and complex product systems was reviewed. 
2.2.1 Modularity 
Herbert Simon observed and recorded how complexity in natural systems, such as social, 
biological and physical systems, results in their decomposability into hierarchic layers of 
compound systems with diminishing complexity (Simon, 2004). While absolute decomposability 
is mostly theoretical, near decomposability is the most common organizational form in complex 
industries (Simon, 2004). Near decomposability allows the whole complex system to create 
value while minimizing the need and costs of coordination (Simon, 2004). 
Baldwin and Clark define three requirements for systems modularity, namely an architecture that 
specifies the component modules and their functions, an interface dictating how they fit together 
and communicate and standards that verify the conformity of each of the modules to the design 
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rules (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Parnas recommends information hiding in systems modularity, 
by encapsulating the knowledge within the different modules, for minimizing the complexity of 
the required interface and standards (Parnas, 1972). Bargigli argues that modularity is needed for 
support high product variety as it permits interoperability of components and the linear 
association between components and functions (Bargigli, 2005). 
Amongst the three modularity elements, standards have been the most developed and have given 
rise to a significant portion of recent economic literature (Garud et al, 2003). While many firms 
attempt to establish their proprietary product architectures as standards, this increases their 
competition hence destabilizing the existing ones. This inherent instability in standards 
influences the strategic outcome of first-mover advantages (Garud et al, 2003). Network effects 
have also been observed when the value to an individual of adopting a standard is dependent on 
the others who also adopt it (Garud et al, 2003). The role of standards extends beyond 
verification of conformance. They act as accumulators of knowledge and experience, codifying 
tacit knowledge (Garud et al, 2003). They also reduce the transaction costs of coordination and 
create economies of scale (Kindleberger, 1983). In fact, it is standards that act as the vanishing 
hand and permit the decentralization of design and the production of modular systems (Langlois, 
2003). 
Modularity is quite commonly exhibited in complex industries thereby necessitating an 
interrogation of the literature on complexity and complex products. 
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2.2.2 Complex Products 
Complex product systems (CoPS) may be defined as "a set of humans and technologies united to 
perform a specific function, which are collectively incomprehensible to any single person" 
(Johnson, 2004). Simon defines them as "made up of a large number of parts that interact in a 
non-simple way" (Simon, 2004). Dosi et al, characterize complex products by having an 
increased number of functionalities requiring multiple components, and an increasing number of 
distinct scientific disciplines and technologies (Dosi et al, 2004). Yet Prencipe provides another 
definition for CoPS as capital-, engineering and IT-intensive business-to-business products that 
are often produced by multi-firm alliances as a one-off or in small batches for specific customers 
(Prencipe, 2004). All these definitions converge to identify the following feature of CoPS 
industries: 
1. They are made of integrated multiple components 
2. They require special integration skills 
3. They are unique products 
4. They require the emergence of alliances and networks of suppliers to make them 
5. They have specific and involved customers 
The military industries in the US have played a significant role in driving innovation and systems 
integration since World War II (Sapolsky, 2004). Pavitt attributes increased product complexity, 
since the industrial revolution, to the trend of increased specialization, bolstered by mass 
production, and the appearance of periodic waves of major innovations in specific technologies 
(Pavitt, 2004). 
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Modular complex products may develop open product architectures where the integration of the 
product modules is done by the market. Such a product architecture requires a re-organization of 
the industry to support it while protecting the intellectual property rights of the various players. 
To better understand the effects of product architecture on industry organization, the definitions 
of open and closed product architectures were sought in the literature. 
2.2.3 Architecture Modularity & Openness 
Ulrich defines product architecture as "the scheme by which the function of a product is allocated 
to physical components and by which the components interact" (Ulrich, 1995). He elaborates 
further that product architecture is the arrangement of functional elements; the mapping from 
functional elements to physical components; and the specification of the interfaces among 
interacting physical components (Ulrich, 1995). In these terms, he defines a modular architecture 
as one where there is a one-to-one mapping between functional elements and physical 
components (i.e. every function is performed by one distinct component). This enables 
standardized and simple interfaces between the product components (Shibata et al, 2005). An 
integral architecture, on the other hand, is where there is no such linear relationship between 
functions and physical components, i.e. multiple components may do the same function or one 
component may perform multiple functions (Ulrich, 1995). This lack of linearity between 
components and functions hinders the development of standardized interfaces and thus 
modularity (Shibata et al, 2005). 
Along different axes from those of modularity or integrality, architecture openness is the degree 
of sharing standard component interfaces amongst the companies in an industry (Shibata et al, 
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2005). This openness directly affects the capability of these companies to create value 
independently from one another and sometimes in the absence of arm's length contracts. While 
hypothetically modular and integral products may have open or closed architectures, creating four 
possible product configurations, it is quite uncommon to find integral products with an open 
architecture (Shibata et al, 2005). The inadequacy of standardized interfaces in the integral 
product will hinder value creation from companies that are not directly involved in defining the 
proprietary architecture. This leaves three configurations of products: closed integral, closed 
modular and open modular. Closed integral products are composed of a single module and 
produced by one firm and its network of certified subcontractors (Miller and Olleros, 2008). 
Closed modular products are composed of multiple modules but still produced by one firm. Open 
modular is when a modular product is produced collectively by several companies in the industry 
governed by product standards rather than formal contractual agreements. Figure 6 depicts these 





Figure 2.5: The configurations resulting from product modularity and industry architecture 
openness 
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It is important to make the distinction between architecture modularity and architecture openness 
as the former refers to the product integration scheme while the latter pertains to the industry 
organization structure (Shibata et al, 2005). Some literature seemed to invariably correlate 
architecture openness with product modularity. Christensen, for example, hypothesizes that when 
modular products reach technological maturity, competitive pressures result in pushing their 
coordination to the market level and hence opening the architecture (Christensen and Raynor, 
2003). Gawer and Cusumano presented a similar view in their study of platform industries where 
core component suppliers who invested in defining a global product architecture where successful 
in opening the architecture of their modular products (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). Simon, on 
the other hand, finds that the costs of coordinating the member organizations and maintaining 
their motivation towards the organizational goal may hinder architecture openness even in 
conditions of product modularity (Simon, 2004). 
2.2.4 Hierarchical vs. Heterarchical Architectures 
The literature describing open architectures often refers to cases of hierarchical architectures 
where a deterministic strategy of defining an interface then opening the architecture is pursued by 
the provider of a distinguishable core component (Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough et al, 2006, 
Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). This is true in many cases such as Intel, Microsoft and Cisco as 
described by Gawer and Cusumano (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). For other industries though, a 
heterarchical open architecture may be created through a series of uncorrelated industry moves 
carried out by different players. Olleros uses such a non-normative approach to non-contractual 
innovation to interpret the failure of Sony's Betamax standard in front of its VHS competitor 
(Olleros, 2007). The adoption of the VHS standard by video-rental stores created the necessary 
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network externalities for establishing it as a monopoly in the US market and later internationally. 
Neither Sony nor JVC had much influence on this grassroots movement by individual video 
rental stores that shaped the industry despite Hollywood's opposition and Sony and JVC's 
surprise. Olleros also highlights the literature's oversimplification of the core and periphery roles 
citing Apple's desktop publishing platform where it is quite hard to identify the core and 
periphery amongst the Mcintosh computer, laser printer, PostScript printer interface and 
PageMaker application (Olleros, 2007). The literature therefore makes a distinction between 
normative hierarchical open platforms centrally created and maintained, and decentralized 
heterarchical platforms where architectural openness is driven by the peripheral component 
markets. 
2.2.5 The Cyclical Model of Openness 
Chesbrough and Christensen predict a cyclical model of modularity in industries where product 
architectures constantly alternate between modular open architectures, at times of technological 
maturity, and proprietary closed architectures at times of technological development 
(Chesbrough, 2004; Christensen and Raynor, 2003). They predict that administrative 
coordination of subcomponents integration, i.e. within the firm, is needed at the earlier phases of 
a new product lifecycle. As the product matures, its component attributes better understood and 
its supplier base expands, this administrative coordination may be replaced by a market 
coordination, which is the creation of an open product architecture. Chesbrough, similar to 
Christensen, further argues that while organizations will focus on competing within the 
boundaries of the new architecture, they may be losing the necessary system-level knowledge 
necessary to define a new architecture when the limits of the current one are reached 
(Chesbrough, 2004). Even for those who avoid this pitfall, transforming the architecture while it 
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is open and modular may be very difficult due to the complexity of collaborating the 
transformation with all the players and reforming the appropriate system of connections. 
Chesbrough therefore suggests that the product shifts back to an interdependent proprietary stage, 
where it can be reviewed, a new architecture made and then modularized again for the market 
(Chesbrough, 2004). The result, predicts Chesbrough, is a technology path that alternates 
between modular (open) and interdependent (closed) architectures with the transition happening 
as firms and markets outperform each other in each mode (Chesbrough, 2004). 
2.2.6 Integrated Solutions 
Integrated solutions have become one of the popular themes of recent systems integration 
literature (Brady et al, 2005; Wise and Baumgartner, 1999; Davies, 2001; Galbraith, 2002; Oliva 
and Kallenberg, 2003) and an important trend in many industries. Rooted in the infrastructure 
construction industry BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) projects, integrated solutions are unique 
combinations of products and systems with services in order to produce and support a system 
throughout its lifecycle (Brady et al, 2005; Davies, 2001). Integrated solutions, unlike their 
constituent products, are often customized requiring the supplier's full understanding of the 
client's needs (Kandampully, 2002). Several key drivers of integrated solutions are identified in 
the literature. First, the increased complexity of clients and their needs has created a "market 
pull" effect that favors customized and comprehensive product offering (Shepherd and Ahmed, 
2000; Brady et al, 2005). Second, the rapidly changing markets, and consequently client needs, 
necessitate that suppliers remain in close contact with their clients and hence favoring post-sales 
support and involvement with the product lifecycle (Shepherd and Ahmed, 2000). Third, 
integrated solutions provide continuous revenue streams to suppliers unlike the occasional 
demand surges and long sales cycles, characteristic of most complex products (Brady et al, 2005). 
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To make the transition from a traditional products organization to one offering integrated 
solutions requires overcoming an enormous inertia and acquiring new skills and competences 
(Brady et al, 2005). Brady, Davies and Gann conducted research on suppliers of complex 
industries transitioning to integrated solutions and concluded that they need to acquire: systems 
integration capabilities, operational service capabilities, business consulting capabilities and 
financing capabilities (Brady et al, 2005). These capabilities often require a change of corporate 
culture and this adds to the complexity of their acquisition. 
2.3 Networks and Coordination 
Networks, alliances, joint ventures and partnerships are formal mechanisms of cooperation 
between companies. They occur for various objectives such as developing new products, 
penetrating new markets or acquiring competitive advantages (Kamel, 2006). On the other hand, 
forms of informal network formation and collaboration have also emerged in industries. 
Researchers such as Langlois, Porter, Nalebuff and Cusumano studied various forms of 
collaboration modes that shape industries today. The dominant theories of clusters, bundling, 
value nets and platforms are reviewed below. 
2.3.1 Integration-Based Classification of Organizational Forms 
Robertson and Langlois presented a 2-axes classification of the different organizational forms that 
industries may assume based on ownership integration and coordination integration extents 
(Robertson and Langlois, 1995). Figure 7 below depicts this classification followed by a 
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Figure 2.6: Classification of organizational forms based on degrees of ownership and 
coordination integration 
The ownership integration axis refers to the firm boundaries surrounding the various entities 
networked. The coordination integration refers to the degree of formal collaboration between 
them. 
Marshallian districts refer to clusters of small producers of a particular product with little 
legislation and market interactions between them. They exhibit the least coordination and 
ownership integration as they are often distinct firms relying on market mechanisms. Venture 
capital networks are relatively independent networks with some synergies and coordination 
imposed by a layer of venture capitalists superimposed over the management layer. Japanese 
Kaisha networks are coordination mechanisms prevalent in the Japanese automobile industries 
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where tier-1 suppliers are given autonomy over the design and provision of complete sub-
assemblies according to arms-length contractual specifications. Chandlerian firms are vertically 
integrated exhibiting a high degree of ownership integration as well as coordination integration. 
"Third Italy" firms are those modeled after the region in Northeast Italy where much of the 
industry is located in smaller towns in the form of small independent producers with intense 
cooperation between them (Brusco, 1982 and Robertson & Langlois, 1995). Finally, a holding 
company model, one that is becoming increasingly popular since the legacies of General Electric 
and Mitsubishi, networks companies through integrated ownership but distinct and independent 
operations. 
2.3.2 Clusters 
Porter defines clusters to be "geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and 
institutions in a particular field" (Porter, 1998). As shown in the few examples that Porter cited, 
clusters may go beyond geographical limitations to establish a network of suppliers and clients of 
a particular product sharing the same logistical, informational and marketing support 
mechanisms. 
Clusters permit and encourage cooperation and competition relationships to coexist along 
different axes and among different players (Porter, 1998). Bell argues that this involvement in 
the cluster enhances the innovativeness of the individual players (Bell, 2005). In establishing an 
informal cooperation bond between competitors, clusters address the difficulties of contractual 
relationships without imposing the onerous need for vertical integration or for establishing 
expensive alliances and cooperation agreements. They also drive the pace of innovation in an 
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industry while encouraging new businesses to emerge, motivated by the benefits of operating 
within the cluster (Porter, 1998). 
Clusters literature addresses the geographical or logistical proximity of similar and 
complementary products and is therefore suitable to analyze a higher level of coordination than 
that required to produce a single systemic product. Clusters literature is therefore expected to be 
of limited use in this research. 
2.3.3 Value Nets 
Another major milestone in modern strategic management science was Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff s introduction of the concept of co-opetition, meaning simultaneous competition and 
cooperation (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1995). Contrary to Porter's model of antagonism 
between firms, Nalebuff introduced the need to collaborate even with competing firms in some 
circumstances. While competitors, customers and suppliers are crucial, Nalebuff added 
Complementers to a firm's external interactions to group all other firms, competitors or not, 
whose products add value to the firm's own product. The relationship between the firm and its 
complementary organizations are not necessarily formal contractual ones but are often 
circumstantial. Nalebuff s value net, describing the above-mentioned interactions, is shown in 
Figure 8 below. 
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Customers 
Substitutes Company Complementors 
Suppliers 
Figure 2.7: Nalebuff's Value Net Framework 
Value nets provide a tool for understanding some interactions within an industry. However, they 
are quite limited in their applicability towards understanding and analyzing concepts like product 
maturity, product architecture and disruptive innovations. 
2.3.4 Platforms 
A platform is a locus of new business opportunity that offers option value to its members through 
its flexible and scalable architecture (Miller and Olleros, 2008). In 2002, Gawer and Cusumano 
published "Platform Leadership, how Intel, Microsoft and Cisco drive Industry Innovation". In 
this work, the authors used the cases of Intel, Microsoft and Cisco to elaborate the creation, 
maintenance and leadership of platform industries. A platform industry is one where a central 
product component is defined as the core and other components are defined to be peripherals 
interfacing with it (Gawer and Cusumano 2002; Cusumano and Gawer, 2003). The core provider 
defines and makes the interface standards to the core available, thereby reducing the risks of 
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innovation for peripheral suppliers and enabling the emergence of new ones. The defined 
interface standards enable suppliers of peripheral components to focus their design and 
innovation efforts on the functionality of their own peripheral without having to coordinate their 
moves with those of other suppliers or the core. The onus of developing the whole platform, 
therefore, lies on the core supplier and its development of the core and its interface. 
The examples cited in the platform industry literature are from the ICT (Information and 
Communications Technology) sector (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). Intel, building the processor 
chips, realized that for its business volume to continue to grow it would have to develop the PC 
industry and create demand for its component. The PCI Bus Interface was created as the standard 
for connecting the various components and peripherals of the PC in a standard way. The PCI Bus 
permitted component developers to focus on developing their input/output peripherals pushing 
their CPU performance needs further and hence growing the processor's market. The established 
standards also permitted the emergence of many entrepreneurial firms supplying peripherals, 
increasing the competition on the established players and hence accelerating the demand for the 
core processors (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). 
The mechanisms of platform creation and leadership are expected to be quite useful for this 
research. Complex products may evolve to a platform configuration with the definition of a core 
and an architecture that maintains the independence of peripheral components from each other. 
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2.4 Management Literature 
2.4.1 Porter's Competitive Strategy Framework 
Porter's perspective on strategy is that coping with competition is its essence (Porter, 2007). His 
theoretical framework, discussed below, was based on an economic view of the firm and its 
interactions with the main entities surrounding it (Porter, 1980). Porter's five force industry 

















Figure 2.8: Porter's Five Force model (Porter, 1980) 
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In this model, Porter argues that a firm interacts with the following 5 entities: 
1. Suppliers 
2. Buyers 
3. Possible Entrants to the industry 
4. Substitutes 
5. Competitors 
A firm's optimal strategy is one that enables it to leverage its relationship with these five entities, 
protect itself against them and influence them in its favor. This allows the firm to secure a 
competitive advantage position in its market. Increasing the negotiation power over customers, 
decreasing the negotiation power of suppliers, building high entry barriers to entrants and 
sustaining comparative superiority over substitutes enables a firm to build a competitive position 
in its market. The industry's long-term profitability, as a whole, is also influenced by these 5 
competitive forces (Porter, 2007). Porter went further to suggest three distinct strategies that 
firms ought to choose from to ensure their competitive success, namely: 
1. Cost Advantage; 
2. Quality Advantage; 
3. Market Segment Specialization. 
Porter warned against hybrid strategies combining these three strategies as they may expose the 
organization to their combined risks. 
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In approaching the question of disruptive innovation in complex industries, Porter's model is 
insufficient to account for the complex interactions among the firms that collaborate to make the 
product. The primary unit of analysis in Porter's model is the production organization. It will 
therefore be insufficient for investigating relationships between different competitors and 
complementors inside that primary unit. Porter's model also represents clients as an external 
entity, independent of the product organization. This latter assumption may not be true in 
complex industries where expert clients are heavily involved in the product design and 
manufacturing processes. 
2.4.2 Industry Transformation 
Porter's view of industry structure, composed of 5 competitive forces, usually evolves slowly as 
relationships reinforce one another into one of a few internally consistent configurations (Porter 
and Rivkin, 2000). Shifts in industry dynamics, however, do occur and can be triggered by 
changes in cost or buyer value in the same industry or in another upstream or downstream to it. 
These shifts may result in industrial transformation and shakeout of incumbent players. Such 
shifts may be triggered by changes in technology, in customer needs or in regulations. The 
triggers alter relative positions of the 5 competitive forces forming the industry structure, favoring 
some positions over others and forming management to make tradeoffs to adapt to the 
transformation. 
The transformation triggers often first result in a period of experimentation where different 
companies initiate trial-and-error attempts to find the new winning formula (Porter and Rivkin, 
2000). This period usually coincides with flooding the industry with numerous entrants seeking 
their opportunity to find the next optimal configuration of relative positions. Alliances usually 
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abound during experimentation periods as entrants seek to hedge their risks and acquire 
knowledge from others. Management's decisions during such experimentation periods may 
influence, not only their respective companies' market positioning during and after the 
transformation, but also the array of possible industry structures. Experimentation periods are 
usually followed by convergence where 50% or more of the players in the industry are driven out 
of the market by the emerging dominant designs (Porter and Rivkin, 2000). 
The pace of industrial transformations has dramatically increased over the last few decades. 
Agarwal and Gort reported a 10 fold decrease in the average duration of first-mover monopoly 
between the turn of the 20* century and the period of the 1960's - 1980's (Agarwal and Gort, 
2001). This should result in an increased emphasis on strategic planning with an increased 
awareness of the inherent uncertainties and increased attention to anticipating industry structure 
in the future (Porter and Rivkin, 2000). 
Industrial transformation literature will be an important tool in the understanding of the evolution 
of product and industry architecture in response to technological maturity in complex industries. 
Its unit of analysis, however, remains the individual company thereby limiting its applicability for 
the research subject at hand where inter-firm collaboration is key. 
2.4.3 Configuration Strategy School 
In contrast to Porter's deterministic strategy style, Mintzberg and other academics in strategic 
management have developed the configuration school (Mintzberg et al, 1998). While the 
strategic positioning school sets the optimum strategy based on external factors, the configuration 
school, on the other hand, considers corporate strategy to be a description of a company's state as 
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a function of time (Mintzberg et al, 1998). In other words, the configuration school adapts the 
strategy to the company's status quo rather than seeking to change the company's present state to 
adhere to the strategy. 
It is difficult to understand disruptive innovations in complex industries through the configuration 
school's perspective. The somewhat reactive strategic management approach, that the school 
promotes, does not provide an adequate framework for understanding the deterministic 
coordination relationships engineered by players in complex product industries. 
2.4.4 Evolutionary Theory 
"In contrast to economic approaches that assume perfect rationality, evolutionary theory implies 
uncertainty, learning, and a permanent 'race' for competitive advantage" (Barron, 2003). 
Different evolutionary schools have been introduced in the literature: Institutionalists, post-
Keynesians, neo-Austrians, neo-Schumpeterians and neo-classical economists (Foster, 1997). 
Perhaps the most influential of these is evolutionary economics developed by Nelson and Winter 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). Other important evolutionary approaches are McPherson's niche 
overlap model (McPherson, 1983) and Hannan and Freeman's organizational ecology theory 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977). 
With the exception of post-Keynesian school, all the modern evolutionary schools use biological 
analogies, and particularly competition, to analyze evolutionary change in economic systems 
(Foster, 1997). The general guidelines common to all evolutionary approaches is that they 
involve 3 distinct mechanisms: variation, selection and retention (Barron, 2003). Blind variation 
is the presence of alternative technologies, organizational forms or products, the results of 
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implementing which are unknown (Barron, 2003). Selection is the process that favors the more 
beneficial amongst the different alternatives available. For the effect of selection in an industry to 
be well understood, it is important to specify the product characteristic that is being selected for 
and the expected output of that selection (Barron, 2003). Selection from the variations does not 
necessarily result in optimality. This is because of the limitation of the human ingenuity 
capacities, the constant changes in the environment thereby constantly re-defining optimality and 
the entrenching of some technological variants due to non meritocratic technical factors (Barron, 
2003). 
Evolutionary Economics 
In Nelson and Winter's evolutionary economics model, organizations possess bundles of routines 
that constitute their memory and knowledge of how to carry-out their core operations (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Nelson and Winter, 1997; Barron, 2003). These routines are contained in the 
explicit processes and procedures but more importantly in the tacit knowledge that each member 
of the organization possesses about his role. Coordination to produce the organization's product 
lies at the core of these routines (Nelson and Winter, 1997). Evolution takes place when routines 
are updated and improved by the organization management following their performance 
evaluation. These organizational routines are often self-sustaining and are difficult to depart 
from. Quality and competitiveness therefore become functions of the organization's ability to 
control its routines and ensure their smooth operation. 
One way to achieve this smooth operation is by controlling the various inputs to the routine as 
well as the components and equipment that it utilizes (Nelson and Winter, 1997). Some of this 
control would be exercised using other routines while some will be ad-hoc. In either case, this 
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control affects the organizational routines and hence the competitiveness of the organization 
(Nelson and Winter, 1997). Teece has further developed this concept by introducing dynamic 
capabilities, which permit firms to integrate, build and reconfigure these routines (Teece, 1987). 
Zollo and Winter further explored this area investigating the mechanisms of creating and 
developing these dynamic capabilities (Zollo and Winter, 2002). 
Another feature of evolutionary routines is their additivity, which is their modularity and ability 
to be replicated for similar operations but of different scales (Nelson and Winter, 1997). The 
existing routines can serve as templates for new ones to be formed. Obstacles such as poor 
communication, poor codification and reluctance to share information may hinder the replication 
process though (Nelson and Winter, 1997). 
Unlike replication, which happens within organizations, imitation attempts to copy routines, or 
their final outputs, from one organization to another. Imitations are likely to be most successful 
when copying a novel combination of standardized components and is likely to be least 
successful if the routine contains a lot of idiosyncratic and tacit knowledge (Nelson and Winter, 
1997). 
Niche-Overlap Model 
Sociologist Miller McPherson's niche overlap model relies on ecological principles to explain the 
evolution of organizations and their markets. The space of potential clients available to an 
organization is termed its niche (McPherson, 1983). The areas of intersection of niches of 
different organizations represent the customers that they compete on. Large overlap areas, 
representing fierce competition, can be thought of as exploitation hills where the market is over-
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exploited. Organizations on these hills will often try to find niche markets by differentiating into 
under-exploited areas, represented by valleys. This 'down-hill' movement results in increased 
differentiation either towards other resource niches or towards specific subgroups of the existing 
niche (Barron, 2003). Similar to Nelson and Winter's model, McPherson's model focuses on an 
internal characteristic as the driver of adaptive evolutionary change in an organization. Both 
models would predict reaching equilibrium if the environment is stable (Barron, 2003). 
McPherson's model does not rely on managerial action for evolution. While awareness of the 
model dynamics may help managers accelerate it, the model will still work autonomously 
(Barron, 2003). 
Organizational / Population Ecology 
Hannan and Freeman developed yet another evolutionary theory, namely organizational ecology, 
or population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). In their theory, the selection is for 
organizational survival and the variation is caused by industry entrants rather than the adaptation 
of the incumbents (Barron, 2003). Their Darwinian approach emphasizes the inertia that firms 
have and their resistance to change and hence the selection level at the industry level (Barron, 
2003). 
Some evolutionary theories, such as that of Hannan and Freeman, emphasize the 'Darwinian' 
natural selection of the fittest as being the driver behind industrial evolution rather than the 
evolution of individual organizations (Hannan and Freeman, 1995; Barron, 2003). This is 
attributed mostly to the fact that managers can not predict environmental changes early enough to 
adapt their organizations to them and the assumption that organizations need some level of inertia 
to survive (Barron, 2003). However, Hannan and Freeman have shown that most changes in 
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organizations happen at the peripheral level with little changes to their core features, namely the 
mission, form of authority, basic technology and general marketing strategy (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1995). Barron sees that this resolves the apparent contradiction between the 
Lamarckian approaches, emphasizing individual organization's evolution, and the observation 
that inertia is essential for organizations (Barron, 2003). 
Foster argues that the use of biological analogies has weakened the evolutionary approaches and 
hindered their embracement in mainstream economics (Foster, 1997). He argues that a self-
organization approach, based on thermodynamic systems theory, is a more appropriate foundation 
given that an economic system can be modeled as an open system with semi-closed boundary 
conditions (Foster, 1997). Irrespective of the foundations of its modeling, evolutionary theories 
need significant further development in their consideration of demand, knowledge, networks and 
co-evolution before they can be comprehensive enough to tackle disruptive technologies 
(Malerba, 2006). 
Evolutionary theory may be a useful tool for analyzing complex industries due to its emphasis on 
path dependence and learning accumulation within the organization. However, the picture 
provided by evolutionary theory is limited inside the organization and does not account for the 
coordination with external entities, which are an integral part of complex product industries. 
2.4.5 Bundling 
In their work, Adams and Yellen define bundling as "the practice of package selling" (Adams and 
Yellen, 1976). Stremersch and Tellis define it as "the sale of two or more separate products in 
one package" (Stremersch and Tellis, 2002). The latter authors emphasize the word 'separate' 
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and define it as products that have distinct markets, from an end-user perspective, to distinguish 
between bundled product packages and complex products made of numerous sub-products (as 
defined by Salinger, 1995 and Telser, 1979). By limiting their study to pure bundling, Fang and 
Norman were able to develop a model for the optimality of bundling in various industries (Fang 
and Norman, 2003). Their model suggests that products of "thin markets" (i.e. those with high 
marginal production costs or dispersion in valuations) should not be bundled while those in "thick 
markets" are better bundling candidates (Fang and Norman, 2003). 
Marketing and economics literature distinguish between 3 categories of bundling strategies: pure 
and mixed bundling (Adams and Yellen, 1976), product and price bundling (Stremersch and 
Tellis, 2002) and mixed-leader bundling and tie-in sales (Simon et al, 1995). 
Mixed bundling refers to a pricing strategy where the products included in a bundle may also be 
purchased separately while pure bundling occurs when the products in the package are not offered 
for sale individually (Adams and Yellen, 1976; Fang and Norman, 2003). 
Product bundling refers to "the integration of two or more separate products at any price" 
entailing the introduction of an integral architecture encompassing the subcomponents. The 
integrated product bundle should provide more value to the end-user than its individual 
components. This value may be in the form of compactness, seamless integration, reduced risk or 
convenience (Stremersch and Tellis, 2002). Product bundling, therefore, raises the consumers' 
reservation prices higher than the sum of the conditional reservation prices of its individual 
components (Stremersch and Tellis, 2002). An example of a product bundle is a PC system 
composed of different parts, each with its own separate market, packaged into an integrated 
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product. Price bundling on the other hand involves "the selling of two or more separate products 
in a package at a discount" (Stremersch and Tellis, 2002). While price bundling is an easier 
quick-to-implement promotional tool, product bundling is a more strategic approach involving the 
creation of an integrated product architecture (Stremersch and Tellis, 2002). The reservation 
price for the price bundle is equal to the sum of the conditional reservation prices of its 
components, which indicates that the price bundle does not offer any added value to the end user 
and hence has to be offered at a discounted price (Stremersch and Tellis, 2002). 
Related to Stremersch's work on product bundling is the relatively recent work on integrated 
solutions involving both products and services (Davies 2001; Brady et al, 2005; Wise and 
Baumgartner, 1999). The trend towards integrated solutions has appeared in complex capital 
sectors such as the large construction projects industry (Brady et al, 2005) or the flight simulation 
industry (Miller et al, 1995; Kamel and Miller, 2004). 
In mixed-leader pricing strategies, a mature low-priced product is bundled with an innovative 
high-end product. This permits raising the profit margins on the innovative leader products. In 
tie-in sale bundling, the tying product, a durable product, is bundled with tied complementers 
which are often its accessories. This helps the tying product supplier to extend its market 
penetration and control to the tied products (Simon et al, 1995). The example studied in the 
literature of tie-in sales is IBM's strategy in the 1930's of bundling its tabulating machines, 
enjoying a semi-monopoly market position, with punched cards for enlarging its market share in 
the punched cards market (Simon et al, 1995). 
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Product bundling, and integrated solutions more specifically, will be a useful concept in the 
research analysis as it has been a growing trend in the aviation training industry in recent years. 
2.4.6 Resource-Based Theory 
The resource-based view is a key component of the theory of the firm, focusing on the costly-to-
copy attributes of the firm as sources of rents and drivers of performance and competitive 
advantage (Conner, 1991; Barney, 1986). Rooted in evolutionary economics (Spanos and 
Lioukas, 2001), the resource-based theory links companies' performance with their acquisition of 
their resources (Wernerfelt, 1984) and their development of distinctive competences (Selznick, 
1957; Collis, 1994) and dynamic capabilities (Teece, 1987; Zollo and Winter, 2002). In contrast 
to classical and neo-classical economic theories, the resource-based view of the firm does not 
assume competitors' equal access to similar production resources but rather justifies their 
discrepant competitiveness by their ability to find and utilize superior hard-to-copy resources 
(Peteraf and Barney, 2003). Unlike Porter's competitive strategy framework, the resource based 
theory takes an inside-out approach to understanding the competitive advantage of firms (Spanos 
and Lioukas, 2001). While the debate concerning the relative effects of the industry vs. specific 
firm effects on performance continues (Spanos and Lioukas, 2001), the two theories, may be seen 
as two sides of the same coin as the examination of the strategy implementation skills can not be 
understood outside the context of the competitive environment (Barney, 1986). While the 
resource-based view recognizes the role of revolutionary innovation to shift markets, it supports 
the view that incremental innovations, protected by resource barriers, are also sufficient for 
above-average profitability (Conner, 1991). In either type of innovation, the resource-based view 
is insufficient for considering both the internal and external sources of competitive advantage 
simultaneously. 
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Similar to evolutionary theory, the resource based view emphasizes the firm's internal 
capabilities and thus highlights the value of learning and knowledge accumulation which are 
critical for complex product industry players. Both theories are lacking in their treatment of inter-
firm collaboration relationships, industrial organization and product architecture. 
2.4.7 Game Theory 
Game Theory is an interdisciplinary strategic approach to studying behavior. The theory 
appeared in 1944 when John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published their book 'Theory 
of Games and Economic Behavior' (von Neuman and Morgenstern, 1944). A game, as defined 
by the theory, is composed of players, strategies and payoffs. The players are the two or more 
decision-making entities whose utilities are interdependent. The strategies are the set of possible 
moves available to the players while the payoffs are the resulting outcomes of the decisions made 
by each of the players (Wilkinson, 2005). 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern presented two main types of games. In the first 'rule-based 
games' the rules of engagement are known to the players through contractual, regulatory or 
legislative guidelines (Bradenburger and Nalebuff, 1995). In these games, players' actions are 
met with predictable reactions from the other players. Winning strategies are therefore those that 
take into consideration the series of response strategies that will be adopted in response to the 
initial move. In free-wheeling games, the second type of games identified by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, players interact freely without any particular structure (Bradenburger and Nalebuff, 
1995). This results in players not being able to take more out of the game than the added value 
that they bring to it (Bradenburger and Nalebuff, 1995). 
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Wilkinson summarizes at least seven categories of games distinguished in the literature 
(Wilkinson, 2005): 
1. Cooperative and non-cooperative games: cooperative games are ones where the different 
players may communicate with each other and collude. Most business games in 
developed economies are non-cooperative due to the legal restrictions on collusion. 
2. Two-player and multi-player games: two player games are the simplest form of games. 
In multi-player games 'the tragedy of the commons' is more likely as it is easier for 
players to defect than to collude. Risks of coalitions between some players against others 
are also possible in multi-player games. 
3. Zero-sum and non zero-sum games: zero-sum games are those involving a fixed pool of 
payoffs such that the gain of one player is the loss of the other. In non-zero games, on 
the other hand, the combined profits of the players vary according to their respective 
strategies. Most business games in reality are non zero sum games. 
4. Perfect and imperfect information games: in perfect information games, the payoffs 
resulting from adopting the various strategies are well known to all the players involved. 
Imperfect information games are more common in business. 
5. Static and dynamic games: static games involve the players making their moves 
simultaneously and therefore eliminating reactive moves made by one player in response 
to the moves made by the others. Dynamic moves, on the other hand, involve sequential 
moves involving reactions amongst players. 
6. Discrete and continuous strategies: in discrete strategies, a player has to choose from a 
defined list of available strategies. However, in business reality, continuous strategies are 
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more common where the number of possible choices available to each player is virtually 
unlimited. 
7. One-off and repetitive strategies: one-off strategies are those made only once. Business 
games, in reality, are mostly repetitive involving several moves and responses made by 
the different players throughout their market lifetimes. 
Game theory assumes rational economic behavior from all the players, seeking to maximize their 
profits or utility value at all times (Wilkinson, 2005). The theory therefore assumes that the game 
will come to an equilibrium situation and defines three such situations (Wilkinson, 2005): 
1. Dominant strategy equilibrium: this involves the availability of a strictly dominant 
strategy for one of the players that will always give a payoff at least as high as any other 
strategy, irrespective of the strategies adopted by the other players. 
2. Iterated strategy equilibrium: this involves one player adopting strategies that will 
iteratively lead to having a dominant strategy. 
3. Nash equilibrium: is when each player will pursue their best strategy in response to the 
best strategy of the other players. This is the most general type of equilibrium 
encompassing the first two. 
Kretschmer presents an example of a game theoretic strategy that Boeing pursued in response to 
Airbus's plans to build the A380 airplane (Kretschmer, 1998). The payoffs to Boeing were 
optimal had neither Airbus nor Boeing pursued the project to completion. A positive response 
from Boeing launching a comparable aircraft program would have jeopardized the sales of their 
B747 jumbo jet, the next largest aircraft in the industry. Boeing would have, therefore, had a 
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dominant strategy had their attempts to deter Airbus from pursuing this program been successful 
(Kretschmer, 1998). 
The primary insight that game theory brings to strategy literature is the allocentric view of 
strategy that encompasses not only the firm's strategy but that of other firms involved in its game 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1995). This renders game theory a suitable tool for understanding 
and analyzing complex industries where extensive interactions exist between competitors and 
collaborators. However, game theory does not provide a model for technological evolution in an 
industry but rather a model of coordination of the players involved in it. Therefore, while some 
principles from it may be used for this analysis, it is not the main tool in this research. 
To study the effects of technological maturity on the product architecture of complex industries, 
the disruptive innovation theory of Christensen and Chesbrough is at the core of the analysis with 
its underlying constructs used to formulate the research hypothesis. The literature about complex 
products, complexity, modularity and product architecture were also used to help formulate the 
hypothesis and analyze the results of the validation. These theories and definitions given in the 
literature have guided the research throughout its phases from hypothesis formulation to the 
research instrument creation, to data collection and finally data analysis. Tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 
2.4 summarize the key theories from innovation literature, complexity literature and management 
literature discussed above and their relevance to the evolution of industries. 
Familiarity with the aviation training industry and its numerous peculiarities is also critical for 
understanding the various observations made in the industry and linking them to the reviewed 
literature. Chapter 3, therefore, presents an overview of the aviation training industry. 
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Table 2.2: Complexity, Modularity and Systems Integration 
mplexity, Modularity & Systems Integration 
Complexity, Modularity & Systems Integration 
Key Concepts 1. Complex systems have 2 main dimensions multi-component and 
multiple disciplines involved with it. 
2. Complexity often leads to decomposability which may lead to modularity 
(i.e. the presence of a one-to-one relationship between product functions 
and components). 
3. Modular products may have an open architecture where the standards 
of how the components interface are available to a group of companies in 







1. Complex products often exhibit a modular configuration. Christensen 
hypothesizes that this modularity results in an open architecture under 
competitive pressures at times of technological maturity. 
2. The research will analyze the degree of openness of the product 
architecture in complex product industries during times of product 
maturity. 
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Table 2.3: Networks and Coordination 
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CHAPTER 3 THE AVIATION SIMULATION & TRAINING INDUSTRY 
The aviation training industry emerged in the early 1920's and following a slow start, it has 
gradually gained importance since in the aviation sector. A brief synopsis of the history of the 
industry's emergence is given below. 
3.1 Historical Emergence of the Industry 
3.1.1 Early Attempts 
The history of flight simulation is almost as old as the history of flight itself. With the increased 
importance of flight, the process of learning to fly was becoming more indispensable. The costs 
and, above all, safety risks of airborne training favored the emergence of simulation tools to 
familiarize pilots with the cockpit environment on the ground. 
One of the widely used early simulation techniques was referred to as the "Penguin System" 
(EVIECHE, 2007). This learning approach used the aircraft itself as the flight simulation tool. 
The flight student was allowed to sit behind the controls of a reduced wingspan aircraft and was 
towed on the ground, while moving the aerodynamic controls of the aircraft. This introduced the 
student to the feel of the controls and partially replicated his flight manoeuvres to be conducted in 
the air. This system was used in the French Ecole de Combat during the World War I. 
Another similar system was the Sanders Teacher which consisted of a full aircraft cockpit 
mounted on a universal joint and placed in the direction of the prevailing wind (Rolfe and 
Staples, 1986). This allowed the flight student to move the aircraft controls and feel the resulting 
forces on the aircraft. Another version of the Sanders Teacher included a bar that the student had 
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to align with the horizon and hence learned to maintain a stable aircraft attitude1. These early 
attempts were precursors to the new aviation simulation and training industry soon to emerge 
when Edwin Link introduced his revolutionary flight simulator. 
3.1.2 Link's Simulator 
In 1920, Edwin Link started to learn to fly. Frustrated with the lack of hands-on training 
opportunities in the field, he abandoned the flying lessons to work with his father in his piano 
factory (Rolfe and Staples, 1986). In 1927, a group of barnstormers taught Edwin how to fly and 
he got his pilot license in the same year. In the same year, he also acquired the first Cessna 
aircraft built and started investigating ways of making a living using his newly acquired expertise 
and equipment. Constantly concerned about the costs and convenience of flight training, Link 
started a design project of an aircraft cockpit replica for training pilots. He later called his 
machine the "Pilot Maker" and launched it in 1929, out of his father's factory basement, as the 
first synthetic flight training device. 
As in the case with most new technologies, the aviation industry did not comprehend the 
implications of the new training tool and hence did not show any interest in acquiring it. Training 
for the airlines industry was, and continues to be, an overhead cost of operation and hence 
convincing airlines management to invest in new technologies of training is an uphill battle. 
Perhaps another reason for the failure to see Link's achievement was the dominance of VFR2 
1 Aircraft attitude is a term commonly used in the aviation industry and it refers to the position, 
configuration and motion vector of the aircraft in question. A 'banking attitude' for example would mean 
that the aircraft is tilted along its longitudinal axis and is moving in that position. 
2 VFR = Visual Flight Rules: flying using the pilot's visual cues to locate his aircraft in space and identify 
his aircraft's attitude and relative positions from nearby terrain. 
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flying which relies on the pilot's understanding of the flight dynamics vs. IFR3 flying which also 
relies on the pilot's understanding of the aircraft navigational instruments. Flights were few and 
far between and risky enough that adverse weather conditions were considered a sufficient reason 
for flight cancellation. In the absence of any replication of the out-of-window environment in 
Link's technology, the added value of simulating the flight instruments was not clear to the 
potential end users. The commercial value of Link's new technology was not high in light of the 
prevailing flying techniques. Amusement Parks were the principal customers of the newly 
formed Link Aeronautical Corporation. 
In an attempt to demonstrate the added value of his new invention, Link opened Link Flying 
School where the curriculum was heavily based on the new simulation technology that he 
developed. The market timing of the new technology-based service was not in its favor as it 
coincided with the great depression of 1930. 
In 1934, the US Air Force was mandated to deliver the mail by Air around the US (US Centennial 
of Flight Commission, 2007). The military pilots were not trained to fly in the dark and in 
adverse weather conditions. Unlike the commercial flights, still considered a luxury at the time, 
mail delivery was a more pressing need that reshaped the demand on the flying industry. New 
techniques had to be devised to minimize the risk of night and adverse-weather flying, especially 
after 5 pilots and their planes were lost in the first few days of the new mail-delivery service. 
Openness to the new notion of instrument-dependent flying was increasing and hence Link's 
invented technology was now seen as a value-adding tool. Link was invited by the Air Force to 
Newark airport to demonstrate his new technology. Flying in, Link's approach of instrument 
3 IFR = Instrument Flight Rules: flying using the aircraft navigational instruments and displays for 
identifying the aircraft location in space and its proximity to nearby terrain. 
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flying proved its success by his own safe and smooth flight despite the stormy weather. This 
started the negotiations that ended by Link receiving an order of six pilot trainers for the US Air 
Force (Borden, 1968). 
The launch order of Link's training devices was timely with the increasing importance of the 
flying industry and the increasing dependence on its timely and consistent performance. This 
emphasized the instrument flying technique and increased the demand for new instrument flight 
training equipment. It was not until the second world war though that the simulation training 
equipment industry boomed and Link Aviation grew significantly to employ 1500 people, 
producing more than 80 simulators per year (Rolfe and Staples, 1986). 
The period between 1934 and 1945 was the time of technology transfer from the applied research 
stage of Edwin Link (Rodgers, 1996) to a commercially profitable product. Using Abernathy's 
transilience map (Abernathy and Clark, 1985), Link's innovation resulted in an architectural 
innovation as his product gave birth to a new industry that soon developed a stable architecture 
and grew to be an $800 Million industry over the following 5 decades. 
The aviation training industry can be divided into three sub-industries based on the type of 
products provided: the simulation product industry, the training product suite industry and the 
training services industry. These three sub-industries will be treated differently throughout the 
research and the dissertation. 
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3.2 The Simulation Product Industry 
This sub-industry provides synthetic flight simulation equipment for training aircraft pilots and 
maintenance crews to operate, and maintain aircraft systems. Products of this industry may be 
divided into three categories: Full Flight Simulators (FFSs); Flight Training Devices (FTDs) 
(Rosenkopf et al, 1998) and the more recent Desktop Training Devices (DTDs) (CAE, 2000). As 
their name implies, FFSs provide a faithful replication of the flight cues and aircraft experience 
including the motion and visual aspects. FTDs, on the other hand, have more limited simulation 
fidelity and focus on particular systems or specific maneuvers training (Rosenkopf et al, 1998). 
DTDs appeared mostly in the 1990's following the PC revolution providing theoretical and 
limited operational knowledge about systems and procedures (CAE, 2000). 
FFSs became the norm in flight training in 1980 following their adoption by the FAA as a 
substitute to aircraft training (FAA, 2007). The widespread use of FTDs, however, was not until 
the mid 1980's when the regulators were convinced of their added value (Rosenkopf et al, 1998). 
DTDs have gained increasing popularity since the late 1990's due to their cost advantages 
especially during the times of economic difficulties in the industry as well as rapid technological 
advancement resulting from strides in computing power and graphic realism in the PC industry 
(Kamel and Miller, 2002). 
3.3 The Training Products Suite Industry 
With the evolution of the industry and its increased specialization, different levels of training 
products emerged and airlines were combining them in different permutations for accommodating 
their specific training needs. Training product suites have emerged with time and technological 
advancement as airlines seek to optimize their training fleets. In the 1970's, full flight simulators 
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were the norm combined with rudimentary classroom "chalk-and-talk" instruction. In the 80's, 
FTDs started to occupy a more prominent position in the composition of the training product suite 
as level 6 and 7 FTDs were demonstrating significant training value for their lower costs. In the 
90's, levels 6 and 7 started to disappear and get replaced with level 4 and 5 FTDs as these latter 
were proving more efficient in training particular flight maneuvers and operator checklists. In the 
past few years, level 4 FTDs and LCD-based IPTs (Integrated Procedure Trainers) are becoming 
increasingly popular as the non-FFS components of the training products suite. The suite has 
evolved from relying on high-fidelity simulation for both the informational and the tactile part of 
the training to offloading the informational part to increasingly lower levels of training fidelity 
capable of reproducing the basic system performance. Enhances in computing technologies also 
helped this trend by allowing high-fidelity simulation models to be available on lower level 
devices. 
The other aspect of training product suites that has evolved is the market dynamics of their 
creation. The onus of selecting compatible training devices and bridging any incompatibilities 
was traditionally on the training centers. In recent years, training device suppliers have assumed 
an increasing role of packaging their devices into integrated suites (Christensen et al, 2001, 
Pavitt, 2004) emphasizing seamless integration and inter-operability within the suite. 
3.4 The Training Services Industry 
Hardly any academic research has been conducted on the aviation training services industry. In 
the mid 1990's when most of the research about the aviation training industry was being 
conducted (Miller and Olleros, 1993; Miller et al, 1995; Rosenkopf et al, 1998), most airlines 
conducted their own training and the services industry was limited to the business jets and private 
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pilots market. Following the financial difficulties that faced the airlines industry in the late 
1990's independent aviation training providers became more prominent, especially when some 
simulator manufacturers decided to vertically integrate into offering training services (Kamel and 
Miller, 2002). 
Training services are sold in one of two main distribution channels: dry leasing or wet leasing 
(Kamel and Miller, 2002). Dry leasing is the leasing of the training equipment, the facilities 
hosting them and the technical support required for the maintenance of the equipment, but 
without any involvement in the training itself. This form of entrepreneurial exploitation of the 
simulation equipment is still the most common in independent training centers providing 
simulation equipment for commercial aircraft. Wet leasing, on the other hand, consists of 
providing a turn-key service including the training equipment, instructors, curriculums, 
publications and even logistics (such as travel and accommodation of students) in some cases. 
This form of selling training is more common in the business and executive jets training markets 
where clients are often independent jet owners or private pilots whose use of the equipment does 
not justify the investment in developing their own curricula or hiring their own instructors (Kamel 
and Miller, 2002). Wet leasing is becoming increasingly popular in commercial aviation 
following the efficiency pressures that the airlines industry has undergone rendering the 
outsourcing option of training more attractive to many (Kamel and Miller, 2002). 
The main categories of training that a pilot needs throughout his career are: 
3.4.1 Ab-initio 
Ab-initio training is the initial training that an individual receives to become a licensed 
commercial pilot. Ab-initio training traditionally comprises a theoretical component, introducing 
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the student to the theory and basic aerodynamics of flight, followed by a number of flying hours 
with an instructor in different weather and lighting conditions. Ab-initio training has traditionally 
been conducted at the student's own expense at a flying school and ends either in a commercial 
pilot license and a few hundred hours of logged flying time or a private license for leisure flying. 
To become candidates for airlines positions, pilots typically then seek to accumulate more flying 
hours by flying for small regional airlines, flying schools or air taxi companies. 
It is noteworthy to mention that Ab-initio training has been traditionally done in a single-crew 
cockpit such as that provided by a Cessna 132 or similar light piston-engine aircraft. Pilots often 
started experiencing multi-crew cockpits only at later stages in their training and careers. MCC 
(Multi-Crew Coordination) courses were used to bridge the knowledge gap and get the pilots used 
to interacting with their cockpit colleagues. This involves the pilots letting go of some tasks that 
they were trained on performing, but also doing more communications tasks that they were not 
trained to do before. This setup lengthens the overall duration of training and is seen by many 
experts in the industry as an undue risk to the quality of pilot training (Fiorino, 2005(1)). 
In response to forecasted pilot shortage airlines have been putting pressure on the training 
industry to reduce training cycle duration. Some Ab-initio training providers are currently 
providing the entire training in a multi-crew cockpit environment to avoid the learn-unlearn cycle 
involved in the current approach. Oxford Aviation Training in the UK is one of the pioneering 
schools in that domain working closely with several European airlines for maximizing pilots' 
readiness for their line operation environments. The school reduces the overall training duration 
and reduces the number of learn/un-learn cycles by training its students on multi-crew 
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coordination since the very beginning of their flying careers. The consequences of this trend on 
the aviation training industry will be discussed further in Chapter 8. 
3.4.2 Type-Rating 
Before flying with commercial passengers, a licensed pilot needs to be type-rated for the 
particular aircraft he is flying. Type-rating training is often conducted after pilots are hired by 
airlines and is often paid for by the airlines. In new aircraft deals, a portion of type-rating called 
entitlement training is usually carried out by the aircraft manufacturer for the client pilots. Some 
parts of type-rating training needs to be conducted on the aircraft itself or on a Zero-Flight-Time 
(ZFT) simulator. 
3.4.3 Recurrent Training 
Aviation regulatory authorities demand some periodic training for refreshing pilots' skills and 
bringing them up-to-date with the airlines operating procedures and emergency checklists. 
Recurrent training typically requires a ZFT simulator for some components of it. 
3.5 Industry Organization 
The training equipment, training product suite and services industries interact heavily with each 
other as well as with several other industries such as aircraft manufacturers, avionics system 
controllers and aircraft engines industries. Kamel and Miller proposed the organizational 



























Figure 3.1: Organizational design of the aviation industry 
The aircraft industry is at the upstream-most position of the value chain providing the aviation 
training industry with components and data for replicating aircraft. Airframe manufacturers play 
an integrator role putting together numerous specialized systems (e.g. landing gear, wings, control 
surfaces, avionics, etc.) with the most technologically complex component, namely engines. A 
similar organization is found at the aviation training equipment industry where systems 
integrators combine components from specialized system providers with systems simulations and 
visual systems into a portfolio of different training products geared at different applications of 
their clients. The airframe manufacturers, as well as their engines and component suppliers, all 
provide simulation data and components both directly to simulation systems integrators as well as 
to their component and systems suppliers. Finally the simulation equipment integrators provide 
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their simulation products either to airlines or third party trainers for offering training services to 
pilots. Third party trainers offer services to business and small airlines pilots or to airlines during 
peak periods that require more training capacity than what their facilities can provide. 
3.6 Industry Characteristics 
The aviation training industry has certain unique features that have to be considered when 
attempting to analyze its product architecture: 
• Aviation safety is the key factor that gave birth to this industry and continues to be the 
driving factor at the core of its existence. This puts significant emphasis on the quality of 
the industry products and allows very little tolerance to errors or failures. 
• Customers of this industry are well-informed and highly specialized operations and 
management teams who are directly involved in the design of their training products and 
services. This is further accentuated by the hefty investments they have to make for 
acquiring their training products and services. 
Training simulation devices and curriculums have an intrinsic regulatory necessity of 
being customized to the customer's aircraft fleet and training requirements. This 
challenges the traditional definition of a "dominant design paradigm" from Abernathy's 
mass-produced design model (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978). 
Airlines are legally mandated to regularly train to maintain their flying license. For them, 
therefore, it is a regulatory overhead cost that does not generate any rents. This puts 
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significant price reduction pressures on the suppliers therefore increasing emphasis on 
process innovation. 
• Due to the aforementioned high cost, safety and regulatory pressures, reputation is an 
indispensable asset of a supplier firm in this industry. This imposes a high barrier to 
entry but also generates a positive feedback loop for incumbent players as their 
reputations and proven-track records improve over time. Earlier studies in this industry 
have revealed that few entrants were able to penetrate the high entry barriers since the 
establishment of the industry in the 60's (Miller et al, 1995). 
• Synthetic flight simulation products are quite advanced technologically as they not only 
replicate the aircraft systems but also the ambient whether and environment effects. This 
introduces an accumulated knowledge positive feedback loop whereby incumbents 
become more competitive with every additional simulation they build. Adding to the 
company's library of simulation models significantly cuts the development and buildinig 
costs of simulation equipment. One key player in the industry for example, boasts that it 
has the simulation models of almost every configuration of the Boeing 737-NG, an 
aircraft that is highly customizable and has numerous configurations worldwide. 
• The limited number of key players in the industry on the global level makes connections 
with regulators, presence in industry forums and participation in industry standards 
almost essential for firm survival in this industry. 
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3.7 The Traditional Industrial Organization 
Individual training products have traditionally had a closed product architecture, with a few 
oligopolic firms competing with their proprietary designs. Training product suites, on the other 
hand, have traditionally had an open product architecture due to the regulators definition of the 
specifications of individual devices and the interfaces between them (Kamel and Miller, 2002). 
Figure 10, below, depicts the typical architecture of a training suite composed of different levels 
of training devices manufactured by different industry suppliers (Kamel and Miller, 2002). 
Figure 3.2: A graphical depiction of a regulation-driven training curriculum 
The training services industry has traditionally had an open architecture as well due to its high 
level of regulation and the segmentation between the generic ab-initio training and the more 
aircraft-specific type-rating and recurrent training at later stages (FAA, 2006). 
3.8 Regulation 
The regulatory authorities have identified various levels of fidelity of flight training products for 
the various stages of pilot training. Adherence to the minimum requirements of each of these 
training devices is what gives any training device its commercial training usability and hence 
commercial value. Regulatory guidelines define the structure of negotiations between buyers and 
sellers (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1995). The FAA or JAA certification level achievable by 
any aircraft simulation device is what determines the training credits that can be obtained from it 
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and hence the returns on the investment made. The authorities' qualification decisions also take 
into consideration the end user's perception of the product quality as well as its planned 
utilization in the user's training program. This is an important feature of the flight simulation 
equipment industry since innovation is not solely dependent on the technology transfer 
capabilities of the innovative firm but also on customer acceptance (Miller and Olleros, 1993). 
Due to the high safety implications involved, the regulation guidelines were slow to evolve in 
reaction to technological evolution (Kamel and Miller, 2002). Few and far between revisions of 
the guidelines were made, and these were mostly related to training methodologies rather than 
being technology-driven. In other words, these changes reflected the evolution of the aviation 
industry rather than that of the aviation training industry. The only changes made to simulators' 
qualification guidelines were reactive to accidents revealing their deficiencies (Kamel and Miller, 
2002). 
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CHAPTER 4 HYPOTHESIS & RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In the theory of disruptive innovation, Christensen presents a model linking the change in the 
architecture of a product, and subsequently that of its industry, with the level of technological 
maturity of the product (Christensen, 1997; Christensen et al, 2001). When technologies are still 
striving to meet the performance requirements of clients, companies offer proprietary closed 
architectures that permit them to develop state-of-the-art functionality and performance. 
However, once the technology matures to surpass clients' needs, entrants at the lower end of the 
market establish a competitive position based on convenience, cost and flexibility catering to non-
users of the technology or to specialized market sectors with lower technical requirements. As 
the entrants improve technologically and approach satisfying the needs of the mainstream market, 
competition shifts from technological capabilities to price. Entrants, now mainstream players, 
therefore open the product architecture to attain higher efficiency levels and be competitive. 
Product standards are often developed to help in shifting the market from proprietary designs to 
modular ones. Chesbrough builds on this further and describes the conditions for the product 
modularity to result in a similar shift towards industry modularity (Chesbrough, 2003). With the 
increase in competition in the open architecture market, product integrators impose performance 
and cost pressures on their suppliers, the component providers. The latter, in turn, close the 
architectures of their products to attain the required higher levels of performance and market 
differentiation. This model, conforms to earlier literature (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) predicting a 
constant increase in modularity and architecture openness. 
4.1 Research Question 
Christensen's model was formulated based on the disk drive industry (Christensen 1997), and 
supported by case studies from the PC and telecommunications industries (Christensen et al, 
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2001). The present research hypothesizes that this model is not fully applicable to Complex 
Product System (CoPS) industries defined in systems integration literature (Johnson, 2004; Dosi 
et al, 2004; Davies, 2004; Prencipe, 2004). In the aviation training industry regulatory standards 
define the performance specifications of the various components of the training product suite, 
namely the different types of simulation-based training devices, and the training credits that can 
be earned on them. Therefore, the regulatory standards define, in essence, the product 
performance expectations of the market. Since the late 1990's the industry's technological 
capabilities have been observed to attain, and gradually surpass, the regulatory requirements. 
This should signal the start of Christensen's disruptive innovation cycle. Entrants at the lower 
end of the market, started to offer training devices at higher flexibility and lower-costs at the 
expense of some performance features that surpassed the regulatory requirements. Low-cost and 
no-frills airlines were the most receptive to the new products that were aligned with their cost-
minimization business models. The changes in the industry were, thus far, in line with 
Christensen's model. However the result of the emergence of the lower end of the market was 
observed to diverge from the model. Instead of the new entrants opening the product 
architecture, and the incumbents driven out or losing market share, the incumbents were 
prompted to close the product architecture further thus earning back their market shares and 
driving out the entrants. Instead of the regulation-centered open-architecture training product 
suite, what happened is that the incumbents offered a closed-architecture suite of training 
products focused on the pedagogical value. This aspect has traditionally been too far downstream 
for the simulation equipment providers to be concerned about. However, as Wise and 
Baumgartner predict, it forms the basis of the services end of the industry which promises more 
value-capturing potential for the simulator producers (Wise and Baumgartner, 1999). The 
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incumbents have, therefore, been observed to extend downstream to the services industry while 
closing the products architecture further. The hypothesis of this research is: 
In response to product maturity in Complex Product System (CoPS) industries, the product 
architecture does not necessarily open as predicted by the disruptive innovation theory. 
To hypothesize the reasons for the divergence between CoPS industries and disruptive innovation 
theory, the constructs and implicit assumptions of the theory were examined to verify their 
anticipated applicability to complex product system industries. The sequence of steps leading to 
the opening of the product architecture presented by the disruptive theory were all verified in the 
case interviews to verify the point at which CoPS industries diverge from the behavior predicted 
by the theory. At these points of behavioral divergence, the implicit assumptions of the 
disruptive innovation theory were examined to verify if they are applicable to CoPS industries. 
Table 1 summarizes the list of steps observed in the disruptive innovation theory as well as the 
implicit assumptions made for some of them. The table also presents the questions used in the 
research instrument to verify the validity of these steps and assumptions in the context of CoPS 
industries. Where divergence was expected between the theory and CoPS industries, the table 
presents the reasons hypothesized. 
Table 4.1: Constructs of disruptive innovation theory and questions used to validate them 
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to verify the validity in 
CoPS industries 
Has there been an influx 
of low-end entrants? 
What is the role of 
regulators in influencing 
customers needs in the 
industry? 
What is le\el of 
involvement of the 
clients in the design and 
characteristics of the 
product'.' 
Is public safcl> and risk 
liabilities a key concern 
for industry players? 
Is accumulated learning 
an important factor in 
the industry? What is 
its effect on the 
competitiveness? 
What is the market 
volume (measured in 
terms of number of 
simulators produced per 
>car>? 
Have any standard 
designs emerged? 
Has any opening of the 
architecture been 
observed at any of the 
three product levels? 
Hypothesized Reasons 




The need for regulatory 
approval of innovations, 
therefore limiting the 
influence of the market 
selection forces on 
disruptive innovation 
waves 
The direct involvement 
of clients in the design 
and characteristics of 
their products prevents 
incumbents from 
ignoring the needs of 
mainstream clients. 
The public safety and 
legal liability 
considerations involved 
make an open 
architecture a potential 
sccurilv threat. 
The high value of 
accumulated learning 
favors sustaining to 
disruptive innovations 
The market thinness and 
subsequent inability to 
support the emergence 
of a network of 
specialized component 
providers 
The relationships between the theory constructs and the research questions are explained below: 
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Attaining and overshooting the needs of the clients: 
To be able to establish whether the industry has indeed attained its technological needs of its 
clients, it is first important to establish a metric for measuring these needs. In Christensen's 
theory, the market indicator of incumbents' survival was used to highlight the cases where the 
incumbents failed to cater to the needs of the mainstream market efficiently and were 
therefore pushed out of the market. Given that the hypothesis expects the incumbents to 
survive the entrants, it would be inconclusive to use market survival as an indicator of client 
needs satisfaction. The research needed to probe what would be an alternative metric of 
technological maturity followed by a validation that the industry is indeed on the path of 
disruptive innovation predicted by Christensen's theory. 
Entrants enter the low-end of the market and start catering to low-end customers 
Industry experts were asked to validate whether a trend of low-end entrants, as would be 
predicted by Christensen's theory, was observed. 
Entrants gradually displace incumbents by catering to mainstream clients 
Christensen' s disruptive innovation theory attributes the rise of the low-end entrants to the 
level of satisfying mainstream clients to their flight under the radar of the incumbents who are 
mostly focused on their top-tier clients. One implicit assumption in this construct is that the 
relationship between suppliers and customers is direct and does not include any third party 
that governs it. This would permit the entrants to increase the sales of their products while 
the uninformed incumbents undermine the threat that they pose. This free "push" market 
mechanism can be hindered by one of two factors: regulation or a pull market effect. 
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In a regulated industry where regulators have to approve every individual product and where 
customers needs are heavily influenced by a rare-to-evolve set of regulatory guidelines, 
incumbents are always aware of their competitors' sales, thus preventing the flight under the 
radar, as well the needs of the mainstream markets, which are dictated by the regulations. 
The effect of regulation on the ability of the entrants to fly under the incumbents' radar was 
therefore validated by the fourth question about the role of regulators. 
In a pull market, customers are too involved with their clients in the design and specifications 
of the products to allow an incumbent supplier to get disconnected from the mainstream 
market. The clients' level of expertise and direct involvement communicates their needs 
clearly to the suppliers. This effect is further amplified by the market thinness and the fact 
that all clients are significant, in terms of their revenue contributions, for the incumbents. 
Competition shifts to non-technical parameters such as cost and flexibility 
For the competition between the suppliers to shift away from technological merits to cost and 
flexibility, three implicit assumptions have to be satisfied: 
1. Customers of the industry make their acquisition decisions based on optimizing 
the technological features, the cost and the flexibility of use of the products. In a 
consumer product, these decision criteria are indeed valid. In an industrial 
product that will be used for revenue generation, these criteria change 
introducing others such as revenue generation potential or public liability 
considerations. These factors may influence decisions in favor of technological 
features against any cost or flexibility factors. The effect of public liability on 
the customers' decision making, and hence the market's likelihood of switching 
competition towards these factors, was validated by the fifth question. 
2. The other implicit assumption in the disruptive innovation theory is that an open 
product architecture is more efficient for suppliers and would therefore be 
preferable when the market switches to cost competition. This assumption may 
be valid in mass production products where parallel innovation, permitted by an 
open architecture, allows increased production efficiencies. In a CoPS industry 
where products are unique large systems, the research wanted to validate if such 
efficiencies can offset the cost efficiency value of accumulated learning. This 
was validated in the sixth question. 
3. The last implicit assumption in disruptive innovation theory's model of the 
product architecture opening is that the market volume does present sufficient 
business opportunities for the emergence of an open platform with parallel 
innovation. A thin market with a few number of products annually may not 
justify the existence of specialized system components producing to a standard 
product architecture. 
The three questions address the three implicit assumptions underlying the theory's construct 
that once entrants reach critical mass in the mainstream market, they find it more favorable 
for competition to introduce an open product architecture based on a standard product 
architecture. 
Standard designs emerge and the product architecture opens 
The two questions that followed from this construct were simply for validating the emergence 
of standards and the eventual openness of the product architecture. 
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The exploratory questions listed above are explained further below: 
1. What are the indicators of technological maturity in the industry? 
In the consumer electronics industry studied by Christensen, technological maturity 
depends on, among others, client needs and expectations from the product. 
Technological maturity can therefore be indicated by the industry's attainment of the 
features and functionalities that users expect and communicate in market studies and 
surveys as well as from their patterns of purchasing particular products and not others. In 
regulated CoPS industries, however, clients select products using more complex criteria 
such as regulatory compliance, returns on investments and operational efficiency. It is 
therefore essential to identify the indicators of technological maturity in the aviation 
training industry. 
2. Has the aviation training industry attained technological maturity? 
Disruptive innovation is hypothesized to start when the industry attains technological 
maturity hence allowing product selection criteria to shift from technological 
advancement and features to price and convenience. For the research to validate the 
applicability of disruptive innovation theory in CoPS industries, the first observation of 
the theory, namely that the industry has attained technological maturity, has to be 
supported by the analysis of the data collected in the case interviews. 
3. Has there been an influx of low-end entrants in the industry? 
Disruptive innovation theory hypothesizes that in response to technological maturity, a 
low-end segment of the market emerges to cater to less sophisticated clientele requiring 
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less expensive and less performance products. With the continuous advancement of the 
incumbents and the emerging entrants, this eventually becomes the mainstream market. 
The research therefore verifies the validity of this mechanism in the disruptive innovation 
for complex product industries. 
4. What is the role of regulators in influencing customer needs in the industry? 
To confirm the validity of the assumption that the entrants replaced the incumbents in 
satisfying the mainstream market, the role of regulatory constraints on the needs of 
customer should be validated. Unlike the consumer electronics industry, the airline 
customers of the aviation training industry are bounded by regulations about their use of 
training products and services. 
5. What is level of involvement of the clients in the design and characteristics of the 
product? 
If the hypothesis is valid and the product architecture of complex products does not 
necessarily open consequent to technological maturity, then an explanation of the 
alternate behavior is needed. The hypothesized differences between complex product 
industries and the disk drive industry, which is at the base of disruptive innovation 
theory, were verified with the interviewees to establish their significance in maintaining a 
closed architecture despite technological maturity. The first such difference is the degree 
of involvement of clients in dictating the features of their suppliers' products. 
Experienced clients may change the market forces significantly. Their significant 
influence on the design may not allow its feasible standardization. Their tight 
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collaboration with the suppliers may also limit the incumbents' technological 
overshooting and the subsequent loss of competitive advantage to the entrants. 
6. Is public safety and risk liabilities a key concern for industry players? 
To verify the industry's likelihood of favoring cost and flexibility factors over 
technological features, the risks and public safety liability associated with the product. 
High risks or costs of failures may continuously favor technological features and 
suppliers with proven track records over less-known but lower cost entrants. They may 
also result in an open architecture being less favorable because of the dilution of 
responsibility of quality control of the various components of the product. 
7. Is accumulated learning an important factor in the industry? What is its effect on the 
competitiveness of industry players? 
Another factor to be validated to verify if an open architecture is indeed more efficient in 
CoPS industries is the value of the accumulated learning that the incumbents possess and 
its impact on their market competitiveness. If a positive feedback loop is increasing the 
incumbents' competitiveness with every new project they deliver, then entrants have a 
much harder task to penetrate the market, let alone topple existing players. 
8. Have any standard design emerged in the industry? 
Baldwin and Clark noted that standardization is a pre-requisite to architecture openness 
(Baldwin & Clark, 2000). Detecting standardized product forms in the industry may, 
therefore, help identify a precursor to architecture openness. 
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9. Has any opening of the architecture been observed at any of the three product levels? 
If a standard architecture has been observed, then an open architecture may have been 
evolving as predicted by disruptive innovation theory. Following the explanation of the 
meaning of an open architecture, the interviewees were asked if this does exist at any 
level in the industry: training device, training product suite or training service. 
10. What is the market volume (measured in terms of number of simulators produced per 
year) ? 
The average number of simulators produced per year by the market can help confirm if it 
is too thin to support the emergence of specialized component providers. 
The literature about CoPS industries and the preliminary observations from the aviation training 
industry have given rise to five hypothesized divergences of the aviation training industry from 
the constructs and underlying assumptions of the disruptive innovation theory. These five 
reasons of divergence, listed in table 2, are described below: 
1. The high value of accumulated learning in the industry, favoring sustaining to disruptive 
innovations (Christensen and Raynor, 2003); 
2. The need for regulatory approval of innovations, therefore limiting the influence of the 
market selection forces on disruptive innovation waves; 
3. The high expertise level of the industry customers and their direct involvement in the 
design and building of the simulation products, also undermining the effects of market 
selection forces in Christensen's model; 
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4. The public safety and legal liability considerations involved in aviation training that make 
an open architecture a potential security threat; 
5. The market thinness and subsequent inability to support the emergence of a network of 
specialized component providers. 
These factors were validated throughout the research and will be revisited later in the findings 
and discussion. 
4.2 Data Collection 
The field study leading to this dissertation was conducted by interviews over a period of 2 years 
between June 2005 and December 2007 as part of the broader MINE research program. At the 
time the data collection started, the industry's response to disruptive threats from emerging FTD 
manufacturers was in progress. By the end of the period, the response was well under way and 
the incumbents have outlived the entrants as explained in detail in Chapter 5 of the thesis. Data 
for building these case studies came from diverse sources as explained below. 
4.2.1 Interviews 
Eisenhardt and Graebnert state that "...interviews are a highly efficient way to gather rich, 
empirical data, especially when the phenomenon of interest is highly episodic and infrequent" 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Since the research about technological maturity in a high-
inertia industry, such as the aviation training industry, is certainly episodic and infrequent, 
interviews were selected as the key mode of data collection in the research. A research 
instrument was created and used to collect data from different stakeholders in the aviation 
industry. To avoid impression management and retrospective sense-making biases in the results 
of the interviews, Eisenhardt's recommendations of using numerous interviews with highly 
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knowledgeable informants who view the subject from diverse perspectives was followed 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). More than 40 interviews were conducted, mostly in person, 
with executive managers in a variety of sub-industries including flight simulator providers, 
aviation training providers, airframe manufacturers, airlines, avionic systems manufacturers, 
regulators and industry intelligence agencies. These interviews were transcribed for analysis 
against the hypothesis and the aforementioned exploratory questions. With the number of 
interviews conducted and the cultural diversity of the interviewees, it was decided to use a 
manual analysis technique instead of any particular text treatment software packages. The 
research instrument developed to guide the interviews is shown in Appendix B. 
4.2.2 Industry Intelligence 
In addition to the scientific literature reviewed prior and throughout this research, industry 
intelligence documents describing the industry were identified and reviewed. These ranged from 
press releases to reports made by specialized magazines, industry associations and consulting 
firms. 
4.2.3 Validation with Experts 
For further validation of the research findings, a number of presentations were made over time to 
specialized audiences of industry executives and specialists. Their feedback and comments have 
contributed to refining the research scope, identify the limitations and identify the research's 
contribution to theory and practice. 
A presentation was made to a team of senior management at CAE, a leading company in the 
simulation production and training services industries. Another presentation, describing the 
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research findings, was made at the Flight Simulation Conference at the Royal Aeronautical 
Society in London (Kamel, 2005). This conference is one of the most prestigious industry events 
where the majority of leaders and managers of the aviation training industry gather to discuss 
their common challenges and advances. Interviewees were also presented with the preliminary 
findings of the research, after their interviews, to further validate the observations and analysis. 
A list of the interviews conducted can be found in Appendix A while the industry reports 
consulted can be found in the Bibliography section of this thesis. 
4.3 Industry Organizations Studied 
The companies and institutions selected for interviews throughout this research represented most 
of the different categories and types of companies in the industry including both incumbent and 
entrant companies. A list of these companies, with a brief introduction about each, is provided in 
Appendix A. 
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CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The literature review, interviews and other means of data collection used in this research have 
answered the 10 exploratory questions identified in Chapter 3. The responses to the questions 
pertaining to the industry's adherence to the pattern predicted by the disruptive innovation theory 
were all focused on the lower-cost FTDs disruption, which erupted in the late 1990' s and came to 
an end around 2003. In fact, it is worth mentioning, that WICAT systems, a major low-cost 
FTDs provider that was considered a major competitive threat for the incumbents in the late 
1990's, went bankrupt in the early 2000's. The summary of these historical findings is as 
follows: 
5.1 Indicators of Technological Maturity of the Industry 
Technological maturity of the industry is determined by several factors, most notably the 
regulatory requirements. Concerning business and general aviation customers, Tracy Brannon, 
Vice President/Managing Director of SimCom says (Bangs, 2004-1): ".. .most of our customers if 
not required by insurance of the FAA would simply not train." The standards established by the 
regulatory authorities define the bulk of customer requirements and needs from aviation training. 
It is the regulators that create value for the simulator customers when they certify their machines 
as capable of giving accredited training hours to student pilots. The satisfaction of customer 
needs can therefore be gauged by the satisfaction of regulatory requirements. Throughout the 
relatively short history of aviation training regulation, new requirements are defined every 10 -
15 years, often in response to technology surpassing the previously set requirements and therefore 
opening new possibilities and capabilities of synthetic training. Between these few and far-
between evolutions, however, the industry strives to attain the technological requirements of the 
standards. Examples of such evolutions in the regulation include the 1970's regulation of flight 
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simulators by the FAA and the 1980s' regulation of flight training devices. In both cases, the 
regulators prescribed a level of simulation that represents a stretch for existing capabilities yet 
one that is made possible through some recent advances. Therefore, in summary, the key 
indicators of technological maturity of the industry are its attainment of the regulatory 
requirements and the subsequent pedagogic needs of training service providers. 
This indicator of technological maturity constitutes the first divergence from disruptive 
innovation theory where a market indicator, i.e. the disappearance of the incumbents after the 
entrants' penetration of the mainstream market, was used to establish maturity. However, this 
indicator could not have been used to demonstrate an exception to the theory since the survival of 
the incumbents is inconclusive as an indicator of maturity as it could have been caused by 
numerous other factors. 
5.2 Attaining Technological Maturity 
The aviation training industry has indeed reached the technological maturity phase where it has 
met, and in some cases exceeded, the requirements and expectations of the mainstream clients in 
the industry. These requirements are determined by the pedagogical needs of the airlines to 
maintain safe operations, satisfy regulatory frameworks (Bangs, 2004-1) and, in the case of 
business and general aviation, reduce insurance underwriting costs (Bangs, 2004-1). 
At the simulator device level, Level D full flight simulators, being the highest fidelity devices, 
have met the regulatory, pedagogical and insurance requirements of clients. Especially for 
cockpit equipment simulation, the industry has attained the expectations of its various 
stakeholders. Jean-Claude Siew, VP of Systems Engineering at CAE notes that: "Quality and 
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fidelity are not issues anymore; it's simply what we do...the cockpit has become a non-issue" 
(Larson, 2006). Marj DeLong, Marketing Director of CAE Simuflite, also attests to the quality 
standard attained and notes that the level of realism attained has "brought the people out of the 
airplane into the simulator for check rides4", (Esler, 2002). The head of flight training at TUIfly, 
a division of the transport giant Hapag Lloyd, said in an interview that 
"...with the beginning of 1990 vintage simulators, the needs from a flight simulator were already 
met. They (flight simulator providers) added some enhancements later on, such as touch screens 
for example, but for the real simulation quality that you need for doing flight training, the 1989 
simulator was sufficient". 
He went further to say that "...the needs have in fact been met with the level C simulator". The 
Dean of the flight training school at London Metropolitan University, echoes the same opinion 
affirming that simulators resemble the aircraft fully except that they ".. .only lack the fear factor." 
An engineering team leader at Lufthansa flight training affirms that compared to the needs and 
requirements of regulators and airlines, flight simulator providers have "...even surpassed them". 
The general manager of Lufthansa Aviation Training concurred that the industry has reached the 
technological plateau: "/ think right now we are at a stage where you can get all the training 
credits, the highest training credits with these (existing) devices. Even if you put more technology 
into it, it is not possible to get the value from the training credits out of it." Furthermore Bangs 
states that following the availability of the Level D simulators, even insurance underwriters have 
reached the level of confidence and satisfaction in simulation technology to put financial 
pressures on their clients to utilize them for training (Bangs, 2004-2). 
4 Checkrides are the operational examinations of the training that allow a passing student to fly passengers 
in a commercial capacity. 
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At the training product suite level, the technology has also attained a maturity level indicated by 
the maturity of the individual devices and their seamless vertical integration into a suite with 
common simulation software (George, 2003). Training experts acknowledge the integral value of 
the entire product suite for the quality of the training offered and the pilot's preparation for the 
valuable ZFT simulator time (George, 2003). This acknowledgment was also paralleled with an 
increased emphasis from device providers on integrated suites. FlightSafety International has 
introduced its vertically integrated devices suite MatriX, CAE introduced its Simfinity line of 
integrated training solutions and Thales Training & Simulation introduced its comparable suite 
focused on the FFS together with low-end devices ranging from desktop simulations to an LCD 
screen-based trainer (George, 2003). These integrated training suites introduced technology 
commonality throughout the different phases of training and hence resolved a significant part of 
the training providers' problem of designing around the learn-unlearn cycles of traditional 
independent devices. Jean-Claude Kuoyo, FSI's EMEA marketing manager, comments on his 
clients' consistent feedback about FSI's vertically integrated software suite: "Customers say it's 
much easier to learn using the MatriX simulations" (Bangs, 2004). 
At the training services level, technology is composed of the individual training devices, their 
integrated suite, as well as learning management tools and pedagogical aids. Some aviation 
training centers enable students to login to their prescribed training courses and simulator courses 
via an online LMS (Learning Management System) (CAE, 2007). PC-based courseware, FTD 
sessions and FFS sessions are all scheduled into this system that stores a profile file for every 
student containing everything from contact information to the results of evaluation tests 
conducted at the end of PC-based courseware modules. The LMS is integrated with the 
scheduling software used to manage the center, the various computerized training devices, as well 
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online training tools that the pilot can access anywhere in the world. The system also produces 
the necessary reports for the pilots to provide to the regulatory authorities as proof of their 
fulfillment of their annual training requirements. 
Despite the maturity level attained, technology continues to develop incrementally for simulation 
systems tied with the computing industry (Larson, 2006) and at a more rapid pace for visual 
systems introducing innovative technologies such as LCoS5 and Laser Projection (Larson, 2006). 
These developments however are targeted, at least in the short term, towards the elite clientele 
seeking continuous technology and fidelity improvements. Mainstream clients, on the other 
hand, have reached the technological satisfaction level that allows them to seek higher 
efficiencies and lower costs of training. The industry has been assessing a proposal by 
Mechtronix, a recent entrant into the FFS market, to utilize lower level B FFSs for the majority of 
their recurrent training hence significantly reducing their FFS investments into the more 
expensive level D simulators (Anselmo, 2006; Potomac, 2006; Hughes, 2005). 
The industry experts, articles and intelligence sources consulted in this research do not agree on a 
particular point in time at which the 3 sub-industries have attained technological maturity. 
However, they all agree that this has happened within the last 5 to 10 years. 
5.3 Low-end Entrants 
As described by disruptive innovation theory, as the incumbents matured and started surpassing 
the needs of the mainstream clients in the industry, low-end simulation providers entered the 
aviation training industry. Companies offering low level FTDs and different levels of desktop 
5 LCoS: Liquid Crystal on Silicon is a novel visual projection technology similar to LCD screens 
technology commonly used for computer screens and home entertainment systems (Larson, 2004). 
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trainers emerged to grab a share in the lucrative market. Helped by the rapid advances in the 
personal computer technologies, many employees of simulation providers started their own 
companies offering desktop trainers and low-cost FTDs. Some of these companies later 
developed into larger providers that expanded the depth and breadth of their expertise and started 
offering more advanced simulation devices. Examples of such companies include Opinicus, a 
simulation company started by an ex-CAE employee that has developed into a low-level FTD 
provider and eventually a full-flight simulator provider (Opinicus, 2007). 
The appearance of these low-level entrants in the industry occurred in parallel to that of low-cost 
airlines that have "...increased significantly over the past few years" as noted by the General 
Manager of Lufthansa Flight Training. This has created sufficient demand to allow the efficient 
low-end device providers to gain momentum and build the necessary expertise to grow their 
product offering in an attempt to cater to the needs of mainstream clients. This influx of entrants 
was a relatively rare incident in the industry's history which traditionally had a relatively stable 
number of producers organized in an oligopoly (Miller and Olleros, 1993). Therefore, similar to 
the prediction of disruptive innovation theory, entrants did emerge in the industry to cater to the 
low end of the market. 
5.4 Role of Regulators 
Regulators, such as the Federal Aviation Administration in the USA or the Ministry of Transport 
in Canada, have a significant influence on all stakeholders in the aviation training industry. 
Pilots, training providers, simulation device producers and airlines all have to abide with 
certification requirements from their local regulation authorities. Training service providers, both 
independent and airline centers, need to qualify their training curriculums indicating the details of 
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their plans to train their pilots on a list of maneuvers and skills prescribed by the regulators. 
These plans also include the number and qualification levels of the simulation devices that will be 
used to achieve the training. 
At another level, flight simulation devices have to satisfy a detailed set of requirements and 
performance tolerances to attain specific qualification levels. These requirements define the 
customer expectations as well as the suppliers' overall product design. They also limit innovation 
to their prescribed boundaries. New products or technologies need to comply with the regulatory 
guidelines before they can create value for their customers. Customers needs, therefore, become 
primarily the prescribed requirements in the regulations. Suppliers, on the other hand, can not 
offer new or innovative technologies before getting them approved by the regulatory bodies. This 
process can be a long one lasting from a few months to a year during which competitors usually 
have enough time to react. For example, introducing touch-sensitive LCDs to replace tactile 
cockpit panels in low-level FTDs was first introduced by Thales Training & Simulation. CAE 
soon followed suit and pushed the concept further and even announced its intention to attempt to 
qualify it to a level 4 FTD. By the time the actual first qualification on an LCD-based FTD was 
obtained, Mechtronix and FlightSafety (the other 2 remaining key players in that market) had 
already introduced their versions of the innovative product and were working on its qualification. 
The lengthy regulatory process not only hinders the innovative company from introducing its 
innovation to the market rapidly but it even penalizes it as it facilitates the process for subsequent 
imitators who introduce their products only after the regulators have become more familiar to 
them. 
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Therefore, while the entrants did cater to the low end of the market, they were unable to advance 
and penetrate the full flight simulation niche or the services market while the incumbents were 
too close to their top-tier clients. In fact, the lobbying required with the regulatory authorities to 
advance their innovative attempts put them at a disadvantage compared with the incumbents who 
have proven track records and higher credibility. 
5.5 Level of Involvement of Clients 
Another factor that prevents the entrants' introduction of low-cost or high-flexibility products 
while the incumbents are not listening to the mainstream market is the tight relationship that the 
suppliers of this industry have with every one of their clients. While some airlines may indeed be 
more important clients in terms of their business volume, every client of the industry is a 
significantly large organization with specialized engineering crews that study the technologies 
offered on the market and play an important role in defining the suppliers' products and services. 
Unlike the consumer industry model where suppliers innovate and push their innovations to the 
market, the aviation training market is characterized by the pull of the clients' specialized crews. 
This direct intervention and pull from the market has resulted in the incumbents always being 
able to hear the needs of the mainstream market and adjust their product offering accordingly. 
5.6 Public Safety 
While none of the interviewees attributed a conscious influence of public risk and safety concerns 
on decision-making, they all, especially regulators, expressed concerns with negative training 
risks. All have agreed that should an accident happen, the effects in the industry are often quite 
drastic and regulatory frameworks are often changed as a result. Therefore public safety concerns 
do play a key role in the industry favoring the proven track records of the incumbents and raising 
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the barriers to entry for the entrants, especially to the more critical technologies and training 
phases (such as the full flight simulators and the type-rating training respectively). 
5.7 Accumulated Learning 
Customers of the three levels of the aviation training industry are typically quite knowledgeable 
about their products and hence have a significant influence on its design. For example one 
incumbent made several attempts to standardize its full flight simulation products hence reducing 
their costs. In one such attempt in the late 1990's, two directors were named and the company 
was re-organized around the standard product concept. Heavy investments were made in 
researching and developing the most common configurations of different aircraft types to create 
the standard products. Customers, on the other hand, continued to get heavily involved in the 
design and customization of products to suit their specific needs and the standard products were 
eventually abandoned demonstrating the strong role of the customer in the design and 
configuration of the simulation devices. 
On the simulation providers' end, the research has demonstrated the positive-feedback loop of 
accumulated learning that companies are subject to. With every new simulator made, the 
company becomes more efficient in the specific aircraft type as it becomes able to amortize the 
heavy development costs over a bigger number of products. This continues to raise the barriers to 
entry for industry entrants and limits their access to the more complex products such as full flight 
simulators. Accumulated learning therefore was found to have a strong role in the industry 
favoring the incumbents' track record perception, economies of scale and technical skills and 
knowledge. 
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5.8 Standard Designs 
Despite the high modularity of the products of the aviation training industry and the frequent 
integration of some products made by different vendors, such as E&S visual systems for example 
on CAE simulators, no standard designs or integration protocols have emerged in the industry. 
The complexity and specificity of every single product has resulted in the failure of most 
standardization attempts. In the early 2000's, CAE tried to introduce the concept of a standard 
product based on a common aircraft configuration and which may be offered at a lower price than 
highly customized products. After 3 years of investing in acquiring the expertise and working on 
the technical designs, the company dropped the idea and both directors of standard products lost 
their positions. Every device brought about its own technical complexities and integration 
challenges. While the accumulation of tacit knowledge about these integrations was taking place, 
they were never codified into product standards or interface control documents (ICDs) that were 
published or shared in the industry. 
5.9 Opening of Product Architecture 
The research and literature review conducted have demonstrated that the product architecture of 
the aviation training industry, at its 3 different levels, have exhibited a trend towards further 
closure over the past few years. All three product levels, however, remained modular to support 
the high variety of products and services tailor-made to satisfy the diverse client needs. At the 
flight simulation device level, products continue to adopt a closed product architecture with a few 
competing proprietary designs offered by competing providers. Industry respondents have all 
confirmed that there has never been any noticeable degree of non-contractual interfacing between 
simulation components. Even visual systems, which are the most portable components of full 
flight simulators, require contractual collaboration between the simulator provider and the visual 
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system provider to integrate. This closed architecture has not exhibited any changes in the last 10 
years when the simulation technology, at the different levels explained above, have attained 
maturity. 
At the device suite level, the product architecture has exhibited a shift from an open architecture 
of independent devices, assembled by the client, into an integrated training suite that offers 
software commonality across its different components. Simulator providers started to architect 
complete solutions of multiple-level training devices offering consistent training at the same high 
fidelity level. CAE's Simfinity and FSI's Matrix product lines were amongst the earlier 
integrated solutions offered (Bangs, 2004). 
At the training services level, the architecture has exhibited a similar closing trend from a market 
segmented into 2 main segments, each with its different suppliers, to an integrated one. Ab-initio 
and air carrier (consisting of type-rating and recurring training) segments were traditionally 
separate market segments where small aircraft-equipped flight schools catered for the former 
while large, capital-intensive and simulator-equipped training companies catered for the latter. 
Two parallel initiatives are changing this open service architecture into an integrated offering 
spanning the entire training lifecycle of a pilot. 
The first initiative is industry-driven and consists of partnerships and backward vertical 
integration of some air carrier training providers. In 2005 CAE, the second largest player in the 
training industry, created the CAE Global Academy, a network of Ab-initio flight schools that 
collaborate with CAE for providing a similar standard of training to laymen seeking pilot careers. 
The services of the members of the Global Academy are integrated with those of CAE enabling a 
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complete pilot outsourcing solution for companies where CAE finds, recruits and trains pilots all 
the way from the initial ground school classroom component to the type-rating and specific 
operating procedures of the client airline (CAE, 2007). CAE's main competitor, FSI, shortly 
followed in its footsteps announcing partnership with a flight school for providing integrated 
ground school for its clients. These partnerships are not mere business partnership agreements as 
they involve synchronization and harmonization of the training curriculum to bridge gaps and 
reduce redundancies. 
The second initiative that is resulting in closure of the training industry architecture is a 
collaborative one proposed by an ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) panel in 
2005. MPL (Multiple-crew Pilot License) is the name given to the new training program 
currently being formulated by industry forums consisting of experts from regulators, simulator 
manufacturers, airlines and training providers. Bud Oaster, member of the ICAO panel, says that 
the MPL "takes a zero-time pilot candidate to airline first-officer in less time and at less cost than 
traditional methods" (Fiorino, 2005 (2)). To meet the surge in demand for pilots expected over 
the next few years, the MPL is expected to reduce the pilot training cycle from 45 weeks down to 
1 8 - 2 6 and from $90,000 - $180,000 down to $75,000 (Fiorino, 2005 (2)). The MPL relies on 
increasing the pilot's training time spent in the simulator and thus increasing its effectiveness and 
efficiency, all while providing a seamless integrated service solution to airlines. 
5.10 Market Thinness 
A review of the annual reports of all the key players in the flight simulation industry between 
1991 and 2007 was conducted as a part of this research. This revealed that the number of full-
flight simulators, which are the best documented products, ranged between 17 and 47 with an 
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average of 30 simulators per year. Figure 14 shows the number of simulators per year in this 
period. Priced at between $10M and $15M, the total market size is too thin to justify the 
existence of specialized component suppliers independently innovating on an open product 
architecture. This is especially true given the complexity of the components and the R&D 
investments that are required to satisfy their technical requirements. 
Figure 5.1: The number of full flight simulators produced between 1991 and 2007 
The interviews conducted and the industry literature reviewed yielded the answers to the 10 
exploratory questions of this research explained above. The following 3 chapters explain in 
further details the findings of the research with special emphasis on each of the 3 sub-industries 
identified and their specific trends and changes. 
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CHAPTER 6 RESEARCH FINDINGS - SIMULATION DEVICES 
Following the presentation of the answers to the 10 questions formulated in the research, chapters 
6, 7 and 8 present the details of these answers and the findings for each of the 3 sub-industries 
studied. Each chapter starts with a description of the product of the sub-industry, followed by a 
description of its architecture. The key trends and changes following technological maturity in 
the sub-industry were presented next followed by a conclusion about the effects of these trends on 
the product architecture evolution. 
6.1 The Product 
The flight simulation device is the primary product of the aviation training industry. Devices are 
categorized along two performance axes, their fidelity to the aircraft they replicate and the 
training skills and knowledge they are used to teach. Regulatory authorities worldwide define 
different criteria and standards for naming and qualifying flight simulation devices. The most 
widely accepted norms are the FAA's in the US and the JAA's in Europe. Regulations in other 
countries are mostly derived from either of these two regulatory standards. 
6.1.1 Flight Training Equipment 
To provide the different types of training mandated by regulators in a safe and cost-effective 
manner, flight simulation devices are often used extensively. The choice of simulators to use is a 
function of the type of training needed, cost and the regulatory standards in effect. The FAA 
standards, for example, define 3 categories of flight simulation devices: 
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1. Non-aircraft specific flight training devices: these represent the behavior of generic 
categories of aircraft such as a turboprops or jets. Categorical flight training devices have 
increasing levels of complexity ranging from level 1 to level 3 FTDs. 
2. Aircraft specific flight training devices (FTDs): these are simulation devices that replicate 
the performance of a specific aircraft type (e.g. an Airbus A320) and a specific airline 
configuration also known as tail configuration. Aircraft-specific FTDs range from Level 
4 system trainers to Level 7 FBSs (Fixed Base Simulators) which lack only the motion 
system to become FFSs. While popular in the mid 1980's to the mid 1990's, level 6 and 
level 7 FTDs are increasingly uncommon in training centers due to an increased use of a 
Level-4 and FFS combination to decrease the capital investments in training equipment. 
3. Full Flight Simulators (FFSs): these have the highest fidelity level of simulation devices 
replicating the aircraft systems, ambient environments, visual cues and motion cues. Full 
Flight Simulators may be qualified to 4 levels: A, B, C and D. Level Ds are ZFT (Zero 
Flight Time) devices that faithfully replicate the aircraft performance and are built to 
replicate an aircraft manufacturer supplied advanced performance data package detailing 
the aircraft performance in a large number of attitudes within and outside of the normal 
flight envelope. Level Cs are the next most common FFS especially when the aircraft 
data package is still under development, as in new aircraft programs, or when the aircraft 
is too old to have the instrumentation necessary for producing a detailed data package. 
Level C simulators are non-ZFT and therefore need to be complemented by a level D 
FFS or actual aircraft training. Level Bs were quite rare until recently when Mechtronix, 
an emerging simulator manufacturer, started promoting their use as a cost-effective 
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device for conducting a significant portion of training traditionally conducted on a level 
D FFS (Anselmo, 2006; Potomac, 2006; Hughes, 2005). Mechtronix' proposal does not 
eliminate the need for a Level D device as some training procedures need to be conducted 
in a Zero-Flight Training (ZFT) environment, offered only by a level D, but reduces its 
market as it claims that 100% of recurrent training and 80% of initial training that are 
traditionally done on a Level D FFS can be carried out on a Level B. The industry has 
been quite slow to accept Mechtronix' proposal which started in the early 2000's and it 
was not until Lufthansa Aviation Training acquired one in 2006 that industry critics and 
specialists started giving the proposal more serious consideration (Warwick, 2006). 
The JAA device guidelines, called the JAR standards, are somewhat similar to those of the FAA 
consisting of 3 categories: 
1. Flight Training Devices (FTDs): 
Similar to the FAA framework, JAR standard FTDs are intended for training on systems 
operation and basic procedures. Unlike the FAA though, there are only 2 levels of FTDs 
under the JAA, Level 1 and Level 2 and both are aircraft-specific. A JAR Level 1 FTD is 
comparable to a FAR Level 5 FTD while a Level 2 is comparable to a Level 6. 
2. Flight Navigation and Procedures Trainers (FNPTs): 
FNPTs have no equivalents under the FAR standards and are primarily geared towards 
teaching flight maneuvers, procedures and SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures). FNPTs 
are aircraft-specific and require a high level of simulation fidelity. They also have a visual 
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system to enable out-of-cockpit view training in visual and instrument flying conditions. 
FNPTs are commonly used for recurrent training to offload time on the full flight simulator. 
3. Full Flight Simulators (FFSs): 
FFS qualification under the JAR standard is quite similar to that under the FAR. Four levels 
of qualification exist ranging from the preliminary A level to the ZFT D level. 
6.1.2 Product selection criteria 
To understand the forces behind the openness or closure of product architecture, it is important to 
analyze the product selection criteria in the industry and their evolution over the past 10 years. 
These criteria represent the market's needs from simulation device producers and therefore the 
driving force behind their product offering. The research has revealed that the following criteria 
influence buyers' decisions in the equipment industry: 
1. Regulation 
Satisfying regulatory requirements of pilots' training is essentially the key driver of the flight 
simulation industry. Following the US legislation permitting the use of flight simulators for 
training pilots in 1970, the industry has been driven by the training credits that the regulators 
grant using synthetic simulation devices. The regulators qualification of the device is a 
function of several variables, namely its satisfaction of the prescribed regulatory 
requirements, its match with the simulated aircraft performance, the client's satisfaction with 
its performance, its intended utilization and its positioning within the client's training 
curriculum. The regulators' requirements are the strongest driver of the customer needs such 




As previously mentioned, customers of flight simulation device manufacturers are either 
airlines providing training to their own crews or third party trainers using the devices to sell 
training. In either case, the cost of simulators is a key consideration for these clients as it 
represents a fixed cost of operation. 
Costs of training include three key components: infrastructure and equipment costs, crew pay 
and travel expenses and finally the opportunity costs of flying the aircraft with passengers. 
The cost parameter has had an increasing importance as a selection criterion for airlines and 
independent training providers in the past few years. Since the events of 9/11 and the drastic 
downturn that the industry experienced, a record high number of airlines have declared 
bankruptcy, especially in the US. During these hard times, airlines have been trying to 
minimize fixed training costs to the minimum possible level while maintaining the crews' 
licenses to fly. In answering a question about whether airlines have changed their "shopping" 
habits for training, the General Manager of Lufthansa flight training said: 
"They (airlines) now look at other possibilities and try to learn what other airlines are doing 
in the market and if there is a chance for them, with nearly no reduction in the quality, they 
tend to want to cut training costs". 
This has favored the emergence of lower cost training alternative, such as the level B FFS as 
well as online delivery of training reducing travel and living expenses and the pilots' time off 
flying for revenue generation. 
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3. Pedagogy 
The learning value of the flight simulation devices is another key factor that affects their 
acquisition decisions. While this factor may seem embedded in the regulation frameworks, it 
has been becoming increasingly distinct differentiation factor as flight simulation providers 
have attained and started surpassing the regulatory requirements. For some airlines, such as 
Lufthansa Flight Training, highly customized features and specific demanding requirements 
ensure the quality and uniformity of the pedagogical service offered to their pilots. Most 
clients acquire lower-cost standard configurations of flight simulators defined by the aircraft 
producer or the simulator producer and provide differences training to their pilots to 
compensate for any differences. Pedagogy-centered airlines, such as Lufthansa, would pay 
an additional premium to have the simulator replicate their exact aircraft configurations and 
even acquire maintenance contracts to ensure the continued update of the simulators to follow 
the evolution of their aircraft fleets. 
6.2 Product architecture 
A flight simulation device is composed of the following key components: 
1. Flight Deck: this is the replica of the aircraft flight deck that is used for training the 
pilots. Panels, displays and switches range from low-cost approximations to actual 
aircraft parts depending on the level of fidelity of the simulator and the targeted 
qualification level. 
2. Instructor stations: these are the computer stations on and off the simulator deck, where 
instructors can manipulate the simulator's systems and environment as well as observe 
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the students. In full flight simulators, these often consist of 2 stations on deck as well as 
a few off-deck instructor/engineering terminals. 
3. Computer complex: traditionally, the computer complex consisted of an array of mini-
computers networked to handle the massive calculations and processing necessary for 
simulating flight dynamics and the aircraft systems. Commercial off-the-shelf PCs have 
been increasingly use in the computer complex. 
4. Electronics cabinets: these consist of electronic chasses and PCBs (printed circuit boards) 
hosting the simulation of aircraft systems and flight dynamics as well as some original 
software of aircraft electronic controllers sometimes. 
5. Visual system: consists of image projectors, image generators, a visual host computer and 
a screen for projecting the out-of-window scene to complement pilots' training with the 
visual cues. The image generator lies at the core of the system, producing the dynamic 
image that closely follows the simulated aircraft position and attitude. Visual systems 
vary significantly from simple flat television screens connected to the image generators to 
fully integrated visuals depicting high levels of realism in day and night scenery. 
6. Motion system: consists of the hydraulic or electric jacks, their controllers and a motion 
host computer that controls the flight deck movement according to the aircraft 
performance and operator inputs. Motion systems are often used only on full flight 
simulators and differ in their levels of complexity and fidelity. Military aircraft and 
rotorcraft simulators often have the most complex motion systems due to their diverse 
modes of motion including vibration. 
Different simulator manufacturers define and use their own proprietary architectures at both the 
software and hardware levels. While many boasted their architecture innovations at industry 
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forums, such as the Royal Aeronautics Society conferences, details remain proprietary and 
confidential. Despite their distinctiveness and appropriation, these architectures have been quite 
similar primarily due to the inevitable flow of information caused by the labor mobility within the 
industry (Chesbrough, 2003). The complexity of the simulation technology, and the historical 
limitations on programming and software architectures have also resulted in similar solutions 
pursued by the different players evolving over time. The resulting outcome in the industry is a 
few similar product architectures with no inter-operability or compatibility across the different 
brands. 
6.3 Architecture Evolution - Detailed Findings 
In the last 10 years, the aviation industry has experienced several economic pressures that have 
resulted in diverse effects ranging from consolidation in some segments to a record number of 
airlines seeking bankruptcy protection. These events have increased price and efficiency 
pressures on the training industry, which is usually lagging 6 months to a year behind the airlines 
industry. These economic pressures on the aviation training industry have resulted in the 
following technological and business trends: 
/. Increased Outsourcing & Off-shoring: 
In addition to the closed product architecture of all simulator manufacturers, many 
manufacture the bulk of the components that made their flight simulators. One simulator 
manufacturer went as far as making its own power bars. However in the past 10 years, with 
the increased emphasis on off-shoring manufacturing to China and software development to 
India, manufacturers are increasingly outsourcing. CAE, for example, created a Strategic 
Sourcing division in 2004 with the mandate of creating and managing a supply chain for 
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reducing the company's in-house manufacturing and hence production costs (Kamel, 2006). 
The division was headed by a former executive from the aircraft manufacturing industry 
which is highly dependent on outsourcing. CAE went even to the extent of off-shoring some 
of its software development by opening a division for visual systems software development in 
India (CAE, 2005). 
It is important to distinguish between outsourcing and off-shoring on one side and opening 
the product architecture on the other. The increased sub-contracting of sub-assemblies or 
creation of foreign divisions in low-cost regions does not constitute opening the product 
architecture as these external entities operate at arm's length under tight contractual 
frameworks and, more importantly, have no visibility of the overall product architecture. The 
outsourcing therefore did not result in any changes in the degree of closure of the product 
architecture. 
2. Emergence of low-cost FTDs 
During the 80's and early 90's, simulator providers mostly competed on their technological 
capabilities to fulfill and surpass their clients' needs. FFS providers, therefore, competed in 
the FTDs market by stripping down features and components from top-of-the-line devices to 
make them comparable to those provided by the competition. This resulted in over-designed 
devices as the cost of developing simpler technologies combined with the fear of low-quality 
perception sometimes outweighed those of keeping existing ones from higher-level devices. 
While these expensive devices did not attract tight-budget airline startups and aviation 
schools, they appealed to traditional flag carriers due to their high fidelity and compatibility 
with FFSs. 
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During the economic downturn of the industry, the increased popularity of low-end FTDs 
forced the incumbent equipment providers to transform their top-down approach to a bottom-
up one. Some companies used creative approaches to reduce the costs of developing new 
devices that barely meet regulatory standards. This bottom-up trend pushed the incumbents 
to challenge the traditional interpretation of regulatory standards eventually resulting in the 
emergence of innovative LCD-based trainers. 
In the late 1990's CAE developed LCD-based FTDs, a concept that low-cost entrants 
experimented with and introduced in the early 1990's. These devices replaced simulated 
cockpit displays and panels with online representations on touch-active LCDs. The 
simulation logic and systems performance of both devices were nearly identical while the 
LCD-based ones were able to offer the following additional auxiliary features: 
LCD-based FTDs could be placed in regular office space without the need for the 
special flooring and power supplies that traditional FTDs needed; 
It was possible to run online courseware in a 3-D cockpit environment in LCD-
based devices due to their graphical switches that are easy to toggle to any 
particular configuration during the course; 
- The selling prices of LCD-based FTDs ranged from $300K to $800K while those 
of comparable tactile FTDs ranged from $2M to $5M; 
Relocation of the LCD-based FTDs was quite inexpensive and did not necessitate 
recertification from the regulatory authorities . 
6 Moving tactile FTDs or FFSs requires re-certification to validate the accuracy of the re-assembled flight 
controls LCD-based FTDs had graphical representations of controls and were therefore exempt from this 
requirement. 
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At the beginning, the absence of the tactile feeling of switches and the auditory cues of 
toggling them made many suspicious of the possibility of negative training7. However, due 
to their superior economies, low cost airlines were less reluctant to accept them followed by 
some cash-tight traditional airlines. Northwest Airlines, for example, was the first of the 5 
major US carriers to embrace LCD-based FTDs. To respond to negative training concerns 
from his colleagues, one of Northwest's chief pilots proposed to bolt real aircraft switches to 
a wood panel and put it outside the FTD for the trainees to familiarize themselves with after 
their non-tactile training sessions. As Christensen's disruptive innovation theory suggests, 
the technological and pedagogical inferiority of the non-tactile panels were gradually out-
weighed by their cost and flexibility advantages. 
3. Shift of emphasis from FFSs towards integrated solutions 
Following the 1970's regulated use of full flight simulators, the Zero-Flight Time concept 
was considered as the safest approach in synthetic simulation training. It took until the mid 
1980' s to regulate the use of FTDs acknowledging that their limited fidelity can still prove 
useful for training a specific subset of skills and procedures. The training providers' 
developed distinction between areas of knowledge and process familiarity on one hand and 
motor skills on the other hand, have permitted an increased reliance on FTDs, especially that 
they reduce the overall cost of training. The typical configuration of flight training devices 
used in recurrent training has emerged from complete reliance on the FFS, to a combination 
of the FFS and several lower level FTDs seamlessly integrated in an integrated suite. The 
FAA has placed an increased emphasis on regulating these integrated suites fitting the 
individual devices within the existing frameworks (Philips, 2002). 
7 Negative training refers to the possibility that the pilots make a false learning or acquire an incorrect 
reaction to a cockpit event. The consequences of negative training may prove disastrous in a real flight. 
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The three trends do demonstrate the industry's behavior and its compliance with the pattern 
described by disruptive innovation theory at first, with the emergence of low-cost FTDs, but how 
this did not allow the entrants from displacing the incumbents. Rather, the incumbents were able 
to respond by leveraging their understanding of the pedagogical aspects of training and the wide 
scope of their products by offering integrated solutions, thereby shifting the competition away 
from individual devices and their costs. 
6.4 Technological maturity of the industry 
Christensen defines technological maturity as the stage when the suppliers are able to meet the 
needs of the majority of customers in the industry (Christensen, 1997). A few traditional clients 
will always push suppliers to continue to advance their products for their own specialized needs 
but for the majority, other considerations such as cost, convenience and size of the product 
become the key differentiators chosen for. 
In the aviation training industry, as explained above, customer needs are mostly driven by the 
regulatory requirements of training as well as some pedagogic aspects. The industry experts 
interviewed in this research all concurred that the industry has satisfied the regulatory 
requirements and, to some extent, pedagogic needs during the last 7 and 10 years ago. It is hard 
to identify a particular event or year when the industry has attained this stage primarily because of 
the iterative nature of the majority of its innovations rendering it difficult to pinpoint a particular 
new product as the answer to the market needs. However, this conclusion is also supported by 
the observations made above about the emergence of low-end products during a trend of 
increased emphasis on cost and convenience over quality and technological advancement. 
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Price has been an increasingly important factor of differentiation due to the economic pressures 
on the industry discussed above. In the absence of radical technological differences, price has 
been the key competency of several start-ups in the industry. In fact some simulator providers, 
such as Mechtornix Systems, openly market their devices almost entirely based on their price 
merits (Anselmo, 2006). Convenience has also been increasingly in demand as training providers 
seek to lower their customers' travel bills by providing local and internet-based training facilities. 
The integrated solutions' seamless update potential has also been a key success factor for the 
integrated product suites offered on the market. 
The observations made above and the interviews with the industry experts all converged to the 
same conclusion that the industry has attained technological maturity during the last few years. 
The technological innovation, currently underway, happens in an incremental mode, surpassing 
the needs of the majority of customers and catering to the few specialized ones. 
6.5 Conclusion - Industry architecture 
According to Christensen's disruptive innovation theory (Christensen, 1997; Christensen and 
Raynor, 2003), the technological maturity attained in the industry should have resulted in a shift 
in the competition away from product quality towards price and convenience. This shift should 
result, in turn, to an opening of the product architecture in the industry by entrant firms that seek 
to reduce costs and benefit from the commoditization of the product. Christensen cited the disk 
drive industry and its eventual architecture opening following the diffusion of the 3.5" disk drives 
initially slated for laptops and lower-performance machines. 
As shown above, the technological maturity of the flight simulation products industry did lead to 
the emergence of entrants competing on cost and convenience factors rather than the traditional 
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quality and technology axes. Lufthansa flight training, for example, has received new clients 
from eastern European countries and from China as stated by its General Manager. 
However, the emergence of these entrants has failed to open the industry architecture as proposed 
by Christensen's theory. The flight simulation products continued to exhibit a closed architecture 
with a few competing proprietary designs in the market. None of the industry interviews, 
literature, discussion forums or in-field observations has suggested any change in the product 
architecture in the openness direction. For example, the General Manager of Lufthansa Flight 
Training describes the situation as follows: 
"...when we buy a new simulator from Thales or CAE there is no standard interface from these 
manufacturers. So we have to put a lot of effort into it to connect it to another stand alone 
system. There are a lot of proprietary designs behind the simulators, even if they use standard 
PCs that can be bought anywhere. Integration of some off-the-shelf parts into the simulator 
shows how they are very specific. It is not easy to exchange things or redesign something or even 
add a new element or feature." 
The following five factors that explain the divergence of this industry from Christensen's model 
are discussed below elaborating, from the research conducted, their relevance to the peculiar 
behavior that the industry has exhibited: 
1. The high value of accumulated learning in the industry, favoring sustaining to disruptive 
innovations (Christensen and Raynor, 2003); 
Disruptive innovation theory, as implied by its name, predicts an industry's behavior in 
response to a disruptive innovation where the incumbents' core competencies are 
rendered obsolete by new metrics of competition introduced by the entrants. In the 
aviation training industry, the high traction of accumulated learning makes sustaining 
innovations the most common and disruptive ones an exception, if possible at all. With 
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every new simulator, the efficiency, track record and competitiveness of its producer are 
increased, thereby improving its positioning and likelihood to win the next simulator 
contract available. In an industry where software constitutes between 35 and 65% of the 
cost of the simulator, the breadth of software libraries that the company has on its shelves 
can significantly offset its production costs and hence competitive advantage. This innate 
characteristic of the industry favors the presence of a few large players engaged in a 
positive feedback loop continuously improving their competitiveness and market share. 
Most innovations are produced by this oligopoly of producers (Miller & Olleros, 1993) 
and are therefore sustaining in nature. 
For entrants to introduce disruptive innovations, they have to drastically change the way 
synthetic simulation is done to offset the cost advantages of the incumbents' existing 
software libraries and hence be able to make commercial success out of their disruptive 
innovation. Other than Link's initial disruptive innovation that gave birth to this industry 
replacing aircraft training, no such disruptions have occurred. All changes made were 
incrementally done through the coordination between suppliers, customers and 
regulators. This natural bias against disruptive innovation in the industry does not permit 
the entrants to create cost and convenience value more than their incumbent competitors. 
2. The need for regulatory approval of innovations, therefore limiting the influence of the 
market selection force on disruptive innovation waves; 
In Christensen's research on the disk drive industry, market selection forces initially 
favored quality and technology (represented by storage capacity) until a certain inflection 
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point where the market preferred criteria such as cost and convenience instead 
(Christensen, 1997). This then launched the sequence of events leading to the opening of 
the product architecture. In the aviation training industry, the tight regulation of the 
devices required (before they create value to their customers) puts an intermediary layer 
between the market pull forces and the suppliers' response. The slow pace of evolution 
of the regulations and their aversion to risk slows down the market's influence on product 
selection forces and reduces the chances that they occur too fast for the incumbents to 
react. 
3. The expertise level of all the industry customers and their involvement in the design and 
building of the simulation products, also undermining the effect of market selection 
forces present in Christensen's model: 
Customers of the flight simulation equipment industry are quite involved in the design 
and building of their devices. Some customers possess sophisticated internal capabilities 
developed over the years of acquiring and maintaining simulation devices that they are 
capable of modifying or updating their own simulation equipment. The heavy 
involvement of customers in the definition of their products puts them in more direct 
touch with their suppliers and therefore hindering entrants' introduction of disruptive 
innovations that meet customers' needs but that incumbents were not responding to. 
4. The market thinness (i.e. the insufficiency of production volume for the emergence of a 
component supplier base to transfer the modularity from the product to the industry): 
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Despite the current modularity of the flight simulation device within the proprietary 
desisgns, the total number of simulators sold per year is too small to lure many 
competitors into the simulator components market. For example, the FFS market has 
historically ranged between 12 and 49 simulators sold annually. This market volume is 
too small to be divided amongst more than a handful of players. For generic components, 
most suppliers overcome the small market by being involved in other larger markets, 
such as military simulation or commercial applications, to justify their economics. For 
example, Barco, the key supplier of projectors for most FFS visual systems, is also 
diversified in the media & entertainment, medical, education and transportation industries 
(Barco, 2007). For specialized components, however, the market is too small to justify 
the presence of competing component suppliers and therefore these are usually 
manufactured by the simulator integrators themselves. 
5. The public safety and legal liability considerations involved in aviation training that make 
an open architecture a potential security threat: 
An open architecture permits the dissemination of information and public access to 
interface standards. It also shifts part of the onus of quality control in product integration 
from system integrators to the market forces. These two factors, information availability 
and reduced control on quality, may expose the public to safety hazards and airlines to 
consequent legal liability. In an industry where the possibility of negative training is 
deemed to be an unacceptable risk, losing control over product quality is not a viable 
scenario. This risk may not seem to be a key decision criterion for airlines but it is 
certainly one that regulators are sensitive to. 
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The above factors and specificities have influenced the industry's behavior not to fit with 
Christensen's model of disruptive innovation, leaving the product and industry architectures 
closed at the simulation device level. 
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CHAPTER 7 RESEARCH FINDINGS - THE SIMULATION PRODUCTS SUITE 
7.1 Definition 
The simulation products suite can be defined as the complete set of tools and synthetic training 
devices used to train crews on operating and maintaining aircraft. A suite is composed of three 
categories of components: simulation devices, training aids and curriculums. Simulation devices 
are the synthetic trainers replicating aircraft performance at varying degrees of fidelity. Training 
aids are other electronic or non-electronic tools used as pedagogical aids for explaining aircraft 
behavior to trainees. Examples of training aids include actual aircraft parts that are used for 
maintenance trainees to assemble and disassemble. Curriculums are the descriptions of which 
simulation devices and training aids will be used for obtaining a certain level of regulatory 
qualifications or acquiring a certain skill. 
7.2 Regulation 
Regulatory authorities qualify a training provider's curriculum first before qualifying any 
particular devices within it. This is to ensure the overall cohesiveness of the different 
components of training and their collective satisfaction of the regulatory training requirements. 
Following the curriculum qualification, each individual device is qualified based on its fulfillment 
of the regulatory requirements corresponding to its target qualification level. Therefore, even 
though there is no training products suite qualification per se, it is taken into consideration by the 
regulators in the qualifications of the individual training devices. 
7.3 Product selection criteria 
The research has shown that training providers' decisions in acquiring a training products suite 
are influenced by the following factors: 
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7.3.1 Training Market Segment 
Different training providers cater to clients from different niches or market segments. Lufthansa, 
for example, often caters to quality-seeking airlines and flag carriers and has therefore been 
traditionally known for its heavy use of full flight simulators to maximize fidelity to the aircraft 
throughout the trainee's sessions. The General Manager of Lufthansa Flight Training said about 
the experience they try to deliver to their students: "...they need to touch and feel the essence of 
the real aircraft cockpit." 
Flight Safety, on the other hand, has the largest installed base of business jet simulators in the 
industry and is therefore more dependent on FTDs to minimize the overall costs for their more 
cost-sensitive trainees. The training provider's market segment is therefore a key parameter in its 
choice of a training suite and the breakdown of its different components. 
7.3.2 Total Cost 
The costs incurred, for acquiring a training product suite, were traditionally optimized either by 
changing its composition or the price tags of its individual components. As the composition is 
linked to the training provider's market segment and regulatory approval, the individual prices of 
training devices are often the lever used to control the cost of the training suite. Training 
providers also have varying price sensitivities for the different components of the suite. 
Decisions on full flights, for example, are not as easily swayed by price variations as FTDs and 
DTDs are. The level of sophistication of the training conducted on the full flight, and hence its 
overall impact on liability and training quality, is higher than specific mission FTDs. 
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7.4 Traditional Product Architecture 
Aviation training suites were traditionally custom-built with their composition and architecture 
varying based on the training provider's market position, type of aircraft trained and clients' 
business models. Independent training providers, also referred to as third party providers, often 
make their training suites as generic as possible to accommodate the largest number of aircraft 
configurations of their clients, minimizing differences training and simulator changes. This not 
only affects the configuration8 of the full flight simulators purchased but more importantly results 
in more reliance on flexible flight training devices within the suite. Equipment fleets of airline 
training facilities, on the other hand, are usually less accommodating and more specific to the 
airline's aircraft fleets. 
Irrespective of the specificity of the training suite, it was traditionally made up by combining 
different level devices made by different suppliers around a training curriculum as shown in 
figure 10 above. 
7.5 Recent Industry Trends 
Similar to the case of training products, changes in the external economic and technological 
environments have affected the industry and its architecture at the product suite level. These 
external changes and their effects are described below. 
1. Integrated Sourcing: 
Tail configuration is a term referring to the way a particular airplane is setup. Avionics controllers, 
optional features and some cockpit panels may vary between different tail configurations of the same 
aircraft. Airlines usually order several airplanes with the same tail configuration to maximize fleet 
commonality and facilitate maintenance. 
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The difficulties that the airlines industry has experienced over the past few years has resulted 
in increased cost awareness and consequently increased price pressures on the upstream 
training industry. Terrorism, SARS, and war have amplified the airline industry's difficulties 
with maintaining the hub-and-spoke model devised in the 1970's. The increased efficiency 
pressures on training providers have therefore resulted in efforts to better manage costs 
through supply chain consolidation (Kamel, 2006). This has given a competitive edge to 
simulation product companies that are able to provide complete integrated suites of training 
products that reduced transaction and support costs. 
2. Computing technologies 
The latest advances in computing technologies have bridged the gap between computers used 
in simple desktop simulation devices and those used in full flight simulators. This computing 
platform compatibility has enabled companies to affordably offer software commonality 
across different devices of a training product suite. Not only does this reduce the negative 
learning side-effect but it also reduces the costs of fleet updates to match aircraft changes. 
3. Emphasis on overall training value 
The technological maturity attained by synthetic simulation devices has been increasingly 
shifting the focus of clients and regulators from technological features of simulation devices 
to the pedagogical value that they create. The quality of a training provider's product suite is 
increasingly measured by what it can help students to learn rather than the technological 
features of its individual components. 
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7.6 Maturity & evolution of the industry architecture 
The configuration of the training suite was traditionally decided by the airline or the training 
provider using different equipment from different suppliers as explained above. This has been 
gradually transforming into integrated solution offerings made by the large incumbent simulator 
manufacturers such as CAE and Thales. As the simulation devices matured technologically, 
these companies started to offer integrated training solutions that address their clients' needs 
beyond the technological level. The maturity of the simulation and computing technologies 
allowed running high fidelity simulation models, which formerly needed mainframe computers, 
on desktop PCs and hence permitted building the integrated solutions containing different levels 
of devices all sharing the same simulation models' fidelity. 
In 1999, CAE launched a new business unit called Integrated Training Solutions (ITS) with the 
mandate of developing lower-level simulation devices9 (CAE, 2000). By the end of 2001, the 
new division launched the IPT (Integrated Procedures Trainer), the VSIM (Virtual Simulator) and 
SBC (Simulation-Based Courseware). Pictures of these devices are shown below in Figure 11. 
9 Lower-level simulation devices refer to synthetic simulation equipment of lower fidelity and hardware 
complexity than the traditional full flight simulators (FFSs) or flight training devices (FTDs). Equipment 
such as LCD-based cockpit trainers, desktop virtual simulators and PC-based courseware are examples of 
lower level simulation devices. 
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CAESimfinity'uIPT (Gulfstream V) 
Figure 7.1: CAE's Integrated Procedures Trainer (IPT) and Virtual Simulator (VSIM) 
These PC-based devices were built based on a common core architecture where the high fidelity 
flight models and systems simulation from full flight simulators were ported onto a PC 
environment to run with simulated graphical displays of the cockpit interface. The virtual 
simulator created (termed VSIM) was the core layer of the new devices with each device 
consisting of the VSIM and different combination of other components built on top of it. The 
VSIM allowed pilots free-play practice of flight procedures and systems operation at the same 
simulation fidelity level as the full flight simulators yet at a small fraction of the cost. Integrated 
Procedure Trainers (IPTs) consisted of a VSIM whose panels were divided amongst touch-
sensitive LCDs spatially orientated to resemble a cockpit configuration. Special hardware 
actuators (such as engine throttle levers or control columns) may be added in response to special 
client requests to add tactile fidelity to the IPT. Simulation-Based Courseware (SBC) was also 
introduced consisting of a VSIM with an additional instructional layer of narration, instructions 
and performance-based evaluation tests on top. All the various devices were built by adding 
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different layers on top of the same simulation core that powers the hardware simulations and 
panels used on high fidelity full flight simulators. Figure 12 below depicts the common-core 
architecture of the integrated training suite that CAE offered. 
Figure 7.2: Graphical depiction of the common-core configuration of CAE's integrated products 
training suite 
After CAE, Mechtronix launched Matrix and FlightSafety introduced the Integrated Architecture. 
This has switched competition to complete platforms instead of individual products. The 
commonality of the simulation core across the different devices of the training suite did not only 
improve the quality of the overall training but also made updating the simulation software easier 
and less costly. 
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In 2003, following the success and increased adoption rate of the integrated training suite 
concept, CAE launched its Advanced Training Curriculum: a training methodology based on the 
integrated training suite (CAE, 2007). An integrated training solution was created by the 
combination of the advanced curriculum and the integrated training suite of products. Some 
airlines that formerly configured their own training suites were starting to show interest in the 
integrated solution. This allowed them to acquire a turn-key solution that provides higher quality 
of training and ease of updates, all at a lower cost. The traditional approach of assembling the 
suite from different suppliers satisfied the needs of clients and was in use for approximately 15 
years. The new one however, not only satisfied regulatory requirements but exceeded them by 
providing pedagogical value, cost efficiency and ease of maintenance and updating. It is hard to 
determine whether the new integrated solution exceeded clients' expectations or merely fully 
satisfied them as opposed to the former compromise solution. However, it is evident that the 
maturity of the simulation technology and its satisfaction of clients' needs have created the 
opportunity for suppliers to go beyond individual devices and offer integrated solutions with 
closed proprietary architectures that satisfy clients needs more than their predecessor client-
assembled ones. The technological maturity of simulation and computing technologies resulted 
in closure of the product's architecture as the incumbents leveraged their accumulated learning 
and coordination capabilities to close the architecture and capture value. 
7.7 Conclusion 
Unlike the simulation device industry where the technological maturity did allow the emergence 
of low-cost entrants in the industry, the technological maturity of the suite level only allowed the 
incumbents to introduce their integrated solutions. This is primarily because the FFS components 
of the suite and the innovative integration know-how are beyond the capabilities of incumbent 
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low-level device manufacturers, let alone new entrants. The accumulated learning that the big 
players possessed permitted them to reconfigure the simulation devices around the new 
proprietary closed architectures. 
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CHAPTER 8 RESEARCH FINDINGS - AVIATION TRAINING SERVICES 
8.1 Definition 
Aviation training services is at the downstream most position in the aviation training industry 
offering training to flight and maintenance crews of airlines and other aircraft operators. The 
industry emerged as flying became more commonplace and regulated. The industry has been 
traditionally divided into two distinct sub-industries: ab-initio training on one hand and recurring 
& type-rating training on the other. The ab-initio sub-industry teaches "laymen" the basics of 
airmanship up to the point when they can attain a private or a commercial flight license. The 
latter caters to commercially licensed pilots by providing them with specific-aircraft training in 
the case of type-rating, or the periodic refresher training required for maintaining their licenses. 
The growth of the training services industry and the flight simulation industry was triggered when 
the US Air Force acquired Edwin Link's PilotMakers to train its military pilots for delivering 
mail in 1934 (Rolfe and Staples, 1986). Since then, the training services industry has grown to 
become an $8 Billion industry in 2001 and the flight simulation industry $500 Million one 
(Velocci, 2001) 
Ab-initio training service providers are generally small operators that make little or no use of 
simulation technology. Light single propeller aircraft is typically the first step for students of 
these schools following their classroom ground school training. Since the mid 1980' s some of the 
more sophisticated schools have acquired low-cost flexible flight training devices (FTDs) 
provided by some lower-level device manufacturers, such as Frasca International (Frasca, 2007). 
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Recurring and type-rating training has been traditionally conducted by airlines at their own 
training facilities. As commercial airlines started to become more popular in Europe and the 
USA after World War II, they started to build their own training facilities increasingly using the 
simulation technologies available at the time. As these facilities grew, some airlines' leveraged 
their excess capacity for generating revenues by training other airlines. Some even went to the 
extent of spinning off their training providers to operate them as profit centers to offload their 
huge financial burdens. Lufthansa Flight Training is one of the most successful of these service-
provider spin-offs that has been independently operating since 1997. Other dedicated flight 
schools, such as Schreiner, FlightSafety and Simuflite, also emerged catering to one of the 
following 3 categories of pilots: 
1. Additional needs of traditional airlines in excess of their own centers caused by seasonal 
needs, hiring campaigns and cash flow constraints; 
2. Small or regional airlines whose economies do not justify investing in creating a training 
center; 
3. Business or private jet pilots who do not belong to any airline but still need the training 
for maintaining their pilot licenses. 
8.2 Regulation 
Regulators have to approve a service provider's training curriculum, along with the product suite 
and facilities that go along with it. FAA Part 142 licenses are granted to training centers that 
meet the detailed requirements covering qualification metrics ranging from the training 
curriculum to the qualifications of the training center's management. 
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8.3 Product selection criteria 
The product selection criteria for both sub-sections of the training services industry are very 
different as they cater to different markets, different clientele and are therefore described 
separately below. 
For the ab-initio market, clients are individual students seeking private or commercial licensure. 
The criteria most relevant to them therefore are: 
1. Cost: the costs of the full training, including both the ground school and the minimum 
flight hours, may range from $90,000 to $180,000 depending on the geographical 
location, sophistication of training aircraft and licenses sought10 (Fiorino, 2005(1)). 
Students normally finance these costs individually through personal savings, family 
support or bank loans. The Executive Director and the Director of Sales at Oxford 
Aviation Training indicated that some flight schools gain a competitive advantage in the 
marketplace by providing convenient financing options through partnerships with 
financial institutions. The General Manager of Lufthansa confirms as he notes that the 
margins have decreased by up to 20% to attract customers, whose "main requirement 
right now is to reduce the cost". 
2. Reputation of School and Partnership with Airlines: a significant portion of ab-initio 
flight students aim to make a career out of flying and are therefore conscious of their 
employment prospects when choosing the flight schools. Some flight schools have 
traditionally maintained strong relationships with major airlines supplying them with 
their new hire pilots needs. Oxford Aviation Training, for example, has traditionally 
10 Typically students get first a VFR private license that allows them to fly during day time but not for 
commercial profit. An IFR license is obtained next allowing increased reliance on instruments and hence 
night flying. A multi-engine license is then sought before a commercial license is granted allowing pilots 
to fly commercially with passengers. 
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supplied British Airways with new pilots. In more recent years the school has made 
similar partnerships with growing low-cost airlines such as Ryainair, EasyJet and Thomas 
Cook. The airlines are given the opportunity to interview students at the beginning of 
their careers and pre-select a number of candidates based on their character profiles and 
aptitude tests. The school then provides airline-specific courses to these students for 
training them on procedures such as the airline's SOPs (standard operating procedures) 
and emergency procedures. Such partnerships have proved quite beneficial to all parties 
involved: to increase the students' employment perspectives, to allow airlines to secure 
future human resources and save on their initial training costs and to give the school a 
competitive advantage amongst its competitors. 
3. Quality of training: the quality of the training facilities, instructors, aircraft and 
simulation instructional devices are other differentiating factors for flight schools in 
attracting students. Some schools pride themselves in operating Level 4 FTDs to better 
prepare their students for real flying. However, most schools use little or no flight 
simulation given their high initial investment and operating costs compared with single 
propeller engine aircraft traditionally used for training. 
For Recurring and Type-Rating training, clients are typically airlines and commercial aircraft 
operators seeking to attain and maintain regulatory approvals of their flight crews at the highest 
efficiency level possible. The main selection criteria for these clients are: 
1. Availability of specific training: flight training centers provide training on wide-body, 
regional and business jets using FFSs and FTDs as well as other instructional tools. The 
availability of the simulation devices as well as the type-rating and competencies of the 
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instructors determine the training center's ability to offer training on a particular aircraft 
type and hence attract clients operating that aircraft. Furthermore, airlines also seek 
training providers whose simulation devices are configured similarly to their aircraft 
fleets. The flight-deck configuration, avionics suite used and the particular options 
available on the simulator may render it in close resemblance to the aircraft configuration 
of a particular carrier thus more efficient for that carrier to use. Differences between the 
airline's aircraft configuration and that of the simulators are usually covered through 
difference training courses offered to pilots following their simulator sessions. Some 
training centers acquire re-configurable full flight simulators where different hardware 
and software kits can be re-loaded to change the aircraft configuration reflected by the 
simulators and thus appeal to more clients. Lower-level simulation devices are often less 
complex to reconfigure due to their lower fidelity level and less hardware content. 
2. Cost: in the wake of the economic hardships that the airline industry has faced in the past 
few years, cost has been an increasingly important factor in the selection of training 
providers. The economic recession in 2001, followed by the terrorism events of 9/11, 
SARS in the Far East, the wars in Asia and the record-high prices of fuel have imposed 
further constraints on an already-strained traditional industry operating a hefty hub-spoke 
model facing serious competitive threats from a few low-cost point-to-point airlines. 
These circumstances have resulted in several of the world's major airlines and flag 
carriers to declare bankruptcy or at least announce major re-organization schemes. Even 
for the most profitable airlines though, the inevitable overhead costs of training constitute 
a significant cost of their total revenues. Airlines are therefore increasingly conscious of 
their training costs composed of their simulator operation costs as well as other expenses 
such as wages of personnel during training and travel and living expenses. 
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3. Quality: the quality of the training offered is a key selection criterion of training 
providers. The quality of facilities, instructors, simulators and value-add services may 
significantly influence an aircraft operator's choice of training provider. 
8.4 Product architecture: 
The different training services that make part of an entire training program have been traditionally 
loosely connected with regulatory approval. Students seeking to pursue pilot careers follow ab-
initio training in one of the numerous flight schools, alongside private license seekers. While 
some simulation is sometimes available, flight schools rely heavily on light single-crew, single-
engine cockpit aircraft hours to fulfill regulatory flight requirements. Pilots complete their 
commercial license requirements with between 140 and 180 hours of real flight, 40 to 50 hours of 
simulator time and approximately 60 hours of ground school time. They are then expected to 
accumulate between 1500 and 1700 flight hours before airlines will consider their candidacy. 
This additional flight experience is often gained in flight schools, instructing student pilots, or 
flying light general aviation aircraft, such as regional carriers in remote areas or pesticide-
spraying aircraft. The pilots' need for these hours renders their working during this period quite 
hard. It is during this period that most pilots quit the domain and just maintain their private 
licensure for leisure purposes. Some pilots avoid this path by joining the armed forces and flying 
for the military. An Air Canada pilot interviewed describes his circumstances during this period: 
"...I flew a small regional aircraft up North for 18 cents a mile. My role 
included most of the aircraft-related tasks from doing the pre-flight checks 
around the aircraft, to fueling it to preparing coffee for the passengers before 
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take-off. Some other pilots flew for free. Airlines know that you need the hours 
so they don't pay you for flying. You almost have to pay them." 
Upon accumulation of these additional hours, a pilot may be recruited as a first-officer in an 
airline, flying to the right hand side of a more experienced captain. The airline career then starts 
for this pilot including sporadic type-rating training sessions and periodic recurring training 
sessions to maintain airmanship. In summary, pilots go through four different phases of pilot 
training: ab-initio, experience-gaining, type-rating and recurring. 
The tools, instructors, methodologies and curriculums are typically not aligned together except at 
the level of their pedagogical objectives dictated by the regulatory authorities. The self-reliance 
attitude and dial cockpit skills acquired in the first two phases have to be replaced with multi-
crew cooperation skills and typically the ability to manage a computerized cockpits centrally 
controlled by a flight management computer. Suppliers of the training at different phases did not 
need to communicate amongst themselves or coordinate their services any more than strictly 
adhering to the training standards published by the regulators. The resulting open-architecture 
service provided the pilot with the skills and knowledge that the regulators intended without any 
need for collaboration or cooperation between providers of complementary services. 
8.5 Recent Industry Trends: 
In the past few years, the efficiency and effectiveness of the traditional flight training cycle (the 
industry's open architecture setup) has been increasingly questioned. Several concurrent trends, 
in the industry and its surroundings, have fuelled this debate: 
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1. Economic pressures on airlines: 
As mentioned above, airlines have experienced increasing economic pressures over the past 
few years. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, SARS, the wars in Asia and the Middle East have all 
had a negative impact on the demand for flying. Low-cost and no-frill airlines have increased 
this economic challenge by offering a more efficient alternative to the hub-and-spoke system. 
The result was an increasing pressure on airlines to lower their human resources costs mostly 
crew salaries and training costs. The efficiency of overall training and the costs incurred 
during its learning-unlearning cycles were therefore highly scrutinized. 
2. The out-sourcing trend of airlines: 
The rapid surge in the number of small low-cost airlines in recent years has also resulted in 
the growth of the independent training services industry. These airlines often do not have the 
necessary scale to justify investing in their own pilot training facilities and therefore resort to 
outsourcing to independent trainers or airlines with excess capacity in their facilities. This 
has attracted many players in the industry, such as simulator manufacturers CAE and Thales 
and aircraft manufacturers, like Boeing, to enter the training market through establishing their 
own training centers. It also gave room for existing players, such as FlightSafety 
International to grow. Training service providers are therefore becoming increasingly 
efficient and are developing the necessary scale and accumulated learning to attract even the 
established large airlines whose training fleets are becoming obsolescent or who need more 
training than what their facilities can provide. The net result is a significant growth in the 
outsourcing of training in the industry over the past few years, and hence increased 
competition and pressures on efficiency. 
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3. Vertical Integration of Training Providers: 
In recent years, the two traditionally segregated sub-industries of ab-initio and professional 
training have experienced increased amalgamation. Some ab-initio trainers, such as Oxford 
Aviation Training in the UK, have taken the initiative to coordinate with major airlines to 
synchronize their training syllabuses providing seamless training for students. The airlines 
are invited to pre-select student pilots based on interviews and aptitude tests. These are then 
given airline-specific training as well as their standard courses. 
The other concurrent trend in recent years has been the partnership of ab-initio training 
schools with independent professional training providers. CAE, the world's second largest 
training provider, has made a series of partnership agreements with ab-initio flight schools in 
Europe, North America and Asia (CAE, 2007). The company is therefore capable of 
providing end-to-end training to its clients enabling them to outsource their entire training 
function with improved quality and at reduced costs. 
4. Retirement of the Baby-Boomers generation of pilots: 
Similar to many other domains, the retirement of baby-boomers, looming since the beginning 
of the 21st century has alerted many to the upcoming need to train new pilots fast enough to 
replace them. Industry forecasters estimate the need for 140,000 new pilots in the 2002 to 
2012 period (Fiorino, 2005(2)). At the current duration of 18 to 26 months to complete ab-
initio training only, let alone the consequent months spent in acquiring the necessary flying 
time to be considered by a regional airline, the industry is believed to be unable to fulfill its 
staffing needs over the next few years. This shortage is also attributed to the airlines 
traditional absence at the early stages of pilot recruitment and training. Oxford Training 
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Services' program of collaboration with airlines at the ab-initio phase is still considered 
innovative in an industry that has had a surplus of licenses pilots for the past few decades. 
5. Multi-Pilot License (MPL) Working Group: 
The Multi-crew Pilot License (MPL) is an ICAO initiative that is currently being formulated 
by a forum of industry experts from airlines, aviation training providers, simulation providers 
and regulatory bodies (Lekic, 2007). The new license integrates the multi-crew glass cockpit 
skills in the initial ab-initio pilot training. The ICAO website states that the license "allows a 
student pilot to exercise the privileges of a co-pilot in commercial air transportation on multi-
crew aeroplanes" (ICAO, 2007). Rather than learning single-crew cockpit skills only to 
unlearn them in a multi-crew setting, the MPL accelerates the program by putting the student 
in the cockpit he/she will most likely fly right away. The program is also intended to allow 
more use of simulation technologies early-on in the training cycle (Fiorino, 2005(2); Lekic, 
2007). 
The MPL is estimated to reduce training costs and duration by approximately 50% and thus 
enable the industry to meet the high demand for pilot that emerging markets like China and 
India have created (Fiorino, 2005(2); Lekic, 2007; Chennai, 2005). Simulation and training 
providers have already positioned their services to accommodate the MPL. Mechtronix 
Systems has announced that its Integrated Training Architecture (ITA) will enable MPL 
training (Mechtronix, 2007) while Alteon, the training subsidiary of Boeing, has announced 
that it will be graduating the first 6 MPL-licensed pilots (Alteon, 2007). 
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The MPL harmonized the ab-initio portion of flight training with the air carrier portion. The 
former has traditionally been conducted in isolation using light single-engine aircraft with 
little or no change over the past 100 years (Fiorino, 2005(1)). The maturity of the simulation 
technology though has created the impetus for "modernize training because simulation 
devices are now so sophisticated that they can be used in most of it" as Captain Jean Benoit 
Toulouse, an Air France pilot mandated with in creating a French MPL program, says (Lekic, 
2007). The technological maturity of the industry has therefore resulted in closing the 
architecture of the training services around the pedagogical element of pilot training. 
In summary, the integration of the training services architecture is taking place through 2 distinct 
movements as illustrated in figure 13. The MPL, encouraged by the technological maturity of 
simulation technologies, is harmonizing the ab-initio with the type-rating and recurrent training 
allowing training providers to offer turn-key training. Parallel to that, training providers in air 
carrier market are vertically integrating backwards into the lucrative ab-initio market due to its 
prospected growth opportunities over the next few years. Both movements are bridging the gap 
and closing the product architecture of the training services industry into one where integrated 
training solutions are made available for airlines. 
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Figure 8.1: Parallel movements by MPL and vertical integration resulting in closing the product 
architecture of aviation training services. 
8.6 Conclusion 
The efficiency and effectiveness of the traditional open architecture of the aviation training 
industry is currently being questioned. A new closed architecture is emerging for increasing the 
speed and training quality of pilots to bridge the gap between the supply and demand foreseen 
over the next few years. The industry incumbents, such as CAE, are leveraging their expertise in 
the pedagogical aspect of training and are offering seamless training, across all phases, that makes 
more intense use of simulation technologies. This trend only emerged following the industry's 
attainment of technological maturity and the satisfaction of the clients' needs and the regulatory 
guidelines for simulation technologies. The resulting confidence in the simulation fidelity was 
also the driving force behind the MPL working group's guideline of increasing the use of 
simulation technologies throughout the new integrated training program. 
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CHAPTER 9 DISCUSSION 
Disruptive innovation theory has been one of the most influential themes in the last few years. 
With roots in the disk drive industry (Christensen, 1998; Chesbrough, 2004), the theory has been 
extended to attempt to interpret various trends and phenomena in several other industries 
(Christensen et al, 2004). The theory predicts that when industries mature technologically and 
incumbent suppliers start to exceed mainstream customer expectations in favor of their large 
accounts with specialized customers, new entrants find the opportunity to provide lower-cost 
products that barely meet mainstream customers or that appeal to non-customers to enter the 
market. As these become the mainstream, the entrants displace the incumbents out of the market 
shifting competition from technological advancement towards other parameters such as low cost 
or flexibility. In an attempt to increase their efficiency in the new market dynamics, entrants 
open the product architecture shifting the technological advancement pressures upstream to their 
component suppliers. Eventually as the new open architecture matures, the entrants - now the 
incumbents - face disruptive pressure themselves from new entrants offering a new product 
architecture that they cannot compete with. This pushes back the industry in integration mode to 
compete at the architectures level until one is chosen by the market thereby launching its maturity 
journey. This alternation between open and closed product architectures is triggered by the 
maturity of the technology within the framework of a product architecture. 
The validation of applicability of this theory to other industries was then attempted in "Seeing 
What's Next: Using the Theories of Innovation to Predict Industry Change" (Christensen et al, 
2004). An example of an industry analysis was the aviation industry and the rise of the low-end 
regional jet manufacturers (Christensen et al, 2004). Christensen argued that regional jets started 
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as the low-end disruptive innovations that started to encroach on the mainstream industry and 
threaten the incumbents, namely Boeing and Airbus. In response to this disruption and to ensure 
a sustainable market position, three options were presented to the incumbents: 1. Develop a small 
airplane internally to compete, 2. Create a subsidiary company capable of introducing a regional 
jet, 3. Buy a regional jet provider and allow it to operate independently to gain a foothold in the 
emerging low-end market. Four years have passed since this book was published and Boeing has 
not pursued any of the options suggested but yet continues to be the world's largest aircraft 
provider. Moreover regional aircraft has not been able to replace, or at least significantly eat 
away from the market share of, wide-body aircraft. The inherent flaw in Christensen's analysis, 
which can now be proven in retrospect, is the confusion between two distinct market segments 
and a rising low-end market. The regional jets market was never a low-end segment of the wide-
bodies aircraft that was encroaching on its market share. For airlines, both wide-bodies and 
regional jets are important components of their fleets that cater to two types of routes, long-haul 
and short-haul respectively. Indeed, they can be likened to a bus and a taxi car in the vehicles 
fleet of a transportation company. Each is a different vehicle for a different type of service and 
different clientele. The fact that regional jets became more popular consequent to the airlines 
industry downturn in 2001 is attributed to 3 main reasons that are quite distant from technological 
innovation: 
4. Airlines were trying to maximize their loading on the short-hauls in light of the 
prevalent fear of flying, that many passengers developed, and the subsequent 
decrease in passengers' volume in domestic and short-haul flights. Using a 100-
seater regional jet with 80% loading was more efficient that using a 200-seater 
with 40% loading. 
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5. Large airlines and flag carriers were more actively seeking to exploit smaller 
routes that may be more profitable for recovering their losses on the international 
ones that they still had to operate although at a loss. This shifted their focus 
towards better-suited aircraft for these routes. 
6. With the sudden surge in insurance and fuel prices and the subsequent increase in 
airline ticket prices, consumers became more interested in low-cost and no-frills 
airlines. This boost in demand for these airlines which fly standard point-to-
point short-haul routes resulted in a corresponding surge in demand for regional 
aircraft. This was not encroaching, at least to a significant degree, on the market 
for larger wide-body aircraft since the majority of passengers are not likely to 
change their destinations as a function of price and the two categories of aircraft 
types (wide-body and regional) are not interchangeable for the majority of routes. 
Other than the recursive reference to disruptive innovation theory to interpret the change, the 
book did not offer proofs of its applicability to the aviation industry. In fact, history has shown 
that the surge in regional jet sales, observed by Christensen, was nothing more than a transient 
shift that soon died returning the market quite close to its pre September 11th distribution of 
regional and wide-body jets. 
The research presented above tested the applicability of this cyclical model in complex product 
industries using the aviation training industry as a case study. The key steps and constructs of the 
industry were listed and ten exploratory questions were listed against them for verifying their 
applicability in the case of CoPS industries. Where divergence was hypothesized between the 
theory and the behavior of CoPS industries, a reason for the divergence was hypothesized based 
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on preliminary observations from the industry. Five hypothesized reasons for divergence 
emerged. In chapter 5, the answers to the ten questions from the research were presented and in 
the subsequent chapters, their particularities for each of the three sub-industries studied were also 
presented. The five hypothesized reasons for divergence are revisited below in light of the 
research questions answered above. 
1. The need for regulatory approval of innovations. 
It has been shown that regulatory requirements are one of the strongest determinants of customer 
needs at various levels in the industry. Regulations determine the duration, simulation equipment 
used and skills acquired at every phase of pilot training starting from the preliminary ab-initio 
training to the advanced type-rating and recurrent training. Regulations also qualify the entire 
training products suite in light of the training curriculum it supports as well as the individual 
training devices that it contains. Attaining the technological needs of mainstream clients is 
therefore equivalent to satisfying the regulatory requirements behind them. 
These regulatory requirements also act as filters of innovation as they only allow new products 
and technologies complying with them to create value for the end users. This not only limits the 
emergence of disruptive technologies but also slows down the process of bringing innovations to 
the market. In fact, in the strict sense of disruptive technologies (ones that render the core 
competencies of the incumbents obsolete), there have not been any disruptive innovations 
throughout the history of the industry. The majority of innovations was incremental and 
introduced by the incumbents themselves. The entrants' new designs and concepts were merely 
challenging the classical interpretations of certain clauses of the regulations and offering lower 
cost alternatives to satisfy them. The incumbents were always able to match the new products, 
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though, offering better quality and more features by leveraging their existing software libraries 
and diversified product portfolio. The incumbents' response was also helped by the slow process 
of introducing innovations that the regulatory qualifications impose. 
For example, the process of qualifying the new LCD-based FTDs (called IPTs) to level 4 took 
CAE around 2 years. The innovative concept of using touch-sensitive LCDs was first introduced 
by WICAT, a low-level device producer. After seeing it at WICAT, an airline training director 
asked CAE if they can produce a similar device at a comparable price. After months of planning 
for the new product, CAE launched the new FTD and announced its intention to qualify it to a 
level 4. The process started with finding a client to sponsor the technology and demonstrate its 
value within his own training curriculum to the authorities. Then CAE started a lobbying process 
with the authorities to challenge the classical interpretation of the requirements using tactile 
panels (original aircraft or simulated) to satisfy the "cockpit panels" requirement in level 4 FTDs. 
Once this was completed, the regulators' test pilots tested the machine and wrote a detailed report 
that was presented to the authorities and CAE with necessary changes to be made to certain 
features. Some of these changes required developing new technologies before the regulators 
came back for a final inspection and approval of the device. Throughout this period, both 
WICAT and CAE continued to market the device to different customers and at various industry 
trade shows. It was not long before all the other suppliers in the industry had their different 
versions of the technology. The 2 years time lag did not allow the disruptive technology to fly 
under the radar of the incumbents. On the contrary, the incumbents' strong relationships with the 
regulators and their proven track record accelerated their qualification process compensating for 
the delay in launching the new concept FTD. 
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2. The direct involvement of clients in the design of products and services 
Most airline clients have built significant expertise in simulation technologies over the years. The 
involvement of customers such as Swissair, Lufthansa or KLM in the product design of their 
simulation devices has reached the extent of their engineers helping with the debugging of the 
simulation source code. This intimate involvement allows sufficient communication of needs and 
expectations between the clients and the simulation product providers allowing the latter to 
respond promptly to needs and expectations. This type of "pull" market does not provide 
sufficient room for unnoticed overshooting of the needs of mainstream customers. Unlike 
consumer electronic products where suppliers can only rely on marketing and sales information to 
identify the needs and expectations of the market, suppliers in CoPS industries are in direct 
communication with their expert clients and are often well guided by them throughout the product 
lifecycle. 
3. Public safety and risk liabilities 
Public safety has been one of the key reasons behind the emergence of the synthetic simulation 
industry. As mentioned above in the historical background section, Link's own safe landing at 
Newark airport was instrumental for winning the contract with the US Air Force. Safety and 
public liability considerations continue to be at the forefront for regulators and government 
authorities in charge of aviation. For aircraft operators, simulation providers and trainers, the fear 
of negative, or faulty, training entails the safety aspect without having to go as far as considering 
its potential catastrophic failure consequences. This fear of negative training also reinforces the 
competitive position of the incumbents' tested technologies and hampers the industry's 
acceptance of innovations introduced by entrants lacking this proven track record. 
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4. The sustaining value of accumulated learning 
Accumulated learning of the suppliers in the industry has a major effect on their competitiveness. 
It improves the market's perception and confidence in the company, its ability to amortize its 
development investments and its skills in systems integration. In an environment where building 
a simulator is a complex project that spans 12 to 24 months at a cost of tens of millions of dollars, 
the company's proven track record is essential for gaining the customers' confidence. In addition 
to the market's perception of accumulated learning, a company's possession of the simulation 
software can reduce its cost of developing a simulator by 20 to 50%. The large investment that 
companies make in developing the simulation models of a particular aircraft type make 
economies of scale an important factor in its competitiveness. Every additional simulator allows 
further amortization of the development investments. Therefore, accumulated learning increases 
the path dependence of companies' competitiveness and helps to reinforce their strategic position 
against low-cost entrants competing for market share. Accumulated learning also increases the 
suppliers' integration skills and gives it a strong competitive edge especially in projects where the 
customers are more quality-concerned than cost-sensitive. In aircraft development programs, for 
example, airframe manufacturers have always chosen one of the two largest suppliers in the 
industry to work in parallel with them on developing the first generation simulators for delivering 
the entitlement training on the new aircraft. These programs are extremely complex and require 
iterative development of simulation models for every revision of the aircraft configuration and 
controllers. The airframe manufacturers' level of confidence in the simulator suppliers again 
plays an important role as the formers use the simulator as a test-bed for design modifications to 
the aircraft. Accumulated learning therefore is a key competitive advantage of the incumbents 
and a barrier to entry for new entrants. 
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5. The thinness of the market 
CoPS industries, by definition, are unique complex products that involve several orchestrated 
suppliers. This makes market thinness also an intrinsic characteristic of these industries. For 
some industries, component technologies may be used in several applications. Suppliers in such 
industries leverage their R&D investments and high development costs across several industries 
to remain profitable. For example, providers of steel beams used in building bridges are often 
also involved in commercial and domestic construction as well giving them the business volume 
necessary for survival. For the aviation industry, this leveraging across different industries is 
significantly reduced by the regulatory requirements that the suppliers have to comply with. 
These compliances are quite costly and are of no value outside the industry. In fact, except for 
general parts, such as screws and nuts, most specialized components used to make a flight 
simulator are quite specific to the industry. They often resemble aircraft components in form, fit 
and function but are more complex in their interface and controllers to allow them to simulate 
reality. With an average market volume of 30 products per year, it is quite uncommon to find a 
supplier of specialized components, such as simulated avionics controllers for example, who is 
not a systems integrator as well. This type of thin markets does not lend itself to architecture 
openness where a network of specialized suppliers independently produces innovative 
components based on a set standard. 
According to disruptive innovation theory, industries evolve into an open architecture as their 
products mature technologically (Christensen, 1998) and that this transformation from a closed 
architecture to an open architecture is cyclical along the lifecycle of the industry (Chesbrough, 
2004). The implicit assumption behind this theory is that the closure of the technological 
architecture is not an inherent trait of the industry but rather a function of its technological 
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maturity which is turn is relative to its customer requirements. When industries are still on their 
way towards maturity, their technological architectures are still closed and are therefore in need 
of integration at the firm level. As they mature, their modularity increases to a level that allows 
integration to be managed at the industry level. This relativity of the interdependence of 
technological architecture has been an implicit assumption in the studies of Christensen, 
Chesbrough and others who studied consumer electronics and similar appliance industries 
(Christensen, 1997; Chesbrough, 2004). 
The aviation training industry has diverged from this pattern. Its closed product architecture has 
persisted throughout its technological maturity evolution history. In fact, the only change it has 
exhibited has been towards further closure as demonstrated above. The factors favoring closure, 
studied above, point to the inherent need for a firm to actively assume the integrator role for 
managing the high number of components and disciplines needed to build a complex product 
industry. These factors are the regulation, the accumulated learning, the direct involvement of 
clients, public safety and risk concerns and market thinness. 
While the above presented research is insufficient to prove the inherence of architecture closure 
in CoPS industries, it is sufficient to disprove that architecture closure is a function of the 
technological maturity phase in all industries. The exception provided by the aviation training 
industry demonstrates that some of the implicit assumptions of disruptive innovation theory may 
not be applicable to at least some industries. The characteristics of CoPS industries need to be 
thoroughly analyzed before any further conclusions can be made about their categorical exception 
from the existing theory. 
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CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS & FURTHER RESEARCH 
10.1 Conclusions 
The research presented in this thesis has demonstrated that complex product system (CoPS) 
industries do not necessarily fit with disruptive innovation theory as proposed by Christensen and 
Chesbrough. Through a study of the aviation training industry spanning 4 years, the industry was 
observed to attain, and begin to exceed, the technological maturity needed by its clients. This, 
however, did not result in low-level market entrants to take over the mainstream segment of the 
market as the theory suggests. Furthermore, no openness of the product architecture was 
observed at any of the product levels. In fact, the industry is moving in the direction of further 
closure of its products, suites and training programs. 
In a complex industry where collaboration is a key to innovation, the disruptive innovations 
introduced by industry entrants had to be coordinated with the various industry players and 
therefore failed to fly under the radar of the incumbents. Mainstream clients and regulators 
continued to be heavily involved throughout the design and build lifecycle of the product 
therefore leaving little room for disruptive innovation. More importantly, the incumbents' 
accumulated tacit and codified knowledge, in the form of coordination skills and simulation 
software libraries, allowed them to close the industry architecture further around their 
pedagogical competencies offering turn-key training solutions for their clients and off-setting the 
cost advantages that the low-cost entrants offered. 
The disruptive innovation theory, therefore, is not adequate for predicting the pattern and 
consequences of disruptive technologies on players in complex product industries. A generalized 
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theory needs to pay special attention to their particular features such as collaboration, 
accumulated learning, customer involvement in design and market concentration. 
10.2 Limitations 
The main limitation of this research is that a single industry was studied and found to be an 
exception to disruptive innovation theory. This is not sufficient for building an alternative theory 
to be formulated to describe the behavior of CoPS industries in response to technological 
maturity. A more comprehensive research encompassing multiple industries from different 
games of innovation is needed. 
10.3 Recommendations for Further Research 
Christensen's disruptive innovation theory was built from single-case inductive research focused 
on the disk drive industry, which is a consumer technological product. While theoretical 
sampling1' is adequate for constructing a theory about disruptive innovation, its generalizability 
will be quite limited (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). A multiple-case study would have 
provided a stronger base for theory building (Yin, 1994) especially if the cases covered a 
diversified carefully-selected array of product and industry architecture configurations across 
different innovation games (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
Therefore a multiple-case research is needed to build a robust theory of disruptive innovation 
whose constructs, propositions and their underlying logical arguments are more widely applicable 
and permit broader exploration of research questions. This broader investigation of industrial 
cases has to occur early-on at the theory formulation stage while using additional cases to amplify 
11 Theoretical sampling means that decisions about which data to collect next are determined by the theory 
in progress (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) 
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the analytical power (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) rather than what Christensen et al tried to 
achieve by applying the single-case theory to a wide array of industries and trying to fit the theory 
to their observations and their interpretations (Christensen et al, 2004). The research presented 
above has revealed that games of innovation could form an interesting basis for selecting the 
cases to cover different patterns of behavior in response to technological maturity. 
Games of innovation are classified based on 2 principal axes: product architecture and market 
lifecycle stage. On the product architecture axis, products from stand-alone product industries 
(such as medication pills for example) and products from modular product industries (such as the 
PC software industry) are needed. Together with the aviation training industry, these industries 
will cover the variety of product architectures intrinsic to the product, i.e. integral or modular and 
the special case of modular products which is tightly integrated products. The latter does not lend 
itself to architecture openness due to some of the factors identified in the research such as liability 
risks, direct involvement of clients and high value of accumulated learning. 
The other axis of games of innovation that should serve as a guide for industry sampling for 
building a global theory of disruptive innovation should be the market maturity phase. At the 
beginning of the industry lifecycle, while there is still a performance gap between the products 
and the needs of the mainstream clients, industries are still in the technological race phase. As 
the market matures and technology attains the needs of the mainstream clients, some industries 
are commoditized, others evolve towards services while others get concentrated around new 
niches of the mass markets. These categories should form the guide for the other 3 industries 
needed for the uniform sampling of industries necessary for building a universal theory of 
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disruptive innovation. The seventh game identified (i.e. innovation support) can be represented 
by a business consulting or accounting firm supporting the overall production and operations. 
The other venue for expanding this research is towards building a theory of disruptive innovation 
in CoPS industries. While the research presented above confirms an exception to the prevalent 
theory, it does not provide an alternative due to its single-case nature. A multiple-case research 
on complex industries would help reach such an alternative model by investigating the 
consequences of technological maturity on CoPS industries that have different combinations of 
the five divergence reasons studied in this research. Studying other industries that, for example, 
are not regulated but have directly involved clients, high liability risks, high value of accumulated 
learning and have think markets would reveal the impact of singling out the regulation factor on 
the product architecture and its evolution consequent to product maturity. 
10.4 Management Implications 
There are two main lessons that can be drawn from this research for management, one that is 
broad and another that is more specific to managers in CoPS industries. The broad lesson is that 
a lot of management theories are not universal and are therefore not applicable for all industries 
and throughout different evolution phases. The characteristics of the industry and sector, where 
the research leading to the theory was conducted, need to be taken into consideration to 
understand the theory and its applicability to other industries. For CoPS industry managers, this 
research demonstrates that value creation is often achieved by understanding the needs of the end 
consumer, in the case of aviation training the pilot, and offering turn-key solutions that create 
value for that end user. Along this path, knowledge accumulation is key as it strengthens the 
company's competitive position. 
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A brief description of the organizations where research interviews were conducted is provided 
below: 
Associated Aircraft Manufacturing & Sales Inc. (AAMSI) 
AAMSI (www.aamsi.com) is a company that provides airframe and avionic components to 
airlines for refurbishing and repairing aircraft. With a facility in Florida, the company is 
specialized in the rotor-wing and military domains. 
Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC) 
AIDC (www.aidc.com.tw) is a state-owned company in Taiwan acting as an assembly 
facility for several commercial, military and rotary-wing aircraft. With products such as 
the Sikorsky S-92 civil helicopter, the Airbus A321 and Bombardier's Learjet 45, AIDC is 
a strong Chinese player in the aircraft industry. 
Airbus 
Airbus industries (www.airbus.com) is the second largest commercial aircraft manufacturer 
in the world. Part of the multi-national company EADS, Airbus has been competing with 
Boeing for the leadership position in the commercial aircraft market. The company 
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produced an array of aircraft ranging from the A319 to the A380, its most recent 
development. 
Air Canada Jazz 
AC Jazz (www.flyjazz.ca) is another key North American regional airline. It was a spin-off 
of Air Canada but soon became more profitable than its parent airline and competed with it 
in some markets. Its low cost business model is one that is becoming increasingly popular 
in regional airlines, especially in North America. 
Alteon 
Alteon (www.alteontraining.com) is the wholly-owned training subsidiary of Boeing 
Company that was formed by the termination of Boeing's joint venture with FSI (named 
FSBTI: Flight Safety Boeing Training International). The newly formed Alteon retained all 
the wide-body aircraft training facilities while FSI kept the business and regional jet 
facilities. 
BAE Regional Aircraft 
British Aerospace Regional Aircraft (www.baesystems.com) is a subsidiary of BAE 
Systems specialized in providing regional turbo-prop airplanes such as the Avro Jet, BAE 
146 and Jetstream and support services to regional airlines. The company offers its clients 
a range of support services including engineering, technical support, logistical support and 
asset management services. 
Becker Avionics 
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Becker avionics (www.becker-avionics.com) is a German producer of avionic instruments. 
The company has a wide-variety of products and an established customer base in the areas 
of communication, navigation, ATC (air traffic control) and SAR (search and rescue) 
equipment. A sole proprietorship founded in Germany, Becker now has divisions in 
Europe, the USA and China (Becker, 2007). 
Boeing 
Boeing Aircraft company (www.boeing.com) is the largest aircraft manufacturer in the 
world. Boeing's lines of business span commercial aircraft, military aircraft, flight training 
(through their Alteon subsidiary) and aircraft logistics. In the military domain, Boeing is a 
key defense contractor and supplier of the US military. 
Civil Aviation Authority of the UK (CAA) 
The UK CAA is one of the most stringent and influential aviation authorities in Europe. 
Like other European regulatory authorities, it is gradually being phased into the EASA. 
CAE Inc. 
CAE (www.cae.com) is the world's largest flight simulator manufacturer. Since its 
acquisition of Link Simulations in the 1980's, CAE has attained and maintained the 
leadership position in the flight simulation market, notably in the full flight simulators 
segment of it (CAE, 2005). The company has had a significant role in the evolution of both 
the product technology as well as the industry organization. In 2001, CAE acquired 
Schreiner Aviation Training and Simuflite Training International, two of the major flight 
training providers globally (Velocci, 2001(2); King, 2001). Along with a few independent 
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training centers and joint ventures, these acquisitions made CAE the second largest training 
provider in the world. The company has since then continued to invest in training centers 
and established joint ventures with local airline training centers. At the time of writing this 
thesis, the company was running a network of 27 training facilities in 4 continents (CAE, 
2007). 
Canadian Ministry of Transport (CMOT) 
The Canadian Ministry Of Transport is the aviation regulation authority in Canada. The 
CMOT training and simulation standards are very similar to their neighboring FAA. 
Diamond Aircraft 
Diamond aircraft (www.diamondair.com) is an emerging aircraft manufacturer based in 
Toronto, Canada. With roots in motorized gliders, Diamond has recently launched their jet 
aircraft targeting the small executive aircraft market. Modeled after Lufthansa, Diamond 
has launched its own training division operating as a distinct entity in Austria. 
European Commission on Aeronautics 
The European Commission's Aeronautics program (www.ec.europa.eu/transport/air portal) 
is the arm of the European Union that leads and coordinates research in air transport and 
aviation domains. 
Europrop 
Europrop International (www.europrop.aero) is an aircraft engine producer formed as a 
joint venture of 4 of the largest aircraft engine manufacturers: Rolls Royce in the UK, 
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Seneca in France, ITP in Spain and MTU Aero Engines in Germany. The company focuses 
primarily on military aircraft engines and Airbus is one of its key clients (Europrop, 2007). 
FAA (Federal Aviation Administration): 
The Federal Aviation Administration is the aviation authority of the USA and the leading 
aviation authority around the world. The strategic importance of the USA in the historical 
evolution of the aviation industry has given the FAA a leading role in defining many of the 
simulation and training standards. 
Farnborough Aircraft Corporation 
Farnborough aircraft (www.farnborough-aircraft.com) is a start-up supplier of light 
turboprop aircraft in the UK. Encouraged by the promising growth of air-taxi services, the 
company is currently working on the design of its Fl flagship, a single-engine 6 passenger 
light aircraft. Richard Noble, the founder and CEO of the company, has pursued innovative 
ways to raise funds for his new project including soliciting support online from aircraft 
enthusiasts and industry visionaries who share his hopes of a growing air taxi business. 
FlightSafety International 
Flight Safety International (www.flightsafety.com) is the largest provider of aviation 
training services in the world and one of the key producers of business jet and light aircraft 
simulators. Based in Florida, FSI has the largest network of flight simulators globally. The 
second-largest simulators network, operated by CAE, had approximately half the number of 
simulators of FSI at the time of writing this thesis (FSI, 2006; CAE, 2006). The training 
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arm of Flight Safety International operates more than 43 training centers worldwide 
running a fleet of over 230 flight simulators most of which replicate business aircraft. 
JAA (Joint Aviation Administration) 
The Joint Aviation Administration is an organization composed of the aviation authorities 
of the European Union. Based in the Netherlands, the JAA is closer to an industry forum 
that provides a link between the various European aviation authorities than a regulatory 
body. The JAA is gradually transforming into the EASA (European Aviation Safety 
Agency), which is a joint authority with an area of jurisdiction covering the member 
countries of the EU. 
Jane's Industry Intelligence 
Jane's (www.ianes.com) is an industry intelligence and publications company that is 
specialized in, among others, the aviation training industry. Jane's publishes several 
important magazines and publications of the industry containing the latest trends, analyses 
and databases of world airlines. 
L-3 Communications 
L-3 Communications (www.l-3com.com) is a diversified company offering a wide scope of 
technologies, from on-board communications equipment to military flight simulations. L-3 
has acquired the marine simulation division from CAE in 2003 to strengthen its capabilities 
in this domain (L-3, 2004). It is also a prime contractor for military programs especially in 
the US and Canada. 
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London Metropolitan University 
London Metropolitan University (www.londonmet.ac.uk) is an educational institution in 
London offering, amongst other things, pilot training courses and aviation management 
programs. The university's Center for Civil Aviation operates an ab-initio flight school 
while providing the students access to the university's other programs and departments. 
Lufthansa Flight Training 
Lufthansa Flight Training (www.lufthansafliqhttraininq.com) is an independent training 
provider wholly owned by Lufthansa Airlines. The company provides exclusive training to 
its parent airline but also third party training to many other airlines in Europe and North 
Africa. 
Mechtronix Systems 
Mechtronix Systems (www.mechtronix.com) is a Montreal-based privately-owned flight 
simulator company established by two engineering Master's students following the 
completion of their research about simulation. The company was a provider of lower-level 
flight training devices until 2004 when it announced its first full flight simulator. In 2006, 
Mechtronix surprised the industry with its sale of a Level B full flight simulator to 
Lufthansa Training GmbH for conducting recurrent training, a concept that it has been 
pitching to the industry for several years (Warwick, 2006; Potomac, 2006). 
Onera 
The French national aerospace research center, Onera (www.onera.fr). is a government 
agency responsible for conducting research in the aeronautics field on behalf of the 
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industry. Onera's funding comes primarily from aerospace companies in France and the 
rest of Europe while the government provides 40% of its annual budget (Onera, 2007). 
Oxford Aviation Training 
Oxford Aviation Training (www.oxfordaviation.net) is a UK-based school offering ab-initio 
training to student pilots. The school is regarded as a pioneer in the industry as it was one 
of the first to establish strong relationships with airlines in Europe for providing them with 
cohorts of new pilots. The airlines were given the chance to inspect the training, interview 
the students and supervise the training quality while the students were given better chances 
of employment following their costly training. 
Pratt & Whitney 
Pratt & Whitney (www.pwc.com / www.pw.utc.com) is the aircraft engines division of 
technologies mogul UTC (United Technologies Corporation). The company is one of the 
key aircraft engine suppliers and its products cover most market segments ranging from 
light to wide-body aircraft and spanning both commercial and military aircraft. 
Rockwell Collins 
Rockwell Collins (www.rockwellcollins.com) is a key avionics and instruments provider 
with a significant share of the world market. Based in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Rockwell 
Collins has been an increasingly important player in the aviation industry notably after it 
won the bid for supplying the entire avionics deck for Boeing's Dreamliner the B787, 
Airbus's A380 and China's ARJ (Advanced Regional Jet) (Rockwell Collins, 2007). In 
2003, Rockwell acquired NLX, a Canadian producer of flight simulators, hence expanding 
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its operations to the aviation simulation and training industry. Since then, it has also 
acquired the simulation business unit of Evans and Sutherland, a world leader in visual 
system technologies (RockwellCollins, 2006) thereby positioning itself as a key player in 
the future of the industry. 
Royal Aeronautical Society 
The Royal Aeronatical Society (www.raes.org.uk) is an important industry forum where 
industry leaders meet to discuss new trends, technological advances and industry concerns. 
Despite its lack of any judicial authority over its members, the RAeS is a powerful 
association with several subcommittees that collaboratively influence the industry and the 
regulators. Members of the RAeS are typically the executives of simulation producers, 
flight training providers, airlines and regulators. 
Southwest Airlines 
Southwest Airlines (www.southwest.com) is a key customer in the new aviation era. 
Founded in the late 70's with a revolutionary business model of point-to-point flights on 
popular routes, Southwest Airlines has demonstrated a remarkable capability to remain 
profitable throughout numerous industrial and economic downturns of the industry. 
Thales Training & Simulation 
TT&S (www.thales-tts.com) is the second major player in the FFS market and the 
dominant in certain European and Middle-Eastern markets. TT&S provides a products 
suite that is almost as comprehensive as that of CAE but controls a significantly smaller 
share of the market. 
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TUIfly 
TUIfly (www.tuifly.com) is a European low-cost airline that is owned by the shipping and 
logistics giant Hapag Lloyd to penetrate the booming European air travel industry. The 
airline has one of the most extensive networks operating 56 airplanes making it the third 
largest German carrier after Lufthansa and Air Berlin. The company has already expanded 
into international routes outside Europe and is eyeing an even wider expansion into other 
popular international destinations. 
A Sample of Industry Documents Consulted 
• Transcript of address made by Mr. Derek Burney (CEO of CAE 1997 to 2001) to 
shareholders 
• Flight Magazine inventory of Flight Simulators 
• Deloitte Aerospace and Defense Update, Quarterly 2006 - 2007 
• CAE Annual Reports 1964 - 2007 
• Thales Training & Simulation Annual Reports 1991-2007 
Industry Presentations Made 
• ASME MECE Conference, November 2004 
• Presentation to CAE Sales & Marketing team: June 2005 
• Royal Aeronautical Society Conference, November 2006 
• Presentation to Thales Training & Simulation Marketing & Strategy team: November 
2006 
APPENDIX B RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
* ECOLE 
POLYTECHNIQUE 
M O N T R E A L 
M I N E PROJECT 
MANAGING INNOVATION 
INTHE NEW ECONOMY 
Product Maturity and Architecture 
Evolution in Complex Industries 
Research 
Instrument 
Introduction & Definitions 
Thank you for taking the time for this research interview. I am studying the relationship 
between product architecture and technological maturity in the aviation training industry 
for my doctoral research and would like to ask you for your insights about certain aspects 
and recent changes in the industry. 
This study is a part of the MINE (Management of Innovation in the New Economy) research 
program which is studying innovation practices in approximately 20 industries worldwide. 
The aviation training industry is one of these industries studied. 
My main objectives of the research are to establish whether the industry has attained 
technological maturity or not and to investigate the consequences of attaining this stage 
on the product architecture. I want to validate a management theory that was developed 
in the context of another industry within the commercial aviation training industry. 
For the sake of the research, I have divided the aviation training industry into 3 sub-
industries: 
1. The Simulation Device industry: this is the industry that develops the individual 
training devices (whether FFSs, FTDs or other simulation devices) for pilot and 
maintenance training. 
2. The Training Products Suite industry: this is the industry that develops entire training 
product suites composed of the various training devices integrated around a training 
curriculum as well. 
3. The Training Services industry: this is the industry that provides training services to 
student pilots at the various phases of training (i.e. ab-initio, type-rating and 
recurrent training). 
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Established Since Market Share: 
Business Operations 
A/CC " me Sim " " FTD FFS Services 








NO, of yrs in Role Previous Positions" 
2 Aviation Training Industry - Interview Guide 
Technology Maturity 
Objective: What are th£ key drivers Of tecfttidfogicai advancement in the aviation training industry? 
verify the What would be the indicators that the suppliers have met the needs of the mainstream 
drivers of clients? 
How far are the equipment producers from meeting the technological requirements of the 
features indicated by the regulatory guidelines? Did they surpass them in any area? 
3 Aviation Training Industry - Interview Guide 
Emergence of Low-End segment of the market 
How has the number: of tow*bugget clierits:tn the:industry changed over trie past 10 years? 
Can you quantify the change?/:^ ::-; 
How has the number of low-end suppliers In the industry changed over the past 10 years? 
Can you quantify the change and name key ones? 
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Role of Regulators 
Objective: •What role do the regulators play minfueftcing/deterrriining the teetinolofj ica! features and 
verify the configuration of the aviation trairiing:simulation devices? Do they only approve industry-
regulators in 
determininq 




verify the Has this rote changed at all during the last 10 years? If yes, how? 
la of the 
"o/e of 
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Moyv involved are the industry's^ clients :(airlines, independent training providers, etc:) in the 
design and specifications of the aviation training products? 
Has this role changed at ati during the last 10 years? If yes, how? 
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Risk and Liabilities 
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Risk and Liabilities (cont'd) 
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Architecture Modularity 
Verlfv'the For ®ach of the three pr« j : ud iev#$/ is ; t f ie re ; ' 
















Oescrtoe the integration process of the following 3 product levels 
Training Product Training Suite Training Services 
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Architecture Modularity (cont'd) 
Objective: How has this process ctengetf over the past 5 years for each of these products? 
Training Product Training Suite Training Services 
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Architecture Modularity (cont'd) 
/the Traditionally;, what:were:the key $electli3n criteria for each of the 3 product levels? 
Training Product Training Suite Training Services 
Aviation Training Industry - Interview Guide 
Opening of the Product Architecture 
Objective: Architecture openness means that different suppliers can produce components of the product 
validate the without any direct contractual-relationships but based on published product standards. For 
opening of example, PC component makers can innovate separately as Jong as they adhere to standards 
the product such as the USB. Closed architectures, on the other hand, are ones where integration is 
architecture entirelydone by the systems integrator based on a proprietary design. In light of this 
(training explanation, does the flight simulation device have a closed or an open architecture? How (if 
device level) any) has this evolved Over the past 5 years? 
Does the training suite have ah open or a closed architecture? How (if any) has this: evolved 
over the past 5 years? 
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Doesthe trainingservice:havean QpenOr a closet! architecture? How (if any) has this 
evol ved over the past 5 years? : : :::
: :: : :Vv 
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